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Abstract 
This dissertation will observe the capabilities and experience of the Indian Army in 
the Second World War, by examining the 10th Indian Division’s campaign in Italy. The 
focus will be on three themes of the division’s deployment to Italy; its training, 
manpower and the experience of the Indian soldier. Whilst these themes are part of the 
wider historiography of the Indian Army; there has been no significant study of these 
topics in relation to Italy, which this work seeks to redress. Observing the division’s 
training and manpower will indicate its capabilities during the Second World War. How 
did the Indian Army maintain an expeditionary force far from its home base, given the 
structural weaknesses in its recruitment and organisation? Did the Indian Army’s focus 
on the war in Japan, and jungle warfare, have a detrimental effect on the training of 
troops deployed to Italy? The reforms that the Indian Army, made to its training and 
organisation were critical in overcoming the difficulties that arose from campaigning in 
Italy. Studying the experience of the Indian soldier through morale and censor reports 
will demonstrate their attitude towards military service, and how this shaped their 
attitudes on the post-war future of India. 
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CHAPTER 1: HISTORIOGRAPHY 
 
In recent years the study of the Indian Army in the Second World War has 
experienced a renewed interest from historians; however this has mostly concentrated 
upon the army’s role in the campaign in Burma. This is understandable, given that it was 
the primary commitment of the Indian Army, which required the greatest portion of its 
troops and equipment. As a consequence, very little research has covered the 
deployment of the Indian Army in Italy, something this dissertation seeks to redress, by 
following the activities of the 10th Indian Infantry Division.1 This chapter will examine, 
firstly, the existing literature on the Indian Army, and the 10th Indian Division’s, 
involvement in the Italian campaign. Secondly, it will show how this dissertation’s 
decision to study the training, reinforcement and the experience of the Indian soldiers in 
the Italian campaign, are valuable additions to the wider historiography of the Indian 
Army. 
The wider historiography of the Italian campaign has done little to further the 
study of the Indian soldiers who fought there. In books such as Edwin Hoyt’s Backwater 
War2 and Ian Gooderson’s A Hard Way to Make a War3 the focus is largely confined to 
strategic and operational aspects of the campaign, the debate focusing on whether the 
campaign was worth the blood and treasure it cost, given false assurances it was the 
‘soft-underbelly of Europe’. The only mention these works make of Indian troops is to 
note their presence in the theatre. The exceptions to these are the studies concerning 
                                                          
1
 Hereafter referred to as the 10
th
 Indian Division. 
2
 E. P. Hoyt, Backwater War: The Allied Campaign in Italy, 1943-1945 (Westport, 2002). 
3
 I. Gooderson, A Hard Way to Make a War: The Allied Campaign in Italy in the Second World War (London, 
2008). 
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the fight for Monte Cassino; the 4th Indian Division fought in the Second Battle of Monte 
Cassino and is discussed in the literature that exists on the subject.4  
Along with the US, British, New Zealand and Canadian Armed Forces the Indian 
military produced its own account of the Italian campaign in the Second World War, 
entitled The Campaign in Italy, 1943-45.5 However, this volume was not included in the 
eight volumes of the official history that were reprinted in 2012. The focus instead was 
on the campaigns in Africa, Asia and post war occupation duties in the Far East, which 
have seen greater interest from scholars. The volume of the official history, India and the 
War6, provides an overview of the entire Indian war effort, which was included in the 
reprint. Yet, its account of the Indian contribution in Italy fails to mention the role or 
presence of the 10th Indian Division in Italy.  
Two recent works on the Indian Army in the twentieth century, Kaushik Roy’s The 
Indian Army in the Two World Wars7 and Alan Jeffreys’ and Patrick Rose’s The Indian 
Army8, both contain studies of the Indian Army in the Second World War but none of 
them concerns the Indian Army in Italy. In 2011, Kaushik Roy commented that “no 
significant research has been done on the Indian Army’s deployment in Italy and Greece 
during World War II.”9 Charles Chenevix Trench covers the Indian campaign in Italy in The 
Indian Army and the King’s Enemies.10 Trench himself asserted that the book should not 
                                                          
4
 See M. Parker, Monte Cassino: The Story of the hardest-fought battle of World War Two (St Ives, 2004); P. 
Craddick-Adams, Monte Cassino: Ten Armies in Hell (London, 2012); D. Hapgood, Monte Cassino: The Story 
of the Most Controversial Battle of World War II (Cambridge, 2002). 
5
 D. Pal, The Campaign in Italy, 1943-45 (Delhi, 1960).  
6
 B. Prasad, India and the War (New Delhi, 2012). 
7
 K. Roy (editor), The Indian Army in the Two World Wars (Leiden, 2011). 
8 A. Jeffreys and P. Rose (editors), The Indian Army, 1939-47: Experience and Development (Farnham, 2012), 
9
 K. Roy, “Introduction: Warfare, Society and the Indian Army during the Two World Wars,” in K. Roy 
(editor), The Indian Army in the Two World Wars (Leiden, 2011), p. 3. 
10
 C. Chenevix Trench, The Indian Army and King’s Enemies, 1900 – 1947 (German Democratic Republic, 
1988). 
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be viewed as a history, but rather a record and celebration of the achievements of the 
Indian Army in the twentieth century.11   
The most significant published works upon the Indian Army in Italy are the official 
histories produced by the government. The Tiger Triumphs: the Story of three Great 
Divisions in Italy12 was the final account in the trilogy produced by the Government of 
India soon after the war that detailed the achievements of the Indian Army in Africa, the 
Middle East and the Mediterranean.13 Being a purely narrative account it mostly acts to 
celebrate the achievements of the Indian troops, without analysing their performance. It 
is primarily concerned with the story of the combat units14 with no mention of the role of 
the support units that were stationed in Italy. It does not go into the same detail of the 
official histories, as its production soon after the war’s end made it impossible to use the 
same level of research that is present in the official histories. 
The three Indian divisions that fought in Italy produced divisional histories to 
record their deeds during the war. The 10th Indian Divisional history, From Tehran to 
Trieste: The Story of the Tenth Indian Division15, offers a narrative account of its activities 
during the Second World War. No attempt is made to analyse its performance. Rather 
like the Tiger series it instead exists to celebrate the division’s achievements. Chris 
Kempton’s three volumes of ‘Loyalty and Honour’: The Indian Army September 1939 – 
                                                          
11
 Trench, The Indian Army and King’s Enemies, p. 7. 
12
 The Tiger Triumphs: the Story of three Great Divisions in Italy (HMSO, 1946). Accessed at: 
http://www.ourstory.info/library/4-ww2/Tiger/triumphsTC.html#TC 
13
 The other entries in the series were The Tiger Strikes: India’s fight in the Middle East (HMSO, 1942) and 
The Tiger Kills: The Story of the Indian Divisions in the North African Campaign (HMSO, 1944). 
14
 The 4
th
, 8
th
 and 10
th
 Indian Divisions along with the 43
rd
 Gurkha Lorried Brigade fought in Italy. 
15
 Tehran to Trieste: The Story of the 10
th
 Indian Division, p. 14, accessed here 
http://archive.org/stream/TeheranToTrieste-TheStoryOfThe10thIndianDivision#page/n0/mode/1up 
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August 194716 are an invaluable reference resource. They provide campaign histories for 
all the divisions and brigades in the Indian Army during the war, as well as detailed orders 
of battle for divisions, brigades and battalions.  
Other articles on the Indian Army include Gerald Douds and Richard Holmes’s 
contributions to a Time to Kill on Indian Soldiers in North Africa and Italy.17 Douds essay 
suffers from the fact that when writing in a text covering several different topics, he has 
had to recognise that many of his readers may be approaching the topic of the Indian 
Army for the first time.  As such, a portion of the text is devoted to matters such as the 
composition of the Indian Army, the role of the martial races, Churchill’s attitude towards 
the Indian Army and the subversive activities of Subhas Chandra Bose. Whilst for the 
general reader it is useful, the more knowledgeable reader is disappointed at the lack of 
work actually devoted to the Indian soldiers' experience in North Africa and Italy. 
Holmes’s work offers several insights into how the multinational force that made up the 
Allied forces in Italy treated the Indian soldiers and the colonial soldiers of other nations, 
namely France.  
With a lack of published works on the 10th Indian Division’s experience in Italy it is 
necessary to use unpublished works. The United Service Institution of India was founded 
in 1870 for the 'furtherance of interest and knowledge in the art, science and literature of 
the Defence Services.'18 For the officers of the Indian Army it served a similar purpose 
                                                          
16
 C. Kempton; ‘Loyalty and Honour’: The Indian Army September 1939 – August 1947: Part I – Divisions 
(Milton Keynes, 2003), ‘Loyalty and Honour’: The Indian Army September 1939 – August 1947: Part II – 
Brigades (Milton Keynes, 2003), ‘Loyalty and Honour’: The Indian Army September 1939 – August 1947: 
Part III (Milton Keynes, 2003). 
17
 G. Douds, “’Matters of Honour’: Indian Troops in the North African and Italian Theatres,” in P. Addison 
and A. Calder (editors), Time to Kill: The Soldier’s Experience of War in the West 1939-1945 (London, 1997), 
pp. 115-128 and R. Holmes, “The Italian Job: Five Armies in Italy, 1943-45,” in P. Addison and A. Calder 
(editors), Time to Kill: The Soldier’s Experience of War in the West 1939-1945 (London, 1997), pp. 206-221. 
18
 http://www.usiofindia.org/About/History/  
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that the Royal United Services Institute did for officers of the British Army. During the 
Second World War it published several articles by officers who were serving with the 
Indian Army in Italy. The article 'An IAC Recce Regiment in Italy'19 details the activities of 
the 6th D.C.O.20 Lancers who served in the 8th Indian Division. The article 'Poco Poco 
Italiano'21 was written by a 10th Indian Division staff officer about his experiences 
between VE day and the repatriation of the division to India. Articles which attempt to 
analyse aspects of the Italian campaign include 'Q (AE) at Work in North Africa and 
Italy'22, written prior to the 10th Indian Division’s deployment to Italy by a staff officer, 
which criticised the lack of Indian Army representation in the higher staff positions of the 
Allied command in the winter of 1943-4. Major General Jenkins wrote 'Some Lessons 
from the Italian Campaign'23, which was adapted from lectures he had given to Indian 
Army officers describing the tactical situation that confronted the Indian Army in Italy, 
and offered suggestions for training.  
This dissertation will examine the Indian Army’s contribution to the Italian 
campaign in the Second World War, through the experiences of the 10th Indian Division. 
The focus will be on three themes of the division’s deployment to Italy; these being, 
operations, reinforcement and the Indian soldier’s experience of the war in Italy. The 
topics of training and reinforcement are chosen because they feature in the wider 
historiography of the Indian Army. It is believed that by studying them in relation to Italy 
and the 10th Indian Division here, they can be a valuable addition to understanding the 
                                                          
19
 J. M. Howson, ‘An IAC Recce Regiment in Italy’, Journal of the United Service Institution of India, 75 
(1945). 
20
 Duke of Connaught’s Own. 
21
 H. B. Hudson ‘Poco Poco Italiano’, Journal of the United Service Institution of India, 76 (1946). 
22
 G. Barrington, ‘Q (AE) at Work in North Africa and Italy’, Journal of the United Service Institution of India, 
74 (1944). 
23
 F. A. M. B. Jenkins, ‘Some Lessons from the Italian Campaign’, Journal of the United Service Institution of 
India, 74 (1944). 
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capabilities of the Indian Army in the Second World War. The study of the Indian soldier’s 
experiences in Italy will be an addition to the study of the social history of the Indian 
Army, which has so far neglected those troops deployed in Europe during the Second 
World War. 
By focusing on one of the divisions that the Indian Army deployed to Italy, it is 
hoped to conduct a more in depth study than would be possible in a comparative study 
of all three divisions, given the constraints on space imposed on this dissertation. The 
10th Indian Division has been selected because it has been eclipsed in writings on the 
Italian campaign by the 4th and the 8th Indian Divisions. The 4th Indian Division has been 
the recipient of much study due to its impressive war record. It was the first Indian 
division deployed overseas and the last to return, sustaining approximately 25,000 
casualties. It was the subject of a detailed and extensive history by Lieutenant Colonel G. 
R. Stevens24, which is arguably unique for the Indian divisions of the Second World War. 
The fact that the 4th Indian Division was involved in the battles to capture Monte Cassino, 
and that the 8th Indian Division was the Indian division which served the longest in Italy, 
mean they have featured more heavily in the literature on the campaign.  
The chapter on the 10th Indian Division’s operations in Italy will study how their 
training was influenced by their past and future operations. This chapter will not seek to 
be an exhaustive account of the 10th Indian Division’s operations in Italy because this 
already exists in the literature detailed above. Nor will it attempt to ascertain the military 
effectiveness of the division and its commanders in Italy, for such an approach is not 
possible without comparison to the other Indian and Allied divisions that were employed 
in Italy. Instead it will seek to demonstrate the importance that the division, and thus the 
                                                          
24
 G. R. Stevens, The Fourth Indian Division (Uckfield, 2011). 
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wider Indian Army, placed on training. The subject of training in the Indian Army during 
the Second World War has been well documented by numerous scholars, although it is 
mostly related to the campaign in Burma. This dissertation will seek to redress that 
balance, whilst also questioning whether the Indian Army’s emphasis on the war in Japan 
proved detrimental to its effort in Italy. Tim Moreman in The Japanese and the British 
Commonwealth Armies at War25 and Daniel Marston in Phoenix from the Ashes26 have 
researched the training of the Allied forces for the war in Burma. Their works show how 
the initial defeats suffered by the Japanese were a result of the Indian Army’s rapid 
expansion which saw proper training shunned, as quantity was prioritised over quality. 
They argue that the eventual victory of the Indian Army in Burma was partly as a result of 
it recognising the importance of effective training for jungle warfare. Moreman has also 
studied how the Fourteenth Army developed tactical drills to defeat Japanese bunker 
defences, whose strength was threatening to become psychologically damaging to Allied 
soldiers.27  
The security of the North West Frontier was one of primary tasks for the Indian 
Army throughout its existence, and was the focus of Tim Moreman’s The Army in India 
and the Development of Frontier Warfare.28 It has recently been studied to see what role 
it had in the development of training and tactics for operations in the Second World 
War.29 Operations on the North West Frontier and in Italy were frequently in 
                                                          
25
 T. Moreman, The Japanese and the British Commonwealth Armies at War, 1941-1945: Fighting Methods, 
Doctrine and Training for Jungle Warfare (Routledge, 2002). 
26
 D. P. Marston, Phoenix from the Ashes: the Indian Army in the Burma Campaign (Westport, 2003). 
27
 T. Moreman, “’Debunking the Bunker’: From Donbaik to Razabil, January 1943 – March 1944,” in A. 
Jeffreys and P. Rose (ed.), The Indian Army, 1939-47: Experience and Development (Ashgate, 2012), pp. 
109-134. 
28
 T. Moreman, The Army in India and the Development of Frontier Warfare, 1839-1947 (London, 1998). 
29
 See P. Rose, “Indian Army command culture and the North-West Frontier, 1919-1939,” in A. Jeffreys and 
P. Rose (ed.), The Indian Army, 1939-47: Experience and Development (Ashgate, 2012), pp. 31-55 and T. 
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mountainous terrain, with one soldier who fought in Italy commenting “I can say now 
that the lessons of the North West Frontier Province apply 100% to the campaign in 
Italy.”30 
Alan Jeffreys, who is in the process of completing a book on the training of the 
Indian Army31, has published a number of articles on the Indian Army’s training in the 
Second World War. He has studied the effect that Lieutenant General Francis Tuker had 
upon the training of officers in the Indian Army, showing how training was affected by 
Indianization in the Second World War.32 He has researched the publication of training 
manuals by the Indian Army in the Second World War, showing how the success of its 
training programme originated from the efforts of mid-level officers in the 1930s, who 
went on to command divisions and corps in the Second World War.33 In these pieces 
Jeffreys does not dwell solely on the training of the Fourteenth Army in Burma, but also 
discusses the training of the divisions in Italy, observing that they had to be prepared to 
conduct a variety of operations, such as mountainous, urban and river crossings. Whilst 
the focus is on the training methods adopted by the 4th Indian Division, it is noted that 
training directives and instructions were used by all Indian formations and units in Italy.34 
Daniel P. Marston and Chandar S. Sundaram co-edited a volume on the military history of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Moreman, ‘”The Greatest Training Ground in the World”: The Army in India and the North-West Frontier, 
1901-1947’, in D. P. Marston and C. S. Sundaram (ed.) A Military History of India and South Asia: From the 
East India Company to the Nuclear Era (Westport, 2007), pp. 53-73. 
30
 Jenkins, ‘Some Lessons from the Italian Campaign’, p. 16. 
31
 A. Jeffreys, Training the Indian Army (Farnham: Ashgate, forthcoming). 
32
 A. Jeffreys, ‘The Officer Corps and the training of the Indian Army with special reference to Lieutenant 
General Francis Tuker’, in K. Roy (ed.), The Indian Army in the Two World Wars (Leiden, 2011), pp 285-309. 
33
 A. Jeffreys, “Training the Indian Army, 1939-1945,” in A. Jeffreys and P. Rose (ed.), The Indian Army, 
1939-47: Experience and Development (Ashgate, 2012), pp. 69-86. 
34
 A. Jackson, ‘New Research on the British Empire and the Second World War: Part II’, in Global War 
Studies, 7 (2010), pp. 174-179.  
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India and South Asia.35 Marston contributed a chapter on the evolution of the Indian 
Army in the Second World War which examines, albeit briefly, the role of the Indian 
divisions in Italy. In this study he notes that no study has been made that compares the 
performance of the Indian divisions in Italy with one another, nor with the other Allied 
forces in Italy.36 However, Marston does take the time to dwell upon the training 
methods adopted by the Indian Army in Italy, including the divisional and brigade 
commanders of the 10th Indian Division.37  
In this chapter we will also chronicle the activities of the military forces of the 
Indian Princely States, the Indian States Force (ISF), who were deployed to Italy. Two ISF 
units fought with the 10th Indian Division in Italy, the Nabha Akal and Jodhpur Sardar 
infantry battalions. The contribution of the ISF to the Indian Army has been noted in 
passing, but very little work has been done to study in any great depth their wartime 
experiences. By August 1941 17 ISF units were deployed overseas.38 By the end of the 
Second World War the ISF had contributed 50-60,000 troops to the war effort.39 The 
subjects of the states themselves, who were not British subjects but 'British Protected 
Persons', also joined the Indian Army in their thousands. The states placed their 
economies on a war footing and many of the rulers such as the Nizam of Hyderabad, and 
                                                          
35
 D. P. Marston and C. S. Sundaram (ed.) A Military History of India and South Asia: From the East India 
Company to the Nuclear Era (Westport, 2007). 
36
 D. P. Marston, “A Force Transformed: The Indian Army and the Second World War”, in D. P. Marston and 
C. S. Sundaram (ed.) A Military History of India and South Asia: From the East India Company to the Nuclear 
Era (Westport, 2007), p. 216 (footnote 51). 
37
 Marston, ‘A Force Transformed’, pp. 102-122. 
38
 CAB 66/21/34 - Memorandum on India's War Effort by Leo Amery, 30 January 1942, p. 2. 
39
 B. Farwell, Armies of the Raj: From the Great Indian Mutiny to Independence 1858-1947 (London, 1990), 
p. 233. 
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the Maharajas of Travancore, Baroda and Mysore donated warships and planes to the 
British.40 
However, prior to and during the Second World War there were doubts about the 
effectiveness and ability of the ISF troops, despite efforts to improve them. According to 
Major General Sir Arthur M. Mills, some quarters of the Indian Army were unaware of 
the existence of the ISF.41 His article on the 'Indian States Forces'42 published in 1938 is as 
an attempt to raise awareness of the ISF within the Indian Army, and points to the 
improvements that were being made. One of the major issues his article sought to 
address was the apparent negative perception of the ISF held by the Indian Army, 
concerning its abilities and professionalism. We will rely on the training notes and 
instructions published by the 10th Indian Division, its brigades and battalions, which are 
contained in their respective war diaries held at the National Archives. 
The chapter on manpower concerns one of the biggest problems that confronted 
the Indian Army in the Second World War: how it maintained an expeditionary force 
thousands of miles from its home base. Gordon Corrigan’s Sepoys in the Trenches43 
showed that during the First World War the Indian Army suffered horrendous casualties 
when deployed to France during 1914-1915, which they were unable to replace with 
fresh reinforcements, which eventually saw the force withdrawn from France. In the 
fighting in Burma in 1942 the Indian forces stationed there suffered from a lack of trained 
soldiers and reinforcements, because of the rapid expansion of the army in the early 
years of the war. By studying the Indian Army’s attempts to maintain the 10th Indian 
                                                          
40
 W. Barton, 'The Indian Princes and Politics', Pacific Affairs, 17 (1944), pp. 189. 
41
 A. M. Mills, 'Indian States Forces', Journal of the United Service Institution of India, 68 (1938), p. 302. 
42
 Ibid., pp. 302-10. 
43
 G. Corrigan, Sepoys in the Trenches: The Indian Corps on the Western Front 1914-15 (Brimscombe Port 
Stroud, 2006). 
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Division in Italy during the Second World War it is hoped to demonstrate the extent to 
which it had adapted to the demands imposed upon it from twentieth century warfare.      
To understand how the Indian Army was able to reinforce the 10th Indian Division 
in Italy, we need to study the system of camps, naval convoys and clerks that ensured 
units were kept operationally viable. The 10th Indian Division, and the other Indian 
divisions in Italy, had been overseas for many years by 1944, and it will be important to 
see how the Indian Army managed those units which had been committed to operations 
for long periods. In addition we will see what preventative measures the 10th Indian 
Division took to reduce casualties from sickness and accidents, and thus the need for 
reinforcements. John Ellis observed that in the Second World War, the vast majority of 
casualties suffered by a unit were usually from non-battle causes such as disease or 
accidents.44 This loss of manpower still required replacement and placed an additional 
burden on manpower requirements. The British Army’s casualties for the three years it 
fought in Italy (see Appendix 1) show casualties from illness were far greater than those 
from battle, and this is true across all the theatres of operation where the British Army 
served in the Second World War.  
The best evidence to gauge the success of the Indian Army’s reinforcement 
system will be to analyse the strength of the infantry battalions which fought in Italy with 
the 10th Indian Division. These units, unlike the support units, had to contend with 
casualties from battle, in addition to sickness and accidents, and so would have needed 
more reinforcements. We can obtain the information on the strength returns of the 
British and Indian battalions in the division from the field returns and daily situation 
reports they completed, which are held in their war diaries at the National Archives. 
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Unfortunately, because not all the war diaries have the complete collection of strength 
returns, it will not be possible to adopt a standard methodology for all the units. Indeed 
sufficient records are not available for the 2/4th Gurkhas, and so it has not been included. 
Instead we will show a unit’s strength approximately every two weeks in order to 
demonstrate the strength that the units were able to maintain throughout 1944 and 
1945.  
Our final theme will be the Indian soldiers’ experience of the war in Italy, which 
has suffered from a severe lack of academic study, despite it offering a rare opportunity 
to tell the history of the Indian Army from a bottom-up, rather than top-down 
perspective. One of the faults of military history is that the focus has often been on the 
generals and commanders of armies, rather than the experiences of the vast numbers of 
men who made up those armies, although this is beginning to change. David Omissi’s 
Indian Voices of the Great War45 used soldiers’ letters to share the Indian soldiers’ 
experiences of war on the Western Front in the First World War. Kaushik Roy has used 
morale reports and disciplinary records to investigate the experience of Indian, British 
and African soldiers fighting in South East Asia.46 The experience of British soldiers has 
been studied in J. A. Crang’s ‘The British Soldier on the Home Front’, which used morale 
reports to show the numerous positive and negative factors, that affected it.47 Whilst the 
experiences of soldiers from the other Allied contingents deployed to Italy have been 
recorded, most notably in Field Marshal Carver’s The Imperial War Museum Book of the 
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War in Italy48, both Carver’s book and the wider literature have failed to study the 
experiences of the Indian soldier in Italy.   
The sources that this dissertation will rely on to study the experiences of the 
Indian soldier are two forms of censorship reports. The first are those reports conducted 
by the censor sections of the Indian Army on the 10th Indian Division during its time in 
Italy. The second are the appreciation and censorship reports compiled on all the 
national contingents who fought under British command in Italy. Records of the 
testimony of Indian soldiers’ wartime experiences are hard to find, and for scholars 
unfamiliar with Indian languages harder to use. Indian soldiers often corresponded with 
their families in their local dialect, so the censors had to be fluent in several languages. 
Thankfully, these reports were produced in English, which makes the testimony of Indian 
soldiers accessible to historians who are not fluent in all the different languages spoken 
by them. 
The Indian Army’s censorship reports on the 10th Indian Division do not cover its 
entire deployment to Italy, with no reports from March to November 1944. This is 
because of a shortage of censor sections to cover the Indian forces stationed in Italy, and 
later Greece, a shortage which was still present in January 1945.49 As such the reports by 
8 Indian Field Censor Section cover the 10th Indian Division and support units from 16 
December 1944 to 30 September 1945.50 They follow a common format, by which the 
censors monitored topics over a number of weeks or months on matters they deemed 
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important. These topics, to name a few, included evaluations of the soldiers’ morale and 
their opinions on pay, promotion, leave and political events in India. 
However, the appreciation and censorship reports that were produced by the 
British Army in the Mediterranean theatre include coverage of the Indian troops, for as 
long as they were deployed in Italy.51 These reports were conducted in all theatres where 
British troops fought in the Second World War, and those on the home front were used 
in Crang’s work, mentioned above. In the Mediterranean these were produced from 
1942 to the war’s end and featured every national contingent that fought under British 
command, including British, Canadian, South African, New Zealand, Palestinian, Italian 
and Indian forces. Each individual report covered a two week period, and used a common 
structure in its report of each nation’s troops. The reports on the Indian troops are not 
divided by division, but deal with the entire Indian contingent in Italy and Greece. As such 
it may not always be possible to draw upon evidence provided by troops solely from 10th 
Indian Division.  
One of the drawbacks to these reports is that they are not the ‘raw’ data, so we 
do not get the full letters but rather extracts which are used as examples of the thoughts 
of the Indian troops. However, there is no reason to doubt their worthiness as accounts 
of the Indian soldiers in Italy. These reports were produced to monitor the morale and 
opinions of the Indian soldiers, to catch the early signs of dissent or mutinous thought 
whilst ensuring that letters did not breach operational security. As such, it was within the 
report’s authors own interests to ensure they were truthful and honest, so that they 
could ensure the troops were still willing to fight. We also know that the authorities did 
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act upon the conclusions they drew from their analysis of the soldiers’ correspondence. 
When one soldier wrote of alleged mismanagement at 16th Indian Reinforcement Camp, 
the censors subjected the mail of the camp to special review to see if there were any 
further complaints.52 In February 1945, the Indian Postal Directorate requested that all 
extracts in censorship reports that related to the loss or failed delivery of a soldier’s mail 
or parcel, be relayed to them to help their efforts to solve the problem.53  
It is hoped that by studying the training, manpower and the Indian soldier’s 
experience of the 10th Indian Division in the Italian campaign light can be shed on a 
period that has been neglected in the wider research on the Indian Army. By observing 
the 10th Indian Division’s training and manpower in Italy, new light can be shed on the 
development of the capabilities and organisation of the Indian Army in the Second World 
War. Yet, to study the Indian Army as a bureaucratic institution is to ignore the fact that 
it was formed of people, who were experiencing one of the most life-changing events of 
a person’s life – fighting in a war. This dual approach hopes to offer the reader a fuller 
and more nuanced view of the story of the 10th Indian Division in Italy.  
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND 
Before we assess the 10th Indian Division in Italy during the Second World War, it 
will be necessary to explore the origins and background to the organisation of manpower 
in the Indian Army. Firstly, the Indian Army self-imposed restrictions on those soldiers it 
could recruit, defining the Indian peoples as belonging to a martial or non-martial race 
and also denied Indians the chance to become King’s Commissioned Officers. Secondly, 
the Indian Army and the 10th Indian Division were formed from three different sources, 
the Indian Army, the British Army and the forces of the Indian Princely States. These two 
factors had a huge impact on the ability of the Indian Army to not only expand, but also 
maintain its units whilst at war. Lastly, we will chronicle the developments in training and 
expansion of the Indian Army that arose from the First Arakan campaign in 1942-43, and 
which would impact on the 10th Indian Division during its campaign in Italy. 
Allocation of manpower 
The armed forces of the Second World War were not composed of a single 
element; whilst all soldiers were taught to fire a rifle not all served as infantrymen. 
During the Second World War the growth of the armies of the time was attributed to the 
need for men to man the support units that enabled the combat units to function.1 Many 
works on the growth of the armies of the period, such as those by David French2, Martin 
van Creveld3 and John Ellis4, have explored the ways in which manpower was allocated.  
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In the British Army the most able and intelligent, of those who had not already 
been by the Royal Navy or RAF, were generally sent into the engineers or signals with the 
less able posted to the infantry. As Major General J.E. Utterson-Kelso described the 
situation, the infantry were regarded as “the legitimate dumping ground for the lowest 
forms of military life.”5 The German Army selected recruits based on their physical ability, 
psychological state, education, civilian profession and their preferred services. Upon 
reaching their service arm, their unit commander would elect to train them in a role that 
suited the needs of the unit and the recruit. However the German Army also had quotas 
so all arms got an equal proportion of the best recruits.6 
The US Army did many of the same tests as its contemporaries, such as evaluating 
physical ability and matching civil occupation and skills with corresponding military 
roles.7 However it was also heavily based on the Army General Classification Test which 
graded recruits on a system from I-V, with I being the highest and V the lowest. The result 
was that the lowest scoring recruits ended up being sent into the combat arms in higher 
proportions than the highest scoring recruits, who were disproportionally represented in 
support units.8 
The Indian Army had organised its personnel differently to its contemporaries, 
partly because its primary role was as the guarantor of British imperial control in India, 
rather than to combat an external threat. The Peel Commission of 1858-9 had been 
tasked with rebuilding the British military presence in India after the Mutiny. After ruling 
out the idea of replacing the Indian Army with an all European force, it looked at how the 
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Bengal Army could be reorganised to prevent another mutiny occurring.9 Their solution 
was to impose a system of ‘divide and rule’ upon the Indian Army.10 They did not want to 
rely upon a specific caste to provide the troops for its army as it had done prior to the 
Mutiny. One of the major causes of the Mutiny was the monopolisation of the Bengal 
Army by high-caste Brahmins and Rajputs, who had rebelled when they became 
dissatisfied with their British employers.11 The British did not believe that they could 
command soldiers to repress a mutiny when the mutineers were of the same caste. 
However, the British believed an army formed of different castes meant that these 
loyalties would never be tested, as it would be possible to pit one caste against another. 
One British general observed “it was not because they loved us, but because they hated 
Hindustan that the Sikhs have flocked to our standards. They were not attracted by mere 
daily pay. It was rather the prospect of wholesale plunder and of stamping on the heads 
of their enemies.”12 To this end units, in particular Sikh, raised in the Punjab for service 
during the Mutiny were integrated into the Bengal Army with remaining loyalist units. 
The Peel Commission aimed to build an army for internal security duties, where 
loyalty came before fighting ability. This is expressed most succinctly by the 1879 Eden 
Commission on the Indian Army's Organisation, which stated, “as we cannot do without a 
large Native army in India, our main object is to make that army safe.”13  However, in the 
latter half of the nineteenth century the Indian Army was presented with a new role to 
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contend with. The 'Great Game', a possible Russian invasion of India through Afghanistan 
and the North West Frontier, saw the possibility of the Indian Army having to fight a 
European army in conventional warfare. Yet the poor performance of the Indian Army in 
the Second Afghan War (1878-1880) and the Third Burma War (1885-1889) made the 
commanders of the Indian Army question whether the Indian Army could effectively 
oppose a conventional European army. Lord Roberts of Kandahar, Commander in Chief of 
the Indian Army 1885-1893, believed that “the near approach of a great European power 
compels us to have [an] army composed of very different material from that which was 
sufficient when we had no external enemy to deal with.”14 His solution was that the 
Indian Army “must have the best fighting material the country can supply, and can afford 
no place in the native Army to a soldier whose only raison d’être is that he acts as a check 
upon another soldier.”15 
Roberts believed that the best fighting material was found in the 'martial races' of 
India. The concept of martial races was formulated by the British, exaggerating pre-
existing Indian notions of martial ability of certain castes through the ideas of racial social 
Darwinism.16 It broadly defined that the northern peoples of India, in particular from the 
Punjab, North West Frontier and Nepal, were more warlike than those in the South. They 
believed that these races, such as the Punjabi Mussalman, Sikh and Gurkha, were of 
'proven' loyalty to the British as had been demonstrated by their efforts during the 
Mutiny.17 Alleged evidence of the 'martial races' superiority was found in the poor 
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performance of the Madras Army, which was composed from southern, non-martial 
classes, during the Third Burma War. 
However, the reality was that of the three presidency armies only the Bengal 
Army saw much active service because it was based on the North West Frontier. The re-
constituted Bengal Army possessed a large number of soldiers from the Punjab, who had 
earned the admiration of many British officers for their service during the Mutiny. As the 
Bengal Army became the only place for officers to stand much chance of seeing active 
service, the other two presidency armies declined in ability and stature. The Madras and 
Bombay Armies began to contain large numbers of less capable, older and unfit officers, 
whilst their sepoys also began to be on average older due to the lack of active service. 
Roberts, as Commander in Chief of the Madras Army from 1881-1885, recalled on 
inspecting it that: 
I tried hard to discover in them those fighting qualities which had distinguished 
their forefathers during the wars of the last and the beginning of the present century. But 
long years of peace, and security and prosperity attending to it, had evidently had upon 
them, as they always seem to have on Asiatics, a softening and deteriorating effect; and I 
was forced to the conclusion that the ancient military spirit had died in them, as it had 
died in the ordinary Hindustani of Bengal and the Mahratta of Bombay, and that they 
could no longer with safety be pitted against warlike races, or employed outside the 
limits of southern India.18 
Consequently, Roberts began to replace his southern Indian infantry battalions 
with those from the 'martial races' from the Punjab.19 He said “I have no hesitation 
myself in stating that except Gurkhas, Dogras, Sikhs, the pick of the Punjabi 
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Muhammadans, Hindustanis of the Jat and Ranghur castes, and certain classes of 
Pathans, there are no native soldiers in our service whom we could venture with safety 
to place in the field against the Russians.”20 The Parliamentary Commission of 1879, 
which called for the abolition of the individual presidency armies in favour of a single 
Indian Army, was the opportunity for supporters of the 'martial races' theory to press for 
their inclusion into the new unified army at the expense of the southern Indian units.21 
Although some southern Indian castes continued to be recruited (notably the Madras 
Sappers and Miners) the majority of recruits began to be found amongst the martial 
races (see Appendix 3). 
The Indian Army drew recruits in 1914 from twenty-four recognised martial 
races.22 At the start of the First World War three-quarters of the Indian Army was drawn 
from the Punjab, Nepal and North West Frontier.23 The decision to recruit from the 
martial races had an impact on the organisation of the army. Combat units were 
organised into ‘one class’ or ‘company class.’ The ‘one class’ units were those formed 
entirely from one caste such as the Gurkhas, Sikhs and Garhwali. ‘Company class’ units 
saw a battalion's companies, each composed of a different caste or social group. The 
support units adopted the ‘mixed class’ system where soldiers were from all different 
castes.24 However, the 1892 Afghan War had seen the recruitment system nearly break 
down, and the 1912 Nicholson Army Commission noted that recruitment could not be 
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met from a limited section of the population in a future conflict.25 Yet these warnings 
were ignored, and then cruelly exposed, when the Indian Army was sent to fight on the 
Western Front during the First World War. 
The Indian Army experienced the same problems that the British Army suffered in 
the early stages of the war, as two forces designed for imperial policing were required to 
participate in a conventional war on a scale previously unseen.26 However, the British 
Army was able to suffer the initial casualties on the Western Front because of the 
reservists of the Territorial Force, who numbered 268,777.27 In contrast, the Indian Army 
numbered 241,934 in 1914, which included 34,767 trained reservists and 45,660 non-
combatants.28 The decision to form units based upon caste meant that, to maintain 
morale and combat ability, reinforcements had to be of the same caste. The inability of 
the Indian Army to replace the casualties it suffered on the Western Front led to its 
withdrawal from France in 1915. The organisation of the Indian Army, based on the 
recruitment of only the martial races and units organised on caste lines, caused problems 
throughout the First World War. 
The British Army unlike the Indian Army was not limited to recruiting from a 
particular section of the population. This led to the martial races theory having a serious 
negative impact on recruitment, as despite high demand for troops many potential 
recruits were dismissed because they did not belong to a martial race.29 As the war 
progressed, the Indian Army grew to meet growing commitments in Africa, Mesopotamia 
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and the Middle East. By 1918 the army grew to 573,000 strong, but the martial races 
could not hope to supply this alone.30 In 1917, 63,000 Punjabi Mussalmans had been 
recruited from a population of 145,000 who were liable for service, and 43,500 Sikhs out 
of a total of 112,000.31 To meet the manpower requirements demanded by the 
expanding Indian Army, recruitment of the non-martial races began. The Indian Army 
recruited seventy-five ‘new’ martial classes during the First World War, which included 
Dogra Jats, Mahtam Sikhs, Punjabi Brahmins, Punjabi Hindus, Punjabi Christians, South 
Punjabi Muslims, West Punjabi Muslims, Oudh Rajputs, Mahars, Telugus, Bhils, Bengalis, 
and Moplahs.32 These alleged non-martial classes proved as capable as the martial 
classes. In his 1919 novel The Sepoy, Edmund Chandler wrote, 
The war has proved that all men are brave, that the humblest follower is capable 
of sacrifice and devotion; that the Afridi, who is outwardly the nearest thing to an 
impersonation of Mars, yields nothing in courage to the Madrasi Christian...These 
revelations have meant a general levelling and the uplift of classes hitherto undeservedly 
obscure.33 
With the end of the war, the 1920 Esher Committee reduced the Indian Army in 
size due to government spending cuts. It was reduced from its 1918 strength of 573,000 
to 120,000 by 1923; however the cuts had fallen disproportionately on those units of the 
non-martial races which had been raised during the First World War.34 Throughout the 
inter-war years the Indian Army reverted to recruiting from the pre-war martial races, 
although there were some pre-war non-martial classes who were re-designated as 
martial races. One of the reasons for this was that the martial races had managed to 
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obtain a degree of political power during their years of service in the Indian Army. They 
were unwilling to lose what were an important source of jobs for their communities, and 
worked to ensure it never happened. Yet it cannot be ignored that the belief in the 
martial races was incredibly strong in the officer corps of the Indian Army. The Journal of 
the United Service Institution of India's 1934 Gold Medal Prize Competition called for 
essays on the hypothesis that “it is often said that Indians are by nature divided into what 
might be called martial and non-martial races. This is a mere myth...”35 Major General E. 
C. Alexander had argued in his essay that the martial and non-martial races were not 
myth but fact, writing that “experiences of the last two centuries generally confirm the 
deduction drawn from the general history of the previous twenty, that where Northerner 
and Southerner compete on no more than equal terms, the Northerner wins.”36 It 
continued well into the war with Leo Amery, the Secretary of State for India, commenting 
in 1942 that in India “...there is a vast reservoir of man-power; but the difficulties of 
utilising it, apart from those connected with equipment and training, are the 
complications which arise from differences of race (which carry with them considerable 
differences in military qualities)...”37 
The Indian Army expanded to aid the Allied war effort, from a force of 194,373 in 
1939 to 2,049,086 in 1945, the largest volunteer army ever known.38  It achieved this in 
spite of a range of problems. It was not expected that the Indian Army would have to 
make such a large contribution to the Allied war effort. In September 1939 the War 
Cabinet's Land Forces Committee predicted that hostilities would last only three years 
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requiring a force of fifty-five divisions, to be provided by Britain, her Empire and Allied 
nations. Britain would provide thirty-two of these divisions, with fourteen from the 
dominions, a further five from Allied nations whilst the Indian contribution was to have 
been limited to four divisions.39 This estimation was arrived at before the Allied failures in 
the opening stages of the war, when the possibility of large numbers of French troops 
aiding the British on the continent disappeared with the Fall of France in 1940. It is not 
clear whether this decision was taken because of the doubts by the British government 
on the effectiveness of the Indian Army or because of the fact that, unlike the forces of 
the dominions, the British government was liable to pay for the deployment of any Indian 
forces overseas. The lack of inter war funding of the Indian Army meant it had only begun 
mechanisation of its cavalry and transport arms in 1938, and so was short of quality 
equipment by the beginning of the war. Also, this modernisation effort was only being 
conducted because the Indian Army was at the time planning to reduce its forces due to 
budgetary constraints.   
From September 1939 to April 1940 only 50,000 troops were added to the Indian 
Army, most of which came from the incorporation of the Indian territorial forces. 
However, between May 1940 and September 1941 approximately 550,000 Indians were 
recruited. From October 1941 recruitment averaged 50,000 per month, including 9,000 
per month for the fledgling technical services of the Indian Army.40 The strength of the 
Army in India (including British and ISF units) by October 1941 had increased to 820,000 
from its strength of 237,500 at the beginning of the war. This rise can be largely 
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attributed to the expansion of the Indian Army.41 However, in order to meet the huge 
demands of manpower that the Indian Army required during the Second World War, it 
had been necessary to expand recruitment into the non-martial races. This, in terms of 
obtaining potential recruits, was very successful. Amery stated that “the response from 
practically all communities is highly encouraging and voluntary offers of service are much 
greater than can possibly be accepted.”42 By October 1942 he commented that 
“recruiting from the “Martial classes” recruited in the pre-war Indian Army is now 
gradually drying up, and the monthly intake of these classes is only just sufficient to 
maintain existing units. All further expansion has now to be carried out with Madrassis 
(Southern Indian classes), who were only recruited to a very small extent before the 
war.”43   
Yet the fact remained that India was a land of different castes, languages, 
customs and religions and this made creating a modern army a difficult proposition.44 
Despite opening up recruitment to those classes previously denied it, the Indian Army 
still continued to organise units according to caste and social group, continuing with the 
‘one class’ and ‘company class’ battalions in the combat arms. This meant that the NCOs 
and VCOs of units had to be the same as the men they commanded. Yet for those units 
composed of the non-martial races there was not a pre-existing supply of trained NCOs 
and VCOs. Trials in using NCOs and VCOs from the martial races in these newly raised 
formations of non-martial troops were a failure, which according to Amery “might have 
been expected seeing that there is as much difference between the Northern Indian and 
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Madrassi both in language and customs as between, say, a Norwegian and a Greek.”45 
Schools were immediately opened to allow instruction of entry level NCOs and VCOs, but 
these were not expected to be ready for active service before the summer of 1943.46 
One of the methods used in the expansion of the army was 'milking'. 'Milking' 
involved taking a cadre of experienced soldiers and officers from one or more units and 
using these as the nucleus of a new unit raised with new recruits. The vacancies in their 
old units were filled by recruits, the idea being that these veterans would provide training 
and experience to the new recruits. However, in the rush to expand the Indian Army as 
quickly as possible the 'milking' process was accelerated. Within eighteen months the 
number of infantry battalions had doubled via 'milking'.47 The extent to which 'milking' 
was used left units which possessed 100% of their troops having seen combat, reduced to 
40%, which was believed to be dangerous.48  
The expansion of the Indian Army reflected lessons learnt in the First World War. 
Recruitment of the non-martial races was implemented immediately, showing an 
understanding that the martial races could not meet the demands of expansion alone. 
The process of 'milking' had been used in the First World War to increase the number of 
infantry battalions in the army, with the army doubling in size between 1917 and 1918. 
As would be the case in the Second World War concerns were raised about the quality of 
this expanded force. However, the Indian Army was given time to train and supply its 
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troops before committing it to battle against a fatigued opponent, a luxury not afforded 
to it in the Second World War.49  
The entry of Japan into the war proved the dangers of the 'milking' process. The 
majority of trained troops had already been deployed overseas to North Africa and the 
Middle East, leaving half trained and poorly equipped formations to confront the 
Japanese. By December 1941, half of the 600,000 strong Army of India were still in recruit 
training, 150,000 soldiers were stationed on the North-West Frontier and tasked with 
internal security duties, leaving just six divisions in India to face the Japanese, three of 
which were in the process of training and equipping and were without support arms.50 
The performance of the troops against the Japanese was criticised with the blame 
attributed to 'milking'. What the Indian Army needed was time, to allow reinforcement, 
training and new equipment to be acquired. 
The Officers of the Indian Army 
We have seen how the Indian Army expanded the rank and file of its forces in the 
Second World War, and it is now time to look at how it expanded its officer corps. Initially 
British officers had exercised command over the sepoys of the Indian Army, yet Indian 
demands for greater involvement in the governance of their country and the demands of 
twentieth century warfare eventually led to Indians being commissioned. The reasons for 
the presence of the British officer in an Indian unit are found in the early days of British 
involvement in India. The French had proved that Indian soldiers trained and equipped in 
the European style of warfare could defeat a native Indian army which, though 
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numerically larger, was undisciplined.51 The European officers were the natural choice to 
instruct Indian soldiers in these tactics and weapons as they possessed first-hand 
knowledge of European warfare and were of proven loyalty to their paymasters, whether 
that be to the East India Company or the British Government. 
The British officer held the King’s Commission in the Indian Army and could rise to 
field rank. For Indians the King’s Commission was not open to them, but they could 
become NCOs or VCOs. The Indian NCO served a similar function to that in the British 
Army, whilst the VCO was something unique to the Indian Army. A VCO was a veteran 
and distinguished soldier who operated as a tactical commander and cultural adviser to 
the British officer on Indian troops (see Appendix 2). He fulfilled many of the functions of 
a lieutenant or captain in the British Army by commanding platoons or troops and this 
allowed the British officer to experience a higher level of command far sooner than if he 
was in the British Army.52 
The events of the Indian Mutiny in 1857 were important in the development of 
the British officer in Indian service. The first point to note is that one of the reasons for 
the failure of the mutineers was that after they killed their British officers, many of the 
Indian leaders then lacked the tactical knowledge, which had previously been supplied by 
their British officers, to conduct operations. There were numerous occasions of 
outnumbered British and loyalist Indian units defeating larger mutineer forces due to 
their greater tactical ability.53 However, the most important lesson was that the 
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breakdown in the relationship between British officers and their Indian troops had been 
one of the main causes of the Mutiny. In planning for the future the army looked to those 
examples set by the loyalist Indian units, where officers had cultivated trust and honour 
between themselves and their soldiers. They had been repaid through valiant and loyal 
service. The importance of this relationship between an officer and his sepoys would 
become one of the Indian Army’s greatest strengths, yet ultimately a weakness in the 
world wars that were to come.54 
This emphasis, in the Indian Army, of the relationship between the Indian soldier 
and his British officer was to unravel in the First World War, in particular on the Western 
Front. As has already been noted the Indian divisions who were sent to France in 1914 
suffered horrendous casualties, and the British officers shared in this suffering. In their 
first contacts, the 57th Rifles and 129th Baluchis lost half their British officers which at full 
strength were only twelve per battalion.55 However, unlike other national armies the 
Indian Army could not easily replace the loss of these men, not just because of the poor 
system of organising replacements but also the crucial role they played in sustaining the 
fighting ability of an Indian unit. Unlike a trainee officer for the British Army, a 
prospective Indian Army officer had to be familiar with the languages and the culture of 
the men he commanded, as well as the tactical and administrative knowledge necessary 
to command troops in battle. The British officer of the Indian Army commanded not just 
through his position but because he earned the loyalty of his soldiers by accepting Indian 
norms, which revolved at the time around multiplex relationships. He was not just a 
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military leader but also a patron, father figure and counsellor.56 The Indian soldier, 
contrary to the practice in Western armies ‘respected the man, not the uniform.’57 As 
such, when an Indian unit lost its British officers it usually resulted in a markedly reduced 
combat effectiveness, and often led to the units breaking and fleeing from battle.  Unlike 
the British Army, where command could be taken over by subordinate officers or NCOs, 
this was not possible in the Indian Army. Pradeep Barua observes that the inability and 
poor performance of Indian NCOs or VCOs, when forced to assume command, was due to 
a system where Indian soldiers were made wholly dependent upon their British officers. 
As such, when the most senior Indian VCO was subordinate to the most junior British 
officer, it created a culture whereby Indian VCO's “position of subordination to British 
officers in the regiment is calculated to impair any initiative or leadership they may have 
originally possessed.”58 
The demand for officers for the Indian Army grew as the war progressed and the 
army expanded. As such by 1917 the government decided, as part of a wider package of 
devolving political power of India to Indians, that “the bar which has hitherto precluded 
the admission of Indians to commissioned rank in His Majesty’s Army should be 
removed.”59 With this statement Indians could hold the King's Commission and become 
officers in the Indian Army.60 However, the inter-war years never saw Indianization61 
reach the levels hoped for by its supporters. The reduction in size of the army in the 
1920s, the inter-war popularity of the Indian Army for British officers and a lack of will on 
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the part of the British commanders of the Indian Army to carry out Indianization were all 
major factors. Even with the establishment of the Indian Military Academy at Dehra Dun 
in 1932 the subsequent decision to class its graduates as Indian Commissioned Officers 
(ICOs) as opposed to KCOs, which was earned by those who had qualified from 
Sandhurst, and appoint them as replacements for VCOs were a blow to Indianization.62 
As Claude Auchinleck stated to Leo Amery in 1940: 
In my opinion, we have been playing a losing hand from the start in this matter of 
‘Indianization.’ The Indian has always thought, rightly or wrongly, that we never intended 
the scheme to succeed and expected it to fail. Colour was lent to this view by the way in 
which each new step forward had to be wrestled from us, instead of being freely given. 
Now that we have given a lot we get no credit because there was little grace in our 
giving.63 
In 1919 there had been nine Indian KCOs, which had risen to ninety-one by 1929. 
On the outbreak of the Second World War there were 400 Indian KCOs and ICOs out of a 
total of 3000 officers.64 The expansion of the Indian Army also affected the officer corps, 
and just as the First World War had unlocked the door for Indian KCOs, the Second World 
War flung it wide open. The demand for extra officers quickly exhausted the supply of 
British officers, which the Indian Army had to compete for with the British armed forces. 
In July 1940, compulsory service for European British subjects in India was introduced 
which raised 4,600 men. However, by 1941 Amery reported that “expansion is being held 
up by lack of officers,” so the decision was taken to increase recruitment of Indians as 
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officers. The aim was to increase the number of Indian officers being commissioned by 
1942 to 2,000 a year from the previous figure of 900 a year.65 
The British Elements of an Indian Formation 
Throughout its existence the Indian Army had served with British units in the 
same formations. All Indian infantry brigades had one British battalion alongside two 
Indian battalions (post First World War). In an infantry division the presence of British 
units was still evident as they formed artillery and logistical units. The 10th Indian Division 
in Italy was estimated to be 40% British.66 
British units had originally been brigaded with Indian troops as it was thought 
Indian troops took inspiration from seeing them fight. Ironically, it was the heavy 
casualties suffered by the British units during the Afghan War and Sikh Wars of the 
nineteenth century that were one of the reasons for the Mutiny in 1857, as they had 
dented its perceived image of invincibility against Indian troops. After the Mutiny, as a 
buttress against further uprisings, the Indian Army was no longer in control of its own 
field artillery; it would all be in the hands of the British Army. The decision was also taken 
to increase the number of British troops to one British soldier to every three Indian 
soldiers, (see Appendix 4). 
This practice continued through the First World War and into the Second, 
although by then there were plans to give the Indian Army control of its own field 
artillery. However, the rapid expansion of the army meant not all Indian divisions had 
Indian artillery units, such as the 10th Indian Division. The supply of replacements now 
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meant that British units were being served by British bases and the Indian units from 
Indian bases. 
The Armies of the Indian Princely States 
A third of the Indian subcontinent was controlled by the Indian Princely States, a 
reminder of a time when India had been a patchwork of various states and kingdoms. 
After the Mutiny these states were incorporated into British hegemony through 
integration, not conquest. Queen Victoria’s 1858 proclamation stated: 
We desire no extension of our present territorial possessions; and while we will 
permit no aggression upon our dominions and our rights, to be attempted with impunity, 
we shall sanction no encroachment on those of others. We shall respect the rights, 
dignity and honour of native princes as our own; and we desire that they, as well as our 
won subjects, should enjoy that prosperity and social advancement which can only be 
secured by internal peace and good government.67   
They were allowed to keep their titles and lands and most had control of their 
kingdom’s domestic affairs, with the British in charge of foreign policy and military 
matters.68 However the British did on occasion intervene in the affairs of the states 
where they felt there was a threat of civil disturbances or acts of misrule, the latter 
leading to rulers being deposed.69 By 1944 there were 562 Princely States, which ranged 
from those the size of villages, to the state of Hyderabad, which was the size of France 
with a population of sixteen million. Its resources, administration and culture were 
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claimed to be far beyond that of the independent Muslim nation states of the world at 
the time.70 
After the Mutiny the Princely States were permitted to keep their own military 
forces. The motivations for rulers in possessing a military force were personal, 
ceremonial, processional and imperial.71 The British rulers of India also gained from this 
arrangement. The states had cooperated militarily with the British prior to the Mutiny, 
participating in the 1803 Laswari campaign, the First Afghan War, the First and Second 
Sikh Wars and even during the Mutiny itself where it was observed that the military 
assistance from the states of Bahawalpur, Bikaner, Jind, Kapurthala, Nabha and Patiala 
“may well have saved the situation.”72 The fact that the Imperial Service Troops (IST), as 
the forces of the Indian States were first known, would possibly have to serve with British 
or Indian troops meant that efforts were made by the Indian Government to ensure that 
the IST were proficient and equipped with the same weapons and organisation as the 
Indian Army. In 1887 British officers began to supervise the training of the IST units and in 
1889 an Inspector General of IST was appointed. As such the forces of the Indian States 
fought with the British in the Second Afghan War, the 1891 Hunza Nagar campaign, the 
1895 Chitral expedition, the 1897 Tirah campaign, the Boxer Rebellion, Somaliland in 
1903 and during the First World War. By 1918 there were 48,806 IST, of which 26,099 
served overseas.73  The IST who had remained in India replaced British and Indian Army 
units assigned to garrison or internal security duties, allowing the latter to be deployed 
overseas. 
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In 1920 a committee on the IST saw them renamed the Indian States Forces (ISF), 
with one general in the Indian Army commenting that “the great change, as always in our 
army, was to be in name.”74 ISF units were designated class A or B. Class A units were 
armed with heavy weapons and liable for service outside of the state from which they 
were raised, with some earmarked for service with the Indian Army overseas. Class B 
units were armed with light weapons and only intended for internal security operations 
within the state from which they were raised. This distinction in quality of the ISF units is 
because there was no minimum requirement for a state to raise a unit. Some of the 
larger states like Hyderabad and Mysore could offer a division in troops, whereas some of 
the smaller states possessed only one or two platoons. The Government of India in the 
1920s had promised to offer weapons free to any state which sought to raise an ISF unit, 
with the states paying the costs of maintaining and replacing the rifles. The fact that the 
rifles were available to all states, with no restrictions on the size of the force to be raised, 
meant there was great demand from the states for the rifles, as many raised platoons in 
order to obtain them. The higher than expected demand outmatched the government’s 
ability to pay for the rifles and the scheme was stopped in 1932 as the effects of the 
Great Depression took their toll and states then had to begin paying for their rifles.75   
During peacetime the training of the ISF was overseen by the military adviser-in-
chief and his staff of sixteen British officers, seconded to him from the Indian Army and 
given the title of military adviser, all serving for four year terms. The position of the 
military adviser-in-chief was a civilian one. He worked for the Political Secretary of the 
Government of India, and spent eight months every year touring India observing and 
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supervising training. He, along with the military advisers, were concerned with matters of 
training, organisation and administration of the ISF; whilst all matters of policy relating to 
the ISF were the prerogative of the Political Department of the Government of India. By 
1938 there were forty-nine Princely States in the ISF scheme who could raise 52,000 
troops. However, only a portion of these were available for service as class A units (see 
Appendix 5).76 
The states were divided into nine military adviser's circles which were allocated 
military advisers in proportion to their size (see Appendix 6). It is interesting to note that 
the largest contributor of ISF units was the Punjab Circle, an area which had long been 
the main recruiting ground for the Indian Army. The position of military adviser was 
carried out by a major, or in the case of assistant military adviser a captain. The position 
carried no executive powers to make changes and as such it was vital that he was able to 
earn the trust and respect of the troops, officers and the state ruler to implement any 
changes he saw fit. The responsibilities of the military adviser were primarily concerned 
with overseeing training. He had to prepare classes on training for NCOs and officers and 
organise exercise camps. Major General Mills, as part of his essay seeking to improve the 
ISF, devoted time to the subject of military advisers, and the pay and benefits they could 
earn as an enticement for higher quality applicants in the future. Yet he also stated that 
“gone long since are the days when a tour with the ISF was looked on as four years leave 
on full pay. Military Advisers have a full day's work and more if they are going to pull 
their weight.”77  
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Several of the states obtained the services of an Indian Army officer on a full time 
basis to act as an adviser and mentor to the troops. By 1938 there were only four Indian 
Army officers lent to states in this manner, all to the larger states as the costs for lending 
the officer had to be borne solely by the state, which could amount to Rs. 2000 a month 
for a major.78 Cheaper alternatives for those states who wanted a permanent adviser to 
their troops were to hire a retired Indian Army KCO or VCO, although permission had to 
be obtained from the Government before they could take up the post. They did not 
replace the military adviser but worked with him.79 Mills warned the retired British 
officer seeking service in an ISF unit against joining on the premise of taking a part-
time/holiday posting.80 
Mills also outlined attempts to improve conditions of service and standards of 
training, moving away from 'spit and polish' towards tactical exercises and drills. To make 
more ISF units available for service with the Indian Army the number of training exercises 
with regular Indian Army units was increased. The NCOs and officers of ISF units were 
able to serve with the Indian Army on six month attachments. This was something that 
was built upon during the Second World War. By September 1942 there was a realisation 
that the training arrangements for ISF units in the Middle East were substandard. The 
problem was that ISF units were conducting internal security duties or guarding prisoner 
of war camps, and so found it hard to train for conventional operations. The fact many of 
the units were un-brigaded meant “higher direction of training is lacking and the 
elements of competition and example are absent.” To rectify the problem, independent 
ISF units were affiliated with a brigade to allow administrative and tactical training to 
                                                          
78
 Mills, 'Indian States Forces', p. 307. 
79
 Ibid., pp. 307-8. 
80
 Ibid., p. 308. 
  
39 
 
take place.81 Unaffiliated regular Indian Army battalions in the Middle East were also 
affiliated to brigades.82 Affiliation allowed an Indian infantry battalion the chance of 
training with a higher formation without permanently replacing it from its current duties. 
The intention was for the affiliated brigade to conduct TEWTs for officers and NCOs and 
attachments to the brigade headquarters for members of the affiliated battalion. 
Battalions on internal security duties were to be relieved by a battalion from its affiliated 
brigade, to allow it the chance to conduct company and battalion training. However this 
had to be approved by the formation under whose command the internal security 
battalion served.83 By January 1943 the 10th Indian Division had an ISF battalion affiliated 
to each of its three infantry brigades whilst stationed in Cyprus.84 The Middle East schools 
of instruction, which were open to the Indian Army, were also open to the ISF troops. 
During its time in Cyprus in 1944 the Nabha Akal ISF infantry battalion sent its officers 
and soldiers to courses held at the Middle East Training Centre.   
Steps were being taken to improve cooperation between the states themselves. 
An annual Senior Officer's School, modelled on Belgaum, for ISF officers was established 
which allowed ISF officers to give lectures to their contemporaries and also to network 
with officers from other branches and states. The state of Gwalior ran a musketry course 
which was attended by all the states in the Central India Circle (see Appendix 6). Kashmir 
had a widely respected fifteen year old training school which offered unit instructor 
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training, physical training, weapons training (including Lewis and machine guns), section 
training and an education course. The value of the physical training course was 
acknowledged by the Indian Army, which allowed graduates to proceed to its Physical 
Training School without the preparation period which other applicants had to go 
through.85 
The troops who served with the ISF units were generally held to be of a good 
quality. Mills notes that service conditions were ever improving for the troops, whilst 
housing and equipment were of a good standard. The states were beginning to offer 
pensions after twenty years’ service, central messing for the troops and clothing and 
ration allowances, although variations between the states were great.86 Of more concern 
was the quality of the officers of the ISF. The officers were Indian, selected from the 
states’ subjects, but their training varied considerably as they did not go through any 
Indian Army schools of instruction during their officer training. Mills stated that the 
“tools are good but the carpenters are weak. We want to improve the carpenters.”87 
Although improvements had been made, Mills claimed that nepotism in the ISF had been 
greatly reduced, more was still to be done. One proposition was to have trained the 
states officer cadets at the Indian Military Academy at Dehra Dun, but the financial cost, 
which the state had to pay, usually prevented this.88 By 1938, if an ISF unit was mobilised 
for service it would have been accompanied by special service officers from the Indian 
Army to advise and assist the ISF officers. These special service officers were to be 
deployed five to an infantry battalion, four to a cavalry regiment, three to an artillery 
                                                          
85
 Mills, 'Indian States Forces', p. 309. 
86
 Ibid., p. 304. 
87
 Ibid., p. 310. 
88
 Ibid., pp. 308-10. 
  
41 
 
battery, two to a field company and one to a transport unit.89 It was predicted that the 
improved performance of ISF officers would mean the number of special service officers 
required would be reduced. This dissertation will show that the question of the 
competency of ISF officers was still an issue in the Second World War. 
During peacetime ISF troops were administered by their own state's military 
department which was where rations and reinforcements were drawn from. During 
active operations it had to rely on the organisation, supply and infrastructure of the 
Indian and British armed forces, particularly during the Second World War with the need 
for overseas deployment. However, the state’s military department still had a role in 
supplying their formations during the Second World War. The extract below comes from 
a censor's report of incoming mail into the Middle East theatre during January and 
February 1944. It accused the Nabha State’s Military Department of being corrupt, 
incompetent and that favouritism and nepotism were thriving. We have no details on the 
sender, but we do know that the statement was enough for the censor to suggest that 
the department be investigated. 
Nowadays, there is great corruption in your Department. It has become a mutual 
admiration society. The favourites are having a grand time. Even the Sepoys' rations are 
distributed to others. There is no other party to check them. The state of affairs in the 
Department is such that nobody knows what the future will bring. Self-respecting people 
have to suffer and meanness is flourishing. What we see is beyond imagination. The 
more we hear about reforms, the worse it becomes in action.90 
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Indian Army Reforms 1941-1943 
Before turning to the training and reinforcement of the 10th Indian Division prior 
to and during its deployment to Italy, it is important to observe the wider reforms that 
took place in the Indian Army, as a result of its experiences against the Japanese Army 
during 1941-43. The army conducted a root and branch review of itself, following its 
disastrous performance against the Japanese in the First Arakan campaign during 1942-
43, one of the most important parts of which was the Infantry Committee which sat from 
1-14 June 1943. Assessing the performance of both Indian and British units who had 
served in Burma, it recognised that one of the most serious defects of the army was 
providing trained reinforcements, stating “this is [the] most urgent problem facing us, 
and one which requires prompt and energetic action if results are to be produced in time 
for the winter campaigning season.”91 The major problem was that there was no reserve 
of trained manpower, either British or Indian, to call upon to replace casualties. British 
reserves were effectively non-existent due to the low priority of the Far East for the 
British Army; replacements were obtained from support units in India, usually with little 
or no training in jungle warfare. For Indian troops a drop in recruitment and the ravages 
of malaria had left no effective manpower reserve, so troops were sent half trained from 
their training centres to make up losses with disastrous consequences.92 
The poor state of training was the most obvious factor affecting the quality of 
reinforcements. Major General Gurdon observed on 25 May 1943 that “the standard of 
training of recruits and reinforcements has been disgracefully low… I keep on insisting 
that unless we take our chance in putting our house in order now, we shall never get 
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another chance… What we want is quality and not quantity and in order to achieve the 
former we must be ruthless about cutting down the latter.”93 The major flaw with 
training was that too much was attempted in too little time, with basic training lasting 
only three months.94 This limited opportunity to train was hampered by a lack of skilled 
instructors and sufficient equipment to train with.95 Training had generally not given the 
troops the specialist skills in jungle warfare which they urgently required as it had never 
been deemed necessary by the Indian Army. The pre-war planning of the British Empire 
had never envisaged a need for the Indian Army to fight a war in jungle terrain because 
the empire's strategy in the Far East was centred upon the idea of Fortress Singapore. 
Furthermore the opening stages of the conflict saw India build up its forces for the 
prospect of fighting the Germans and Italians in North Africa and the Middle East. All this 
meant that, when war with Japan came, the Indian Army was designed to fight a 
different foe in a different setting. The decision to not designate certain regiments or 
units for a specific type of warfare meant that Regimental Training Centres (RTC) often 
had to train recruits for a variety of tasks. A case in point is the 13th Frontier Force Rifles 
RTC stationed in Abbottabad, which was charged with supplying recruits for fourteen 
battalions which were operating on six different war establishments, to meet demands 
for jungle and desert warfare.96 
The reforms suggested by the Infantry Committee were implemented with vigour 
by General Claude Auchinleck who took over India Command in mid-1943, as its task was 
changed to becoming a supply and recruitment base for the Indian Army, whilst SEAC 
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became responsible for operations against the Japanese in South East Asia. One of the 
changes made was to prolong and simplify the basic training new Indian recruits 
undertook, aiming for a better quality soldier instead of larger numbers of half trained 
recruits, as advocated by Gurdon. Basic training for an enlisted soldier lasted eight 
months, an increase from three months, and took place at the RTC. His training here 
instilled the basic military skills required, covering weapons training (including company 
and platoon weapons), discipline, learning about regimental history/traditions, section 
and platoon training but with little reference to jungle warfare.97 Skills in jungle warfare 
were obtained from attending one of the two Indian training divisions, the 14th and 39th, 
if he were an Indian soldier, whilst British soldiers and officers attended the same course 
at the 52nd Infantry Brigade. Opening in December 1943 they ran a two month training 
programme for both enlisted men and officers, which included realistic and tough 
training which was constantly revised to reflect the circumstances at the front.98 The 
British soldier undertook an average training period of six to nine months whilst the 
Indian soldier had an average training period of eleven to thirteen months for enlisted 
men, and nine months for officers. The reason for this longer training period was 
attributed to the fact that “in INDIA the potential soldier must be educated before he can 
be taught to fight.” The paper stressed that the training period achieved “excellent 
results…so that any reduction of effort would have an adverse effect.”  
Conclusion 
An overview of the Indian Army demonstrates that it was an organisation that 
sought to learn from the mistakes and failures of its past; however, it was not always 
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willing to implement these changes of its own volition because of the conservatism of 
senior officers and a lack of preparation and foresight. The changes made to the Indian 
Army’s recruitment and organisation policies between 1857 to 1940 reflect its struggle 
with its primary commitment as being the guarantor of the British hold on power in India, 
whilst also being able to assist in conventional military operations in service of British 
imperial objectives. The former required a force whose loyalty to the British Raj was 
unquestionable, and which was tasked with internal security duties and proficiency in 
asymmetric warfare. However, the latter needed an army that placed military efficiency 
and capability as the major pre-requisite. Whilst the First World War had demonstrated 
the inability of the martial races to meet the manpower demands of the Indian Army in 
twentieth century total warfare, the inter-war years saw a return to an army formed 
predominantly from the martial races. Upon learning of its expanded role in the Second 
World War the Indian Army, in order to raise the extra formations required, opened 
recruitment to non-martial races and Indians for officer training. Whilst this is an 
example of the Indian Army applying the lessons of a past conflict to a contemporary 
one, it is also apparent that had the inter-war Indian Army been composed from a 
broader section of the Indian population, then the problems experienced in raising new 
formations would have been reduced. Reforms to tactical and training policy, which 
followed the Indian Army’s defeat at the hands of the Japanese Army in 1942-3, are 
particularly impressive given the lack of focus on jungle warfare by the Indian Army prior 
to the war. It will be shown in the next chapter that during the 10th Indian Division’s 
campaign in Italy, it used similar methods to ensure its own tactical and training policies 
were still relevant to the operations it conducted. Whilst the Indian Army was slow to 
implement the steps necessary to make it a force suitable for the Second World War, 
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once in place they were key to providing the foundations for future victories in Burma 
and Italy.  
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CHAPTER 3: TRAINING AND OPERATIONS 
It has been written that “training is a matter which is apt to be belittled by the 
uninitiated. But training for war is just as important as training for sport, and where 
contestants are equal it may decide the issue.”1 It is training that turns the civilian into a 
soldier. This chapter will examine how the 10th Indian Division trained for the campaign in 
Italy, demonstrating the great flexibility that the division possessed, with its ability to 
master multiple forms of warfare as terrain and circumstances required. The training 
notes and instructions issued by the division and its brigades to direct the training of 
troops will be assessed to see how the division formulated new training priorities. The ISF 
units that fought with the division will also be included in this section to analyse their 
training regime prior to and during their time in Italy, and also the reasons for their 
deployment.  
The 10th Indian Division: 1941-3 
The 10th Indian Division was formed in January 1941, and first saw action in Iraq in 
April to overthrow the pro-German government in power. The division was formed from 
the 20th, 21st and 25th Indian Infantry Brigades2, and was under the command of Major 
General W. J. Slim. Landing in Basra the division moved up the Euphrates to capture 
Baghdad and the oilfields and pipelines north of Mosul by the end of June. This led the 
Germans to base aircraft at airfields in Syria, with the approval of the Vichy French 
authorities, to strike at the British in Iraq. Australian and Indian forces had invaded Syria 
in May from Palestine and the 10th Indian Division were sent into Syria from Iraq in June 
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1941. With 21st Brigade as the strike force, 20th Brigade guarding the lines of 
communication and the 25th Brigade remaining in Iraq to guard the oilfields around 
Mosul, the division attacked towards Aleppo.  
With the surrender of the Vichy authorities in Syria on 11 July the division 
returned to Iraq to continue guarding the oil pipelines. In August the division cooperated 
with Soviet forces in the invasion of Persia. After its success in Persia the division 
returned to Iraq where it trained and conducted internal security duties until May 1942, 
when it was despatched to North Africa. Major General T. W. Rees had assumed 
command of the division in March 1942, following Slim’s appointment to command 
Burma Corps. Having covered 1,500 miles in two weeks it reached the Halfaya Pass by 4 
June. The division fared badly in the encounters against Rommel, with its brigades 
committed piecemeal in accordance with the strategy of defensive boxes. On the retreat 
from Libya the division was ordered to hold Mersa Matruh on the coast, but was 
overwhelmed by the Axis forces. During the retreat from Mersa Matruh, 60% of the 
division evaded four enemy divisions to reach Allied lines at El Alamein in twenty-four 
hours. Most of the division was sent to the Nile Delta to rest and refit, except for Robcol, 
formed from the survivors of 10th Indian Division and assorted units who held Ruweisat 
Ridge. The ridge was central to the El Alamein position and Robcol, commanded by the 
division’s C.R.A.3 Brigadier Waller, held the position against attacks throughout 2-3 July, 
until relieved by the 5th Indian Division.  
In August 1942 the division was sent to Cyprus, under the command of Major 
General A. B. Blaxland, where it undertook responsibility for the defence of the island. 
The 21st Brigade had left in June whilst the division was still in Africa, so the 10th Indian 
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Infantry Brigade4 joined the 20th and 25th Brigades in the division. By August 1943 the 10th 
Indian Division was stationed in the Middle East under the command of Major General 
Wilfred L. Lloyd, who had assumed command in July 1943. Under the division’s command 
were 20th and 25th Brigades and the 1st Greek Brigade, composed of royalist Yugoslav and 
Greek soldiers. The 10th Brigade would not re-join the division from Cyprus until January 
1944. The division had been training throughout the summer of 1943 for a role in the 
invasion of Rhodes, as part of the ill-fated Dodecanese campaign. Due to the Allied 
defeats at Los and Keros the attack on Rhodes was cancelled, and the division was sent to 
Lebanon in November. Here the division conducted internal security operations, 
following the French authorities' decision to imprison the Lebanese government after 
their declaration of independence. The matter was resolved when the French acquiesced 
to internal pressure to recognise the independence of Lebanon, but the division did not 
take part in the occupation of Lebanon by Allied forces for the remainder of the war. 
Instead, the division resumed training in conventional operations, as laid down in 10th 
Indian Division Training Instruction No. 2 issued on 27 November 1943.5 
Training for the Italian campaign 
Divisional Training Instruction No. 2 covered training from the division’s 
movement into winter quarters to 31 March 1944, and was the training guide by which 
the division prepared for future operations in Italy. The instruction forecast that the 
division would return to active operations in spring 1944. The instruction indicated that 
the roles the division would have to prepare for had not changed from the division’s HQ 
Training Instruction No. 1 of 1943, which was most likely issued in preparation for the 
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division’s cancelled invasion of Rhodes. Training Instruction No. 1 called for training in 
amphibious assault, operations with motor vehicles on a single road in mountainous 
terrain, all arms attacks on enemy defences in mountains, night ops and plans for 
consolidating and exploiting the capture of a position.6 The only new addition in Training 
Instruction No. 2 was the crossing of water obstacles.7 The roles the division was training 
to carry out were those called for by Major General Jenkins for units being sent to Italy.8  
During the Second World War the 10th Indian Division conducted training of the 
formations within it, and also as part of a larger formation. Training consisted of the 
theoretical and practical, with the subject influenced by the operations it was intending 
to conduct. Theoretical training included demonstrations, lectures given by officers on a 
particular topic or a tactical exercise without troops (TEWT). The TEWT was mostly 
concerned with officers, not the private soldier. Subordinates could demonstrate before 
a senior commander that they could make the right tactical decisions in certain 
circumstances. There is of course much difference between theory and practice; and the 
divisional command was well aware of this. It noted that the only way of learning tactics 
was through practical training, but felt that these theoretical exercises provided “an 
admirable opportunity of allowing [officers] and NCOs to air their views by discussion 
etc.”9  
However, the reality is that it was not always feasible for practical training to be 
conducted. One problem was the area in which a unit was stationed. The division 
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conducted exercise ‘Lark’ during 17-23 December 1943, which saw the 20th Brigade 
assault a position held by the 25th Brigade with support arms in mountainous terrain. 
Training Instruction No. 2 had made mountain warfare a priority, and the terrain in the 
Middle East was perfectly suited for conducting practical training exercises in it. 
However, in training for the crossing of water obstacles the training instruction noted 
that “it is realised that practical trg in this will be difficult in our new location, but the 
study of the theoretical side of the question will be considered.”10 In the light of there 
not being suitable training areas in the immediate vicinity to practice river crossings, 
theory training was the only option. As such, exercise Kingfisher was conducted on 7 
January 1944, which was a TEWT on the river Auja in Palestine. The division did 
eventually participate in a practical training scheme on a river crossing; exercise 
Crocodile over 1-8 March 1944, was staged over the river Jordan and was a Ninth Army 
exercise in which the 10th, 20th and 25th brigades operated together as a division for the 
first time since leaving Cyprus in 1943. The weather also disrupted the division’s training 
plans. In Cyprus, during March 1943, heavy rains impacted pre-scheduled training rotas 
and forced the cancellation of 20th Brigade’s exercise for 20 March.11  
Another issue in conducting practical exercises was the number of troops involved 
and the availability of suitable training grounds. Practical training was composed of 
individual and collective training; both were necessary but only one could be conducted 
at a time. The publication of 10th Indian Division Training Instruction No. 3 on 9 
December 1943 covered “the use of ground for training and field firing and the allotment 
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of Ranges”.12 With three brigades seeking to use the same facilities for training, this 
instruction established a universal system for using training grounds to avoid ‘double-
booking’ of training areas. It was far easier to train smaller units such as platoons and 
battalions because they did not require such large logistic support to train them, nor the 
use of large training areas. Smaller units were able to make use of training areas 
numerous times. For instance, in January 1943, whilst stationed in Cyprus, the 25th 
Brigade set up a training area at Malounda to give infantry companies an opportunity to 
practice mountain warfare tactics and withdrawal of motor transport by night. From 12-
30 January four companies of the 2nd Royal Sikhs and three of the 1st Kings’ Own 
completed the exercises. Also at this time a brigade sniper competition was held at the 
same location.13 Training Instruction No. 2 set out that every infantry platoon in the 
division would attend the two week battle drill course at the divisional battle school by 
the end of February 1944.14  
Collective exercises, especially at army, division and brigade level, were much less 
frequent because they took more planning and preparation due to the need to move 
larger forces. The preparation of a brigade exercise involved a member of the divisional 
or brigade staff performing a reconnaissance of a proposed training area. There were few 
instances of the same brigade repeating a training exercise at the same location. This was 
because if units gained familiarity with a training area, then it would not be as 
challenging as if it was held at a new location each time. In a place such as Cyprus, where 
training areas were limited, brigades had to take turns as to where and when they could 
conduct exercises on a large scale. Training Instruction No. 2 set out that brigade 
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exercises would not take place until February 1944, and only then once every six weeks. 
Unit exercises, which included battalions, were conducted once every four weeks from 
January 1944.15 The opportunity to conduct corps and army level exercises was even 
more difficult. Troops required relief from their operational responsibilities, and training 
areas large enough to accommodate such exercises. Most corps and army training 
exercises were therefore theoretical.  
The 10th Indian Division was based in the Middle East, an area which had been 
building up its infrastructure and logistical support since 1939, which included training 
facilities. In April 1943 the division were given lectures and demonstrations by the 
Mountain Warfare Centre on platoon and company tactics and pack transport 
problems.16 In May 1943 the commander of the 20th Brigade, Brigadier J. Moffat, was 
appointed commander of the Middle East Mountain Warfare Training Centre. Soldiers 
from all units and service arms were able to attend courses at the many schools of 
instruction in the Middle East. The 25th Brigade participated in exercise Duchess in August 
1943 to train for an amphibious landing; preparation for the planned invasion of Rhodes 
where the brigade was to provide the assault troops.  
The other issue that hampered the division’s opportunities to conduct practical 
training was the need to maintain good civil-military relations. Neither the Indian Army 
nor the British Army had any pre-existing training establishments for collective training in 
Cyprus or the Middle East (they had few in Britain and India). Instead they had to make 
use of whatever was available which often meant having to train close to civilian 
populations. When the division was stationed in Palestine the tense political situation 
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between the Jewish and Muslim populations was a cause for concern. The Divisional 
Order of 28 July 1943 stated “all ranks are warned for the need for great care in 
discussing or expressing opinions in public on the internal political problems of 
PALESTINE. Incautious remarks are liable to be quoted as authoritative statements and 
may cause deteriorating the relations existing between the races.”17 The reasoning for 
this is clear; if the situation was to deteriorate to the point where hostilities broke out 
between the two populations then the 10th Indian Division would be involved in the 
operations to quell the unrest. Their involvement would have cost them casualties and 
lost time in training for operations in Italy or the Dodecanese.  
Troops whilst on training exercises were given strict instructions on avoiding 
unnecessary damage and to repair any damage that was done. Divisional Order 120 
warned troops against unnecessary damage to trees, in particular olive trees.18 Olive 
trees were part of a farmer’s crop and any damage to them would have resulted in a 
financial loss for him. On Cyprus the planned training programme of 20th Brigade was 
curtailed as collective training would have meant damaging crops.19 The damaging of 
crops may have produced a food shortage on the island which the military authorities 
would have had to make up. Training Instruction No. 3 ordered that training was to avoid 
all unnecessary damage to crops and property, with training in orchards strictly 
prohibited.20 The policy of British and Indian units was to give compensation for any 
damage done to civilian property during training. Any unit involved in a training 
programme which involved operating away from roads had to appoint a Brigade 
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Compensation Liaison Officer to deal with civilian complaints. He was responsible for 
notifying civilian populations and the Claims Commission District Officer (CCDC) forty-
eight hours in advance of any major training exercises happening in their area, so any 
necessary safety precautions could be taken. He was not permitted to make 
compensation payments himself but instead to note instances of damage to civil 
property (e.g. walls, fences, crops, trees, animals) and report this to the area’s CCDC.21 
Brigadier T. N. Smith of the 10th Brigade, along with other officers, had visited 
Italy in January 1944 to see what lessons could be learned from operations and applied 
to training. In a lecture to 20th Brigade on 23 February regarding the Italian front he 
placed special emphasis on the importance of patrolling. Training sought to teach what 
had been learnt from harsh experience and the 10th Indian Division were not above 
learning from others. The 8th Indian Division produced ‘8 Indian Division Training 
Instruction Number 1' in 1944, which detailed the lessons learnt from its experiences in 
Italy during the period 19 October to 17 December 1943.22 This was distributed to all 
Indian divisions in Central Meditarranean Force (CMF23), the Middle East and Persia and 
Iraq Command (PAIC24), including the 10th Indian Division.25 It is highly likely that this 
training instruction was used by the 10th Indian Division to prepare for its involvement in 
Italy. On 22 August 1943 the 4th Indian Division opened a patrol school in Palestine, to 
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impart the lessons it had learnt from its operations in Tunisia, and the 10th Indian Division 
was quick to make use of it. The war diary of the 20th Brigade commented that “during 
exercise LARK several suggestions emanating from 4 Ind Div were being tried out, 
especially Special Patrol Platoon and Patrol Masters.”26 On 18 March 1944, days before 
the division’s departure to Italy, they were briefed by Major General Hawkesworth, the 
commander of 46th Division, on operations and conditions in Italy.27 The 46th Division had 
been operating in Italy since September 1943 and had been sent from Italy to the Middle 
East in March to rest and refit after the casualties it had suffered, before returning to 
Italy in July.  
Many of the troops of 10th Indian Division, who were bored with the months of 
not seeing active service, expressed irritation at training, as the comments below from an 
Indian and British officer emphasise. 
I'm getting rather browned off with life, just a bit. It's all training which never seems 
to get us anywhere... It's very bad for the officers and men and there is a great deal of 
unnecessary ill-feeling – a bad thing. A Subedar of a Gurkha Battalion.28 
I have just returned from a 3 weeks tour in another theatre of war and found that 
Lord Gort's definition of war 'periods of excessive boredom punctuated by moments of 
intense fear' just about fills the bill. I've got damned good unit and a fine set of VCOs and 
NCOs taken all round. So that I've got nothing to grumble about apart from the fact that 
they seem to be winning the war without us. A Major of an Indian Engineers Field 
Company.29 
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In January 1944, Major General Lloyd was killed in a car accident whilst umpiring 
an armoured exercise in Egypt. Lloyd had been responsible for the training program set 
out in Training Instruction No. 2. He had served as commander of 5th Indian Infantry 
Brigade in 4th Indian Division during Operation Compass in North Africa, the battle of 
Keren in East Africa and the invasion of Syria where Slim asserted he had “outstandingly 
distinguished himself as a fighting brigadier.”30 He was recalled to India to command the 
14th Indian Division, which he led during the First Arakan campaign. Slim’s evaluation of 
Lloyd reveals that he was a soldier who believed in the importance of training. Lloyd had 
decided to keep the 14th Indian Division concentrated for as long as possible for training 
during the summer of 1942, although this had had the negative effect of the division not 
conducting patrolling in the Arakan as aggressively as Slim thought best. On Slim’s advice 
he moved the division south to continue training and to conduct more aggressive 
patrolling and Slim expressed every confidence in Lloyd’s abilities.31 During the First 
Arakan campaign, Lloyd was relieved of his command of the 14th Indian Division after the 
failure to capture the bunker complex of Donbaik and the subsequent losses suffered by 
the Japanese counter attack. He was, however, appointed to the command of 10th Indian 
Division in July 1943 replacing Major General A. B. Blaxland. Slim said that “his 
death...was a great loss, as, in spite of a failure in the Arakan for which he was by no 
means wholly responsible, he would, had he lived, have regained his place in the group of 
brilliant divisional commanders the Indian Army produced.”32 
Major General Lloyd’s replacement as the commander of the 10th Indian Division 
was Major General Denys W. Reid. At the war’s beginning he commanded the 3/5th 
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Mahratta Light Infantry in the 9th Indian Infantry Brigade, 5th Indian Division in the East 
African campaign. He led the battalion in the battle of Keren, where the Mahrattas’ 
capture of the Pinnacle position on the mountain earned him the DSO.33 He was 
appointed to command the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade of the 5th Indian Division in 
October 1941 which, with South African and British troops attached, formed ‘E’ Force 
during Operation Crusader in North Africa. Reid led the brigade during its fighting retreat 
to El Alamein in 1942, but the brigade was destroyed in the Fuka pass at the battle of 
Mersa Matruh in June where Reid was taken prisoner. Reid remained in an Italian 
prisoner of war camp for eighteen months before he escaped to British lines in 
November 1943. 
The battle of Keren is regarded as one of the greatest achievements of the Indian 
Army. Alan Jeffreys suggests it was an example of the evolution from the old-style Indian 
Army, which guarded the North West Frontier, and the modern army of the Second 
World War.34 He believes that the battle, which had seen the troops train in mountain 
warfare for a month prior to the final assault, had a lasting influence on the Indian Army. 
The battle produced an army commander, two corps commanders and seven divisional 
commanders (including Lloyd and Reid). Jeffreys notes that all these commanders 
followed the practice of issuing training instructions once they commanded their 
divisions, which is evident in the 10th Indian Division.35  
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The ISF in the Middle East 
The 10th Indian Division operated with ISF units in Italy, the Nabha Akal and 
Jodhpur Sardar infantry battalions. These did not deploy with the division when it was 
sent to Italy in March 1944 because they were not then fit for operations. By April 1944 
there were eight ISF and four Indian Army infantry battalions in the Middle East.36 This 
dissertation has already discussed how in 1942-3, in an attempt to improve the training 
of ISF units, they were affiliated with a brigade whilst conducting their garrison duties. 
However, in an office note on the future employment of the ISF battalions written in 
March 1944 it was stated that “no Divisional Commander would accept any of these units 
[ISF in Middle East] in their present state for inclusion in a formation that is liable to have 
to fight Germans.”37 The Indian Army wanted the ISF battalions to achieve the standards 
of regular Indian Army battalions, which would require four to six months training with 
regular units.38 However, the problem in such an approach was that to facilitate the four 
to six months of training the battalion needed, it would have to be relieved from its 
current duties. The ISF battalions had not reached the standard required for operations 
in Italy, despite affiliating them to a brigade.  
The four best ISF units identified by the authorities to begin training for service in 
Italy were the Nabha Akal, Bhopal, Jaipur Guards and Jaipur infantry battalions.39 The 
solution was to use lesser formations to undertake the duties that were currently being 
done by the best ISF units, so these could be released for training. As such in May 1944 
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the Jaipur Guards, who were guarding POWs in Egypt, were relieved by a Cape Corps 
battalion. This was done as the Jaipur Guards were undermanned for the role of POW 
guards. The War Office had approved the use of African troops as POW guards, due to 
the expected influx of 10,000 German POWs into the Middle East.40 The Jaipur Guards 
were sent to Italy in accordance with an AFHQ41 request to relieve the ISF unit, the Jaipur 
infantry, who were on garrison duty. The Jaipur Infantry would then take the place of 1st 
Welch in 37 Beach Group.42 The movement of Indian troops from the Middle East to Italy 
was also because of fears from the Indian Army and government of upsetting Muslim 
opinion in India.43 Wavell, Viceroy of India, had agreed in November 1943 to the use of 
Indian troops in Italy and their possible use in the Dodecanese, France and Germany. Yet 
he forbade their potential employment in the Balkans or Turkey because of “Indian 
Muslim public opinion.”44 Later in May 1944 it was requested that all press releases 
detailing Indian troops involved in internal security operations in the Middle East be 
prevented from being published, until approval from Auchinleck, in response to Indian 
and foreign Muslim opinion.45  
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The 10th Indian Division in Italy, March - September 1944 
The request from CMF to Middle East over the transfer of 10th Indian Division to 
Italy was not made until 28 February 194446, with approval granted on 9 March.47 
Departing from Egypt the division arrived in Taranto on 28 March, and resumed the 
rigorous training programme it had conducted in the Middle East. On 4 April 1944 the 
10th Indian Division Training Instruction No 4, titled 'Patrols, Observation and Snipers', 
was issued. The purpose was for all units of the division to adopt a common organisation 
and practice of these skills, and involved many of the recommendations made by 4th 
Indian Division the previous year. To help in the training of soldiers in patrolling the 
appendices featured extracts from Army Training Memorandum (ATM) No. 46 of 1943, 
which were published by the War Office, and featured lessons from Tunisia in 1943.48 
Major General Reid placed high value upon these tactics as they were a means of 
collecting information, writing “It must be continually stressed to all ranks both in 
training and operations that there is no item of information, however trivial in itself, 
which may not usefully contribute to the picture that is continually being pieced together 
at HQs from Bn HQ to higher formations.”49  
Reid intended that all members of a rifle company be able to conduct a patrol; 
however, he did authorise the establishment of a special patrol section in each company, 
which grouped together to form a special patrol platoon at battalion level. These were 
manned by soldiers skilled in patrolling and intended to conduct particularly challenging 
missions. Reid formed these units “until it [was] considered that training of all ranks is 
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sufficiently advanced to make it unnecessary.”50 Reid cautioned against overworking 
these units in case they suffered heavy casualties, which meant they would “not be 
available when the real need for their use arises.”51 Also by relying heavily upon the 
special patrol units it would not improve the skill of all infantrymen which was a stated 
aim of Reid’s, who did not want patrol work to be seen as a task for specialists.52 
Observation posts were to aid in the gathering of intelligence by operating in the day, 
whilst patrols operated at night. The division’s snipers, in addition to their tactical use of 
eliminating enemy targets, were an additional intelligence source.53 Brigade and 
battalion patrol masters were created to supervise, train and organise patrols at their 
respective levels, as well as collect and process information gathered from patrols, 
observations posts and snipers.54 
The 10th Indian Division had moved to Italy because of the Allies’ need for 
“BRITISH equipped inf fmns to go into the line in EASTERN defensive sectors to release 
tps now there for offensive ops.”55 To this end, the 10th Indian Division relieved the 1st 
Canadian Division in the Ortona sector on 22 April 1944, deploying all three brigades on a 
seven mile front under the command of V Corps (see Map 3). It held this sector with the 
4th Indian Division, which was recovering from its experience at the battle of Monte 
Cassino. The sector allowed the division to be ‘blooded’, which was necessary given its 
two years spent in the Middle East away from active operations. Vigorous patrolling 
aimed to keep as many enemy troops committed in the east, so they couldn’t be sent to 
stem the offensive around Cassino. The division did not ‘throw its soldiers into the deep 
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end’; the 10th Brigade’s defensive plan for the Ortona sector laid out that “patrolling 
policy will be to gradually extend our offensive activities as confidence is gained.”56 For 
those infantry battalions held in reserve by their brigades training continued, and the 10th 
Brigade’s reserve battalion trained with tanks for the first time in Italy.57 
The 20th Brigade, under the command of Brigadier J.B. MacDonald, produced its 
own training instruction when stationed in the Adriatic sector, titled Brigade Training 
Instruction No. 1 (Adriatic), which was compiled from lessons learned on the battlefield. 
The instruction was split into parts A and B; part A related to the brigade’s operations in 
the Adriatic, whilst part B relayed conclusions from corps and divisional study days on 
consolidating a position. The intended audience for this training instruction was the 
officers, from battalion to platoon commands. The instruction detailed the mind set with 
which commanders should conduct their operations, calling for guile, cunning and 
initiative. In part A of the instruction MacDonald instructed his commanders to be more 
aggressive and forward thinking, writing that “the very mention of the word defence is 
sufficient to instill [sic] in most minds a feeling of being forced to sit in prepared positions 
to parry blows delivered by the enemy.”58 He called for improvements in patrolling and 
intelligence reporting, suggesting improved briefing and preparation of commanders and 
more detailed observation post records.59  
The division remained in the Adriatic sector until 4 June when it was relieved by 
4th Indian Division, and moved to Venafro in central Italy to undertake further training. 
The training here focused on mountain warfare, which the divisional history records had 
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become a speciality of the division because of its training in Cyprus, Syria and Palestine.60 
During this time a training team from the 8th Indian Division was attached to the division, 
under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Whitty of the 1st Royal Warwickshire 
battalion, continuing the cooperation in training between Indian divisions.61 The 8th 
Indian Division training team discussed battle training methods and brigade exercises 
with the divisional staff, and organised a demonstration by 3/1st Punjab battalion on 
urban warfare for the division.62 The 10th Brigade discussed mountain warfare tactics 
used by 78th Division with the commander of the 6th Royal West Kents.63 Divisional 
exercises were not possible at this time, so exercises at brigade, battalion and company 
level were conducted. The 3/18th Royal Garhwal Rifles took part in exercise Eagle, a forty-
eight hour battalion exercise involving mule transport.64 The 2/3rd Gurkhas put all their 
rifle companies through an urban warfare exercise, with particular attention to specialist 
training.65 The 10th Indian Division sent 184 soldiers of all ranks, from all service arms, to 
be trained at the Mountain School in rock climbing, mules, signals, medical evacuation, 
man pack and engineering course.66 Operating in mountainous terrain made casualty 
evacuation very difficult and so special training was given on the evacuation of casualties 
by mules on 23 June.67   
Upon being returned to operations following the end of their training, Reid issued 
a personal message to all commanders in the division offering tactical advice for 
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forthcoming battles. Reid asked for his commanders to use their initiative in the 
operations that awaited, fully aware that the German Army was retreating to the Gothic 
Line. If they encountered strong resistance then a set piece attack would be necessary, 
but when resistance was light he explained to commanders that “determination – the 
will to go forward – to go wide and clear out the enemy or get to grips with him must be 
the sole aim of all ranks. Risks will have to be taken and taken quickly and boldly.”68 As 
the operations in the Tiber Valley that lay ahead would involve them advancing, as 
opposed to holding a defensive position, Reid gave guidance on the capture and 
consolidation of a position.69 
The division returned to the front line on 28 June relieving the 8th Indian Division, 
which had pursued the German Army since the Allied breakthrough in May at Cassino, 
near Perugia. The terrain north of Perugia was dominated by the Northern Apennines 
which the divisional history describes as: 
The Apennines, ribbed for two hundred and fifty miles by an interminable succession 
of ridges and rivers. The high hills commanded the countryside for miles. Rivers and 
mountain torrents, bereft of their bridges, became grievous obstacles, while the towns 
and villages had been transformed by extensive fortification into fortresses.70 
The training the division had been conducting in mountain warfare served them 
well in its advance up the Tiber Valley, allowing them to exert maximum pressure on the 
enemy forces stationed there (see Map 4). The nature of the terrain meant that to 
capture the towns and villages stationed in the valley required the seizure of the heights 
on both sides of the river. Their recent training in mountain warfare was put to good use 
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in this environment, as the division made full use of infiltration tactics to penetrate deep 
into enemy positions and attack the enemy from the flank or rear. With 10th Brigade 
operating west of the Tiber and 20th and 25th Brigades east, the division advanced up the 
valley (see Map 5). By 2 July the division occupied the town of Umbertide, but it was not 
secure until the capture of Montone on 7 July by the 1st King's Own. The capture of Citta 
di Castello on 22 July allowed the division entrance to the Tiber Basin where it was able 
to operate with tank support, by 1 August the leading elements of the division had 
reached the north of the basin.  
In a month all three brigades had been in constant fighting and had advanced 
forty miles over difficult terrain.71 The Tiger Triumphs records that during this advance 
Reid: 
Had a penchant for slogans, rightly believing that a significant phrase can mean more 
than a tome. As Tenth Division prepared for the critical work ahead, the instruction 
“Always lean forward” became its watchword. Interpreted, this slogan demanded deeper 
penetration, more intimate exploration of the enemy’s rear, speedier infiltration.72   
The 20th Brigade produced a review of its operations in the Tiber Valley on 16 July, 
which served a similar purpose to the training instruction it had produced previously 
when stationed in the Adriatic. Brigadier MacDonald also adopted a meaningful phrase to 
characterise operations:  
I would like them to realise that by “going wide” in this difficult country they have 
surprised the enemy, and have in many cases split units and sub-units into small parties 
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acting on their own without direction; hungry; thirsty; and ripe to be killed or “put in the 
bag”.73 
MacDonald was pleased with the performance of his troops believing that, on all 
but two occasions, the operations the brigade had conducted had caused the maximum 
damage to the enemy at the minimum cost to themselves, against an enemy the equal of 
any in Italy. MacDonald detailed what he believed were the mistakes from the two 
battles that had caused heavy casualties, the first being the 8th Manchesters advance to 
Piccione and the second the 3/5th Mahrattas at Pt 624 6625 on 9 July. With regard to the 
Manchesters he believed that the battalion’s line of advance was the cause of casualties, 
with it selected because it offered the fastest route to its objective. MacDonald believed 
the Mahrattas high casualties were caused by the battalion undertaking hasty counter-
attacks without adequate artillery support.74 However, MacDonald believed that the 
brigade’s success during its operations was because it had, for the most part, conducted 
operations which were well planned and timed that utilised the full range of supporting 
arms, such as artillery and machine guns. One of the most notable qualities that the 
troops were commended on was their field craft, with the 2/3rd Gurkhas in particular, 
praised for their skilful use of ground and cover, often during night operations.75 With the 
onset of cold weather approaching he also studied the rations and equipment that troops 
should carry with them whilst on extended marches.76  
The 10th Brigade produced a wide-ranging review of its operations from 28 June 
to 9 August, detailing the tactical difficulties encountered in pursuit over mountainous 
terrain and how the responsibility for operations fell largely on the infantry battalion 
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commanders.77 In this review it was noted that the patrol master and special patrol units, 
formed in Training Instruction No. 4, were no longer required. The patrol master system 
could not cope with the demands of mobile operations, whilst the huge improvement by 
all ranks in patrolling had meant the special patrol units had been abolished in all but one 
of the brigade’s infantry battalions.78 The revoking of methods laid down in a previous 
training instruction does not mean they were wrong in the first place, rather that as the 
enemy changed its tactics so did the division. Training Instruction No. 4 had been issued 
whilst the division was to be deployed in a static, defensive position, whilst the 10th 
Brigade’s review assessed the tactical lessons of having conducted an advance through 
mountainous terrain. This demonstrates an awareness within the 10th Indian Division of 
the need to keep its training relevant, so they constantly assessed their recent operations 
to see what tactical lessons could be learnt.  
Further advance northwards required the capture of the Alpe di Catenaia heights 
to the west of the Tiber Basin. The position was “...an agglomeration of ridges and peaks 
rising to 4,000 feet... this solid block could not be by-passed by way of either of the river 
valleys.”79 The position dominated the eastern approach to Florence and could not be 
taken by infiltration, which the division had become so proficient at in the past month, 
but by a set piece assault. The assault began on the 4th at Monte Altuccia, the capture of 
this position and the defeat of the German counter attack, led by the fresh troops of their 
corps reserve; permitted an attack on Regina, the last of the high peaks on the 6th, but 
the troops could not hold the position in face of German infiltration. By this time the 
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division was less than ten miles from the Gothic Line, the closest of any Allied troops.80 
Whilst this operation was ongoing the division had to take over the section of the corps 
sector previously held by 4th Indian Division, which had moved to the Adriatic Front. By 
14 August the division held a front of fifteen miles requiring it to revert to infiltration in 
light of its inability to launch set piece operations. Reid found a new slogan with which to 
promote an offensive spirit “Step up. Keep stepping up,” which meant: 
Wherever patrols penetrated, the support groups must be at their heels. A patrol 
would find an opening. A platoon would occupy the position unobtrusively. Next night a 
company would consolidate the ground. The battalion would then move in, and the 
patrols would set forth on a fresh venture.81 
The 20th Brigade produced another review of its operations, which covered its 
operations on the Alpe di Catenaia range, in August. MacDonald drew conclusions on the 
experiences of the combat and support units, analysing both their successes and 
failures.82 He also discussed the thoughts he conveyed in the review with the battalion 
commander of the 2/3rd Gurkhas. The major point of disagreement was on MacDonald’s 
views on the conduct of marches, in particular whether the soldier should carry his own 
pack or have mules carry it. The commander of 2/3rd Gurkhas thought it best if the 
soldier carried it, as if on a mule there was a high possibility that enemy action would 
prevent the soldier from getting his pack as the mules may be delayed.83 The note also 
records that MacDonald conducted similar discussions with the other infantry battalion 
commanders in the brigade. 
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The division's reversion to infiltration tactics led to the capture of the Alpe di 
Catenaia on 19 August, when the 3/1st Punjabis captured the position from the rear. 
Aggressive patrolling forced the enemy to retreat to their positions on the Gothic line 
with the division holding the X Corps front alone (see Map 6). Despite probing attacks the 
10th Indian Division did not attack in the mountains they had become so well acquainted 
with, for on 17 September the division was transferred (less 10th Brigade) to the Adriatic 
Front to aid in the attempt to pierce the Gothic Line. In its place Skinner’s Horse, 8th 
Manchesters and the Nabha Akal infantry84 formed Wheeler Force to eliminate the 
enemy forces that remained on Route 71 between Florence and Bibbiena. 
The ISF in Italy 
We will now return to the ISF units that served in Italy. A letter on 29 August 
regarding the employment of two ISF battalions, the Jaipur Infantry and Nabha Akal, due 
to arrive in September, sought the recommendation of commanders as to “whether or 
not bn is suitable for employment in an Ind Div in relief of a tired Ind bn.”85 The request 
outlined above was undoubtedly from people who were unfamiliar with the Indian Army. 
For although Indian policy was in favour of using ISF battalions in active operations, there 
was a belief within CMF that the ISF battalion may be inferior to a regular Indian 
battalion. 
Regardless of the belief of members of CMF, the ISF battalions were confident in 
their ability to fight as well as other Indian units did. Upon hearing of plans to classify the 
Jaipur Guards as a garrison battalion, its British commander wrote:  
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I desire to record my strongest objection to such grading…As an Indian Garrison Bn is 
recruited from the non-fighting classes of India and its officers and NCOs are usually the 
“unfits” and the “unwanteds” of the Army the stigma attaching to this grade of units is 
obvious. Apart from the adverse effect on the morale of the Troops which such down-
grading will undoubtedly produce His Highness the Maharaja will personally suffer a blow 
to his Rajput prestige which can not [sic] be measured in words.86 
Consequently, the Jaipur Guards were used as a garrison battalion but not 
classified as one.87 The motivation behind this decision is an example of the attempts by 
the Indian Army to consider the feelings of the rulers of the Princely States where their 
forces were concerned. Indian Army staff in the Middle East in April 1944, when 
expecting a visit from the Maharajah of Bhopal, decided “a plan for BHOPAL must be 
prepared in order that it may be put before the Maharajah of Bhopal should he question 
our future intentions regarding his bn.”88  
Assessments on the suitability of the ISF battalions for active operations all had 
similar points to make. The report on the Nabha Akal commented that in its initial 
operations it had performed well. It had joined the 10th Division on 8 September 1944, 
before being attached to Wheeler Force from 17 September to 20 October. The British 
commanding officer was praised for his ability and the assistance provided by attached 
British officers from 10th Indian Division was commended, yet greater training in 
operating as part of a brigade was needed and help in organising their transport.89 The 
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battalion was deemed fit to operate in an infantry brigade, and consequently joined the 
20th Brigade on 23 October, with whom it served until April 1944.90 
A report on the Jodhpur Sardar's ability to operate in Italy stated that in the spite 
of equipment shortages, individual training was of a good standard and there were 
suitable reserves of specialists.91 The greatest difficulty was in its collective training, as 
their duties in Sicily prevented them from conducting battalion exercises as “owing to 
guards and duties the Bn was unable to have more than two rifle coys and half the 
specialists and HQ Coy at any one time for training.”92 The officers needed “stimulus” 
according to their Indian Army training officer and the second-in-command (an ISF 
officer) was replaced by a British officer due to his incompetence.93 Nevertheless, it was 
believed that with training the battalion would be fit to serve in Italy and so was to be 
trained with an Indian division for one month before conducting operations.94 The 
battalion served with the division’s 10th Brigade from December 1944 until March 1945. 
The 10th Indian Division in Italy, October 1944 - November 1945 
Following their withdrawal from the Apennines a divisional conference was held 
on 28 September, which included representatives of all the units serving with the 
division. The subject of the conference was on recent and future operations, tactical 
lessons from the previous three months fighting were discussed, and priorities for future 
training.95 The division relieved the 4th Indian Division at the Rubicon River, on the east 
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coast of Italy, on 3 October and came under command of V Corps (see Map 7). During its 
time here the 10th Brigade re-joined the division on the 5th, and the 43rd Gurkha Lorried 
Brigade was attached to the division on the 7th. Operating in the foothills of the eastern 
Apennines the divisions was tasked with protecting the left flank of V Corps advance. It 
achieved this by seizing the high ground to the west, so as to facilitate 46th Division's 
assault on Cesena on 19 October. To achieve its objectives the division used both 
infiltration and set-piece assaults to capture the ridges and peaks required to protect the 
corps' flank. The division continued to protect V Corps left flank on the advance to Forli, 
forcing bridgeheads across the rivers Savio and Ronco along the way until it was relieved 
by the 46th Division on 3 November for rest and training. 
The division’s training in November was based upon Divisional Training 
Instruction No 7. This training period was tasked with preparing the division for operating 
in the plains of northern Italy and the Po Valley, which would be a departure from the 
mountain warfare it had previously conducted. In regards to training, reforms to the 
organisation of patrols were made and efforts undertaken to “overcome [the] tank and 
88mm hoodoo.”96 New equipment like the WASP flamethrower tank was to operate with 
the division and so troops were trained in its use. There was a strong possibility that 
static conditions would arise during operations in the Po Valley and training on field 
defences and mine laying was undertaken.97  
The division returned to V Corps to aid in the assault towards the river Senio on 
18 November. It was tasked with protecting the right flank of the Corps' advance, whilst 
the Canadians forced a crossing over the River Lamone, which had to be crossed before 
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the Senio could be assaulted. The division conducted this advance with their first large 
scale use of armour, provided by the 7th Armoured Brigade. On 14 December the division, 
together with the 2nd New Zealand Division and Polish Corps, assaulted the German held 
ridge between Pideura and Perfola which guarded the approaches to the river Senio. The 
tenacity of the enemy’s defence in this operation is evident meant that the division failed 
to achieve its primary objectives for the first time.98 Nevertheless, the advances of the 
New Zealanders on the right forced the Germans to withdraw to prepared positions 
beyond the Senio. The 10th Indian Division advanced to the banks of the Senio, yet 
despite the lack of enemy presence on the far bank, Reid did not allow his troops to 
occupy positions there, permitting only the establishment of a patrol base. This was 
because of the casualties the division had suffered and the logistical difficulties in 
supplying a force on the western bank. 
During the division’s time on the Senio sector during the winter of 1944-5 
vigorous patrolling was conducted to constantly harass the enemy. A British soldier of the 
division during this time reflected:  
Ever since we came to Italy we have been in the thick of the fighting and indeed the 
Div [10th Indian Division] has become nearly famous now and bids fair to outshine the 
other two well-known ones... Everybody seems to depend a devil of a lot on the Indian 
Divisions and fair play they get through some sticky work. Incidentally, I have been with 
the same Div ever since I left India. A British Warrant Officer from 125 Indian Mobile 
Workshop Company, IEME.99 
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Training continued in the division, although the decrease in Allied strength in Italy 
by 1945 meant the division was unable to undertake divisional training on the same scale 
as in April, June and November 1944, due to the need for it in operations. Instead, 
training was conducted by brigades, practical whilst held in divisional reserve with 
officers conducting theory training when in the line. The 20th Brigade when held in 
reserve in January 1945 produced a training note which set out priorities for training. In 
the training of officers, the brigade promoted the study and discussion of approved 
training pamphlets and manuals at battalion level when in the line. The arrival of many 
new officers from India to replace casualties led to language classes being held, both in 
and out of the line. The weather of the Italian winter led the brigade to use cloth models 
for officers’ training, for the discussion of tactical scenarios. The theoretical lessons that 
officers learned in the line were then tested during practical training. This was conducted 
whilst held in reserve, where each battalion conducted an exercise which focused on 
battle drills and weapons training.100  
On their relief by the 3rd Carpathian Division on 9 February 1945 the division was 
placed under the command of XIII Corps. The division subsequently relieved the 78th 
Division and 6th British Armoured Division in their sector between Monte Verro and 
Monte Grande in the Apennines south of Bologna, where the First German Parachute 
Division awaited them. The divisional history described the sector as: 
Monte Grande, a hilltop sector north of the Sillaro River, fifteen miles from outskirts 
of Bologna. It was a place of ill-omen which had seen much heavy fighting. The Germans 
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set great store by it. The country was deerstalker's landscape, with high lookouts and 
deep scours...101 
The 20th Brigade once again produced a review of its operations in Monte Grande 
in February, which found that patrols were too reliant on firing at long range and using 
mortar fire instead of using the bayonet. MacDonald also demanded improvements in 
the construction of fortified positions, particularly those based on houses, and improved 
use of snipers and observation posts for intelligence gathering.102 On 9 March the 25th 
Brigade was tasked with taking over the 85th U.S. Division's sector, which was to the west 
of where the 10th Indian Division was currently stationed. It meant that all of the 
positions on Monte Grande came under the division’s control. Despite having three 
brigades of four battalions the division was given extra infantry and artillery units to man 
such a long sector. These units were the Lovat Scouts, 2nd Highland Light Infantry, 2nd 
Loyals and the Italian irregular unit 'F' Recce Squadron. The division conducted aggressive 
patrolling against the enemy in this sector, and plans were made for the defence of the 
sector and to attack in conjunction with the planned spring offensive in 1945. 
On 13 April the division left Monte Grande for the Adriatic Front, to participate in 
the advance into the Po Valley. Due to the attachment of additional infantry units, the 
division left six of its infantry battalions behind to guard the Monte Grande sector, 
including the Nabha Akal, Jodhpur Sardar and 4/11th Sikh battalions. Deployed on the 
right of the 2nd New Zealand Division, under the command of XIII Corps, the division was 
tasked with expanding the battlefield and exerting the maximum pressure on the enemy 
(see Map 8). Operating with only one brigade forward, the 10th Brigade led the advance 
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until their replacement by the 20th Brigade on the 19th, who were tasked with assaulting 
the Idice River where the Wehrmacht made its final stand. On the 20th the 1/2nd Punjabs 
assaulted the Idice, at tremendous cost to themselves, but German resistance prevented 
them from securing a bridgehead on the far bank. The 21st found that the Germans had 
abandoned their positions on the Idice and the advance continued. With the Allied forces 
now in pursuit the 10th Indian Division found itself squeezed out of the advance by other 
formations but were warned of being committed to operations in the mountainous 
terrain south west of Padua should the enemy attempt to make a stand there. The 20th 
Brigade issued a training note to prepare its troops for these operations, which had been 
compiled from training instructions issued by Reid. It called for troops to revert to the 
“Step up” tactics that had been used in the Apennines, stating:  
We have our own drill and technique for this which had proved successful in the 
hills. We may be able to use it also in the country when tps are held up but will have to 
do it in greater strength.103 
However, the declaration of the ceasefire on 29 April prevented them from having 
to put this training to the test. A quick return to India was denied when the division was 
tasked with preserving the peace in Trieste due to the threat posed by Tito's partisans. 
This presented the possibility of a return to internal security duties, which had last been 
conducted in the Middle East in 1943-4. In preparation for this a guide to the principles of 
controlling an unarmed mob was distributed to all commands.104 The situation in Trieste 
was peacefully resolved, so the division turned its attention towards training for jungle 
warfare, given the likelihood it would be committed to operations against Japan in the 
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Far East. The Indian Army published the training pamphlet “Jungle Jottings”, which was 
adapted from the “Jungle Omnibus” jungle warfare training guide issued to troops in the 
Far East, for the use of soldiers in Europe being sent to the Far East to fight the 
Japanese.105 The division ran a jungle warfare training course that all units sent officers to 
attend, these officers would then instruct their units in jungle warfare.106 Although the 
Japanese surrendered before the 10th Indian Division could test its aptitude in jungle 
warfare, it seems likely it would have been given training in a jungle environment before 
being committed to operations. It finally departed Italy on 22 November and arrived in 
India on 17 December 1945. 
Conclusion 
The campaign of the 10th Indian Division in Italy is an example of the importance 
that the Indian Army placed on training, following its reorganisation in the latter half of 
the Second World War. By 1 April 1944 the total number of troops located at training 
formations and establishments in India Command was 523,151 (a detailed breakdown of 
the allocation of these troops is shown in Appendix 7). Of these personnel 14% (73,220) 
were allocated for the training of troops despatched overseas to Italy, the Middle East, 
Aden, Persia, Iraq and North Africa.107 The troops staffing Indian training establishments 
reflected 20% of the total strength of the Indian Army, whilst for training establishments 
                                                          
105
 WO 231/402 Jungle Jottings (based on a series of articles originally published in Army in India Training 
Memoranda, collected and republished by GHQ India as 'Jungle Omnibus', now rearranged and edited, 
adapted and abridged, for officers leaving Europe to serve in the Far East), 1945. 
106
 WO 169/22296. Training Note, 20 June 1945, p. 1.  
107
 CAB 44/209 - Book II: situation and events in India command 1941-1943, by Brigadier M. Henry. Analysis 
of Manpower in India Command, SEAC and Overseas (as affecting British and African Troops in India and 
Indian troops in all theatres) as at 1 April 1944, p. 24. 
  
79 
 
in the U.K. staffing levels only represented 12.5% of the total strength of the British 
Army.108  
The infantry was recognised as the dominant arm in the war in Burma and was 
beginning to be given the best of the new recruits, both officers and enlisted men, as 
opposed to them going to the technical units of the army.109 These measures to improve 
the infantry in the Indian Army were no doubt greatly appreciated by Alexander, who 
commanded Allied forces in Italy, where infantry was also the dominant arm. In a memo 
on the future employment of Indian forces overseas on 21 February 1944 it was noted 
that “Alexander proposed a general reduction in armour in order to apply the maximum 
possible weight against the Hun in the shape of Inf. I do not know how this proposal fits 
in with our higher strategy, but it certainly seems that Inf will be the predominant arm in 
all our future battles in Europe.”110 Soldiers sent out to units in Italy still went through 
the same training as those destined for service in Burma. It was found that training for 
future operations in ‘enclosed country’ was best done in the three new training 
formations located in India and had “been found to be necessary in order to provide the 
final polish and toughness for operation in SEAC and ITALY.”111  
One of the great weaknesses of the units which had fought in Burma in 1942 was 
that many had initially been trained for operations in the Middle East and North Africa, 
with a heavy emphasis on desert warfare. From 1943 it was decided “in all training, 
whether individual or collective, emphasis will be laid on our immediate enemy in the 
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Eastern theatre, the Japanese, and the background of BURMA, MALAYA, NEW GUINEA, 
etc. will be given to all exercises, the enemy in every case employing Japanese tactics.”112 
This decision is perfectly understandable as the war in the East was of far greater 
importance to India and the Indian Army than the war in Italy, which could be seen as a 
sideshow to the main fight in Burma. Major General Francis Tuker, commander of the 4th 
Indian Division, wrote whilst stationed in North Africa, “No formation can come straight 
into the show and do well… I would not take 4 Div into Malaya or Burma as it is. It would 
need and I would need at least a month’s hard training in the jungle with some 
instructors who know their job.”113  
The success of the 10th Indian Division in Italy was because, whilst the majority of 
the Indian Army was focused on the Japanese, it remained focused on its own 
circumstances and requirements. Field Marshal Slim proudly commented that the 
divisions in Fourteenth Army were able to adapt their operations to whatever terrain or 
situation they found themselves in, and this is equally applicable to his first divisional 
command, the 10th Indian Division.114 In two years the division was prepared to conduct 
operations in amphibious warfare, internal security duties, mountain warfare, jungle 
warfare and conventional operations. During the Italian campaign the division was able 
to adapt its tactics to the environment it was deployed to, as demonstrated by first 
operating in the Apennines, and then on the plains of Adriatic Front during late autumn 
1944 and spring 1945. The 10th Indian Division exhibited particular skill in mountain 
warfare and later went on to mentor troops stationed on the North West Frontier on 
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mountain warfare fought with modern weaponry, based on their experiences in Italy.115 
The success of this training can be attributed to the efforts of the soldiers and officers of 
the 10th Indian Division. The dissemination of training instructions and directives at 
division, brigade and battalion level indicates that the officers of the Indian Army were 
fully aware of the importance of training to troops, and so put great effort into ensuring 
it was relevant to present and future operations. Both commanders of the division, Lloyd 
and Reid, demonstrated that they were examples of the new generation of Indian Army 
generals, who placed great importance on training, to the benefit of their troops. The 
story of the ISF battalions who fought with the division in Italy is great testament to the 
positive impact that training could have on a unit. The ISF troops were regarded by many 
as being second rate. However, by undertaking an effective training regime they proved 
themselves the equals of their Indian and British Army counterparts. The main purpose of 
training was to make soldiers better than their opponents, which decreased a soldier's 
chances of becoming a casualty. When a unit suffered a casualty another soldier was 
required to replace him; the next chapter will demonstrate the processes and difficulties 
that were involved in providing reinforcements to the 10th Indian Division in Italy. 
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CHAPTER 4: MANPOWER 
This chapter will show how the Indian forces in Italy were organised and 
maintained. Martin van Creveld wrote “of all the organisational problems an army has to 
solve, that of how best to merge replacements into existing units so as to ensure the 
cohesion of the whole is one of the most crucial, since on it depends the unit’s fighting 
power.”1 This chapter will assess the infrastructure and practices of the Indian Army and 
the 10th Indian Division with regards to reinforcing its units in Italy. This will require 
understanding the system of naval convoys, administrators and camps that provided 
adequately trained soldiers to replace casualties. In addition we will look at the steps 
taken by the 10th Indian Division to reduce the likelihood and impact of casualties on 
itself. These efforts will be defined as preventative, which refers to the disciplinary, 
hygiene and training measures that the 10th Indian Division adopted in Italy. Given that 
the units of the 10th Indian Division that fought in Italy had been overseas for many years, 
we will observe how the Indian Army managed those units. The inability of the Indian 
Army to grant its soldiers regular leave to India shall be studied in the context of the 
beneficial impact it had on efforts to maintain the 10th Indian Division, and other Indian 
formations, in Italy. Finally, we will analyse the structural problems that created 
problems in reinforcing the British and Indian armies in Italy, before assessing the success 
of the Indian Army’s ability to reinforce the 10th Indian Division in Italy.  
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The Indian Reinforcement System: Naval Convoys, Administration and the Indian 
Reinforcement Camps 
The Indian reinforcement system relied on naval transport to get troops from 
India to Italy. The distances involved in transporting troops to these overseas theatres 
placed heavy demands on shipping space. Some troopships went from India direct to 
Italy, but others disembarked their troops in the Middle East where another ship took 
them onto Italy. An example of this is convoy XIF 10, which arrived in the Middle East in 
early February 1944 from India. The convoy consisted of three troopships transporting 
mostly Indian soldiers but with some British troops, all destined for units in CMF. Of the 
three ships, one proceeded directly to Italy with 1,880 Indian Army troops.2 The other 
two ships would disembark 2,739 troops in the Middle East where they were held in 
transit camps before onward despatch to Italy.3  
Indian troops travelled in 'Indian fitted ships' in naval convoy XIF 10 for transit to 
Italy.4 The different religions in the Indian Army led to different dietary and culinary 
requirements which had to be observed on troopships, hence the reason there were 
specially fitted Indian ships. An account from a British officer of 10th Indian Infantry 
Brigade5 during the division's move from Egypt to Italy gives an account of a journey on 
one of these ships. 
On the voyage I was the Indian troops Messing Officer, and had about 1400 Indians 
to cater for. What a job! The cookhouse was a galley about 16 feet square, which had to 
be divided into two, one half for the Mohamedans and the other for the Hindus...I 
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consider it a damned scandal that suitable arrangements are not made for native troops 
of different religions.6  
Given the other difficulties experienced in the expansion of the Indian Army it 
would be understandable if the number, or quality, of troopships for Indian soldiers was 
to be found wanting. In an attempt to create extra shipping space for Indian troops, 
officers from 16th Indian Reinforcement Camp on January 1945 inspected and advised on 
the conversion of a ship to an Indian troop carrier.7  
One of the most vital components of the replacement system was administration. 
For the Indian Army this was carried out by the staff of Advanced 2nd Echelon (Indian), a 
branch of which was present in every theatre where Indian troops were stationed. In 
Italy it was called ‘Adv O2E (Ind) CMF’, or O2E, and was staffed by British and Indian 
personnel. The Indian personnel were, like most Indian service units, a mixed unit with 
both Hindu and Muslim soldiers working together. The only instance of the troops being 
segregated by their religion was during its move to Italy, the troops being split into drafts 
for travel, these being British troops, Indian Hindu troops, Indian Muslim troops, 
followers and the baggage guard.8 It is unclear if this was done because of the caste and 
religious requirements of the troops, which, the quotation above shows, were still 
observed on naval voyages, or simply to move the soldiers in an orderly manner. Each 
clerk was responsible for administering a unit’s strength returns, from which the echelon 
calculated the strength of the Indian forces in Italy and Greece. O2E produced the ‘X’ lists 
which showed soldiers not attached to a unit because they were injured, known POWs, 
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deserters, held in a reinforcement camp or on a training course. The ‘X’ lists were the raw 
data from which requests for reinforcements were made. The 25th Indian Infantry 
Brigade9 was forced to remind its units to promptly submit their strength returns, as 
there late submission caused delay in reinforcements being sent to Italy.10  
During the Second World War soldiers of the Indian Army, both within and 
outside of India, had to travel large distances to reach their units. Troops sent from India 
to Italy had to cover a distance of over 4,000 miles in a troopship. In order to facilitate 
safe travel for these soldiers between units and bases, reinforcement and transit camps 
were formed in every theatre that the Indian Army fought in during the Second World 
War. The Indian reinforcement camps (IRC) played a crucial role in the reinforcement 
process for Indian formations in Italy. They were transit points through which Indian 
soldiers being posted to a unit, and through which those returning to India, passed. The 
advantage of such a system was that divisions were able to draw upon a reserve of 
trained manpower to replace casualties in theatre, which for a unit deployed overseas, 
such as the 10th Indian Division, was vital. It would have been inefficient to have only 
requested reinforcements from India upon first receiving casualties. The uncertainty of 
shipping times meant that by the time reinforcements arrived they would be insufficient 
to cover losses sustained in the time passed. An IRC was commanded by a lieutenant 
colonel with a headquarters section in charge of the administrative running of the camp, 
mess units responsible for catering, and an instructional wing for the training of the 
troops in the camp. The soldiers sent to act as replacements were placed into sections 
whilst they awaited transfer to their parent unit. The number of sections in a 
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reinforcement camp varied according to the number of troops the camp was expected to 
hold. In Burma, reinforcement camps had ten sections each whilst in Italy camps only had 
six. Each section was officially supposed to hold 300 soldiers.11 
By the war’s end there would be three IRC in Italy. The 16th and 11th IRC served 
the 8th and 10th Indian Divisions, respectively, in Italy, whilst the 8th IRC supplied the 4th 
Indian Division in Italy and then Greece. The 16th IRC had been the divisional 
reinforcement camp for the 8th Indian Division since June 1943 and was the first camp to 
arrive in Italy, on 24 September 1943. It did not begin operating until October because 
the camp had not been able to unload all its stores off the ships during the move from 
Egypt, and those ships had then sailed to Oran. The camp commander noted to 8th Indian 
Division that the missing equipment would affect the ability of the camp to function.12  
Being the only IRC in Italy, yet having the responsibility for all Indian 
reinforcements, stretched 16th IRC to the limit. Despite the 4th Indian Division arriving in 
November, its reinforcement camp (the 8th IRC) did not arrive until December and was 
not operational until April 1944. Nevertheless despite these extra burdens they still had a 
section taken away from them in November to set up a transit camp in Foggia on the 
19th. This was in spite of the expected arrival of an advance party of 700 men from 4th 
Indian Division on the 22nd, which the camp was tasked with housing.13  
By February 1944 the increase in reinforcements coming into the Italian theatre 
was too great for 16th IRC to cope with on its current war establishment, being the only 
functioning reinforcement camp for the two divisions and all other Indian units. It was 
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decided on the 9th at a meeting between O2E and the camp commander that, with the 
camp’s current strength of seventy-five BOs and 2,600 other ranks (despite an official 
total capacity of 1,800 all ranks), the expected future arrival of over 2,500 reinforcements 
would be too much for the camp to handle. The camp reverted to a ten section 
establishment by taking four sections of 8th IRC, which was still in a staging area, to help 
with the future influx of reinforcements. These arrived on the 21st and totalled nineteen 
BOs, thirty-four VCOs and 2,677 IORs. So that the 4th Indian Division was less reliant upon 
16th IRC for reinforcements the decision was taken on 16 February to form an immediate 
reserve for them using ‘Y’ Indian Rest Camp to hold ten BOs, seven VCOs and 356 IORs.14 
By 5 April the 8th IRC became operational and supplied 4th Indian Division with 
reinforcements, despite having been in the country since 21 December 1943. It had been 
in a staging area in Taranto whilst efforts were made to find it a suitable camp site, and 
the men of the camp had occupied themselves with training. A site was found eventually 
at Benevento on 19 March and it began to set up camp there immediately, although it 
was not until the 24th that they were able to begin specialist courses given by the 
instructional wing. By the 21st, 16th IRC contained 120 BOs, 106 VCOs and 4,975 IORs 
despite an official strength of only sixty BOs and 3000 other ranks. On the 28th the 11th 
IRC, the reinforcement camp of 10th Indian Division, left Egypt for Italy. The 30 March saw 
a liaison visit to 16th IRC from Major General Denys Reid, who had just arrived in Italy 
with his division.15 
The 11th IRC had been getting its camp assembled at Taranto having arrived on 4 
May from the Middle East, becoming operational on 27th and operating on a six section 
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basis. The speed with which their camp was set up is in stark contrast to the experience 
of 8th IRC. The establishment of all three camps appears to have lessened the burden on 
16th IRC, as on 5 June it despatched thirty-six BOs, sixteen VCOs and 1,144 IORs to 8th IRC, 
which included all 4th Indian Division personnel.16 Also on the 5th, 11th IRC took a draft of 
four BOs, nine VCOs, 504 IORs and 107 Non-Combatant personnel from 16th IRC.17 This 
brought the total personnel of 16th IRC camp down to 1,500 all ranks which was the 
lowest it had been in six months. The four sections that had been temporarily attached 
from 8th IRC earlier in the year were returned on the 8th.18 
By August the Allied advance necessitated the use of transit camps for 
reinforcements travelling between the reinforcement camps and divisions as the distance 
was too great. However, there were no designated transit camps in Italy. Therefore O2E 
converted three Indian P.W. Cages (the 2nd, 7th and 11th), with 2nd Indian P.W. Cage being 
augmented by two sections of 8th IRC, into transit camps. One of these camps was 
located at Monte San Savino for the reinforcement of 8th and 10th Indian Divisions and 
non-divisional units, the second at the Assisi railhead and the third at Ancona to reinforce 
4th Indian Division.19 In November plans were made to relocate 11th IRC to Ancona and, in 
December, the 8th IRC to Taranto, most likely because of 4th Indian Division’s deployment 
to Greece.  
On 23 January 1945 the Indian Section of 2nd Echelon of CMF, which was 
responsible for administering all manpower of Indian Army personnel in the 
Mediterranean theatre of operations, had decided on the allocation of Indian 
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reinforcements for reinforcement camps in Italy (see Appendix 8, Table 1). It also 
approved the move of 8th IRC from Benevento to Taranto in January, where the 16th IRC 
was stationed. The 11th IRC moved north to Ancona from Taranto in February. 
The 8th IRC was tasked with holding all reinforcements for 11th IRC sent from 
overseas until they were able to move forward (see Appendix 8, Table 2). Troops who 
were released from hospital or convalescent depots were sent to a camp dependent on 
their location. 
 Troops released from hospitals or a convalescent depots south of Rome were sent to 
11th IRC if fit for service, those who were to be evacuated out of Italy went to 16th IRC. 
 Troops fit for service who were released from hospitals or convalescent depots near 
Rome were sent to the 32nd Indian Rest Camp at Rome, where they would then be sent 
to their units at the first opportunity. 
 Troops fit for service who were released from hospitals or convalescent depots near or 
north of Arezzo and Jesi were returned to their units.20 
The 8th IRC was also responsible for prisoners from 5th Indian Military Prison, both 
those to return to their units from 8th and 11th IRC and those prisoners who were to be 
dismissed from the service.21 The camp also held those troops of the Indian Engineers 
and Indian military police in Italy until they could be sent to their respective training 
schools.22 The Indian engineers were sent to the Indian Wing of the School of Mechanical 
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Engineers and Indian Engineers Telegraph Department at Capua, whilst provosts went to 
the Indian wing of the Corps of Military Police at San Guiseppe. 
The above allocation was most likely decided by the fact that 8th IRC had eight 
sections as opposed to the six sections of 11th IRC, making it able to garrison more 
troops. The distance from Taranto to the front line made it impractical to send troops to 
11th IRC forward as soon as they had disembarked from their troopship. It was more 
logical for combat units to be closest to the front line as they could be sent to their units 
quickest, which was the case with 11th IRC which held purely infantry reinforcements for 
10th Indian Division and 43rd Gurkha Lorried Brigade and was the most forward deployed 
camp. The other two camps, in particular 8th IRC, contained support and service units 
who were deployed in the rear. However, the most important reason for placing 8th IRC 
in Taranto is that, as the designated reinforcement camp for 4th Indian Division, it would 
need to send its troops to Greece. Therefore being close to a major port was the most 
logistically sensible solution.  
The 8th and 16th IRC both operated beyond their official capacity at times. On 5 
February 1945, 16th IRC had to close down its VCO's mess as its cooks were required to 
serve the troops in the camp, suggesting it was garrisoning more than its established 
strength of 1,800 soldiers.23 This situation was not eased in the short term as 18 February 
saw a draft of 2,000 soldiers from the Middle East arrive and, on 21-22 February, a draft 
of 3,000 troops from India. Such was the need to house all these extra troops the 16th IRC 
took on 2,000 men from the convoy of the 21-22, an increase of 500 from the original 
estimate after consulting with 8th IRC and 52 Area, who were responsible for 
administering the area in which the camps were based. This was done to relieve the 
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pressure on the 8th IRC, as it was estimated that, after the new drafts had been stationed 
in the camp, 16th IRC would have a strength of 5,000 all ranks, and 8th IRC 6,000 all 
ranks.24 The final large draft of soldiers to arrive in CMF before the war's end was on 28 
March 1945 where a party of forty officers and 1,600 IORs arrived from MEF.25 The 
reinforcement camps were the one of the last units of the Indian Army to leave Italy, as 
they were needed for the return of troops to India.  
Like so many aspects of the Indian Army in the Second World War, the successes 
of the reinforcement camps were founded in failure. During the First Arakan offensive in 
1943 the reinforcement camps' capabilities had been called into question. Organised on 
the system of IRCs in the Middle East they were found wanting. They failed to provide 
adequate training opportunities to the troops who passed through them, despite often 
long periods of time spent waiting for transport or orders to move to their unit. It was 
discovered that in these lengthy spells of time spent travelling to and from the camps 
much military knowledge was forgotten.26  
The Middle East had reformed its IRCs in November 1942, deciding that all new 
reinforcements in the Middle East would stay at a reinforcement camp until they had 
passed their training tests, and would then be sent to their units. First reinforcements 
were to be held at reinforcement camps unless special circumstances, such as the unit 
being significantly below strength, deemed they should be sent straight to their unit. 
Certain service arms were permitted to hold their reinforcements within their units if the 
                                                          
24
 WO 169/22862. War diary entry for 18 February 1945. 
25 
WO 169/22862. War diary entry for 28 March 1945. 
26
 T. Moreman, The Jungle, the Japanese and the British Commonwealth Armies at War 1941-45: Fighting 
Methods, Doctrine and Training for Jungle Warfare (Abingdon, 2005), p. 84. 
  
92 
 
reinforcement camps could not provide appropriate training for them.27 Regardless of 
whether the failures in 1943 were due to the failure of the system or the rapid expansion 
of the Indian Army, major reforms were enacted to improve the reinforcement camps. 
The first, being the allocation of permanent section commanders, and the second, the 
association of a camp with a division, to whom it would be the sole provider of all its 
reinforcements. Troops for rear echelon and service units were distributed amongst the 
camps. The result of these changes was an improvement in the training of 
reinforcements.  
Brigadier J. H. Gradidge, who was responsible for the reinforcement camps in 
India, believed the major problem was that section commanders had been found from 
officers passing through the camp on their way to or from the front. This arrangement 
left the troops in these sections poorly trained as there was rarely a permanent section 
commander who had any suitable length of time to train them properly, nor was he 
aware of the latest tactical lessons from the front.28 He believed any improvement was 
linked to the appointment of permanent section commanders, but it was not until August 
1943, with the support of General George Giffard, commander of Eastern Army in India, 
that they were introduced.29 On 17 April 1944 a conference was held between Lieutenant 
Colonel Roberts of O2E (Ind) Mideast, Major Barton O2E (Ind) CMF and the camp 
commander and adjutant of 16th IRC. They discussed staff appointments to the camp, but 
also a plan to make all IRCs equal size. Another matter concerned section commanders, 
with the camp commander asserting that “with a camp of this size it is absolutely 
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essential that all sections have their own permanent commanders.” They were promised 
that appointments would be made soon.30  
Camps bore the insignia of the division they served and the division provided the 
sectional commanders and instructional staff for their camp, to ensure the most recent 
battlefield lessons were being passed on to new reinforcements.31 The 4/10th Baluchis 
appointed temporary Major D. A. Hooper to the 10th Indian Division's training cadre at 
the 11th IRC in February 1945.32 An officer from 8th Indian Division visited 16th IRC on 17 
October 1943 with a request that the camp begin a driving and maintenance course and 
the training of reinforcements for the 6th D.C.O. Lancers, with vehicles and instructors 
being provided by the division.33 When the 4th Indian Division was moved to a location 
near to 8th IRC it provided “an opportunity for all Officers of the Camp staff and Div. Staff 
to liaise, and certainly wasn’t wasted. The lessons recently learnt in the Div. were passed 
on to the I.W. (Instructional Wing) both by Officers and men. The Officers commanding 
the various Units in the Div were both generous and co-operative in tackling the various 
administrative problems. The results of these talks will without doubt increase our 
efficiency in serving the Div.”34  
The fact that the camps and divisional staff began to recognise their mutual 
importance to one another raised standards and morale. A letter sent on 4 August 1944 
to 16th IRC by Major General Dudley Russell, commander of 8th Indian Division, stated 
“you are doing excellent work for the Division, and I appreciate all your efforts. You and 
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your staff play a vital part in our successes and I should have liked to have told you all so 
personally. Please tell all under your command how grateful the Division is for all they 
have done for us.”35 This shows that the division saw the camp not as a separate unit but 
as a part of the division itself. 
Training at the camps depended to an extent on the facilities available to the 
instructors and also on what its parent division wanted in terms of training, but there 
does appear to have been some similarities between the camps. All reinforcements who 
were held at one of these camps took part in training unless designated sick. General 
training for all reinforcements involved mandatory physical training, range shooting (if 
the facilities were available), general field training and educational training which were 
mandatory. The instructional wing of a camp also offered training in the specialist roles 
of the infantry and combat arms, such as two and three inch mortars, sniping, light 
machine guns, medium machine guns, intelligence and pistol shooting. These courses 
were open to not only the men in the camps but also those in the divisions. The 8th IRC 
had its own mortar and small arms ranges as well as a battle inoculation course. Its 
instructors were assisted in other areas by the Central Mediterranean Training Centre 
and the Royal Artillery, who offered them use of their firing ranges as well as letting the 
students attend any demonstrations which may have been useful to them.36 Of crucial 
importance to the ability of the Indian Army to function was the ability of its British 
officers to speak the language of their troops, or at least have an understanding of Urdu 
(or Gurkhali if joining a Gurkha battalion), and so the camps began language classes for 
the British officers. 
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The staff of 16th IRC were responsible for aiding the port authorities in convoy 
embarkation and disembarkation, helping them with the language barrier. It was difficult 
for officers of the British Army to communicate with Indian soldiers. A letter of thanks 
was sent from 52 Area to 16th IRC stating “this is to thank you for the absolutely 
invaluable assistance given by your officers during the disembarkation and embarkation 
of our recent convoy. The language question is invariably a stumbling block when English 
speaking only E.S.Os [Embarkation Staff Officer] are employed and the quick 
disembarkation and despatch from quays of the large No. of Indian Army troops would 
not have been possible without the help of your officers.”37  
Managing the loss of troops 
Commanders accepted that no matter how efficient a reinforcement system was 
it would take time for the soldier to reach his unit. Whilst waiting for its reinforcements 
to arrive the unit would be vulnerable if engaged in operations. Indian and British units 
deployed overseas with their first reinforcements, which equalled 10% of the unit’s 
strength, giving it an immediate supply of troops to draw upon in the event of casualties. 
The 10th Indian Division brought its units up to full strength when ordered to deploy to 
Italy, and units travelled with their first reinforcements.38 The 20th Indian Infantry 
Brigade39 was scheduled to pick up reinforcements from a reinforcement camp in Egypt 
before embarking for Italy, “probable that rfts to complete W.E. plus 1st Rfts if available 
will join in conc area.”40  
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To alleviate the effects of casualties, the 10th Indian Division trained reserves of 
key roles in its units, providing a ready replacement in the event of a casualty. The 
training of reserves was a way of enabling the division to continue to fight effectively in 
spite of suffering casualties. Specialists were the signallers, mortar personnel, six 
pounder anti-tank gunners, M.T. drivers, M.T. driver mechanics, M.T. fitters, snipers and 
pioneers of an infantry battalion. Their loss would diminish the capabilities of the unit. As 
such 10th Indian Division Training Instruction No. 2 in November 1943 set the target of 
training 100% reserves of specialists.41 However, the individual brigade commanders 
increased the reserves to be trained. The 20th Brigade in November set a target for M.T. 
Drivers of a reserve of 150% by March 1944, with all other specialist roles aiming for 
reserves of 100%.42 Both called for speed and prioritisation in training specialists. The 
other two brigades make mention of training specialists much earlier in 1943. The 25th 
Brigade in May and April 1943 had aimed to train 100% reserves of M.T. and carrier 
drivers, with 50% reserves in other specialist platoons. This training was prioritised over 
the training of soldiers for the twenty-five pounder artillery gun, which was stopped until 
targets had been reached.43 In May 1943 the 10th Brigade aimed to train 100% of 
reserves by June 1943, eventually reaching 200%.44 The 10th Indian Division Training 
Instruction No 4 of April 1944 wanted there to be a fully trained reserve for the brigade 
and battalion patrol masters given the possibility of them becoming a casualty and 
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requiring replacing.45 Units were instructed to aim for a 100% reserve in trained snipers 
for section, company and battalion level.46  
The loss of a unit’s commander could be even more damaging to a unit, as was 
proven in the Indian units deployed on the Western Front in the First World War. In order 
to ensure that a replacement officer could quickly take on the duties of a wounded or 
killed officer, from June 1944 Indian infantry and machine gun battalions were permitted 
to have five additional officers attached to them in excess of their authorised war 
establishment.47 10th Indian Division Training Instruction No 7, covering training in 
November 1944, ordered that battalion second-in-commands were to command their 
battalion in action, so they could readily assume the responsibility if the commander 
became a casualty.48 Reid also wanted infantry battalions to train their VCOs to 
command companies in case the company commander became a casualty.49  
In November 1944 the 2/3rd Gurkhas began to organise an NCOs training cadre, 
with three men from each rifle company and six from its HQ Company who had shown 
the potential for promotion to NCO rank. They would be trained to assume an NCOs 
duties should one become a casualty.50 The commander of a battalion had control over 
promotion in his unit to the rank of Jemadar, which allowed a commander to quickly 
appoint new NCOs and platoon commanders in case of casualties.51 To assemble an 
adequate supply of reserve platoon commanders the division opened up the Senior 
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Indian NCOs Training Cadre, whose opening address on 23 February 1945 stated “the 
course is to give you while you have time and opportunity to think about them, ideas and 
help as to what you have to think of as a pl comd.”52 The importance of these cadres is 
evident in that it was Major General Reid who gave the address. The cadre covered 
theoretical training on subjects including field craft, night operations, navigation, urban 
warfare, attacks on fortified positions and infantry/tank combined operations. 
The Indian Army by February 1944 “owing to the shortage of Staffs, Sigs 
[Signallers] etc... cannot now raise extra Fmns. The solution, therefore, seems to be to 
give our existing Bdes a fourth battalion, with a LOB [Left out of Battle] role. The 
advantages of this are that these units could be trained now with Bdes and that they 
would be available at hand to tide over the period when reinforcements are being sent 
forward.”53 Left out of Battle (LOB) was used by the Commonwealth Armies in the First 
and Second World Wars. It involved leaving a cadre of men from a platoon, company or 
battalion in reserve whilst it was in action, to act as a nucleus to reform the unit if it 
suffered heavy losses in battle. In the context of the extract here it involved the fourth 
battalion of a brigade being able to take the place of one of the other three battalions, 
allowing it to rest and integrate reinforcements, whilst maintaining the brigade’s strength 
of three battalions.54 The decision to give brigades a fourth battalion is one of the 
primary reasons for the deployment of ISF units to Italy. The LOB system was practiced 
not only at the brigade level, but also by infantry battalions. The 25th Brigade’s Indian 
infantry battalions were ordered to keep those officers held in addition to the war 
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establishment with their unit’s LOB contingent when the battalion was committed to 
operations.55  
Preventing Unnecessary Casualties 
During the Second World War, the Indian Army was at the forefront of efforts to 
decrease the impact of disease and sickness during the campaign in Burma. The 
development of medicines and procedures to combat the numerous diseases in that 
theatre were credited with being a vital factor in the eventual victory of the Fourteenth 
Army. The 10th Indian Division also took measures to decrease non-battle casualties from 
sickness and accidents in Italy. Whilst some may dismiss their presence as little more 
than 'health and safety rules', they were in fact a means of preventing unnecessary and 
needless casualties and reduced the demand for reinforcements.  
Whilst based in Cyprus between January and June 1943 the division took steps to 
reduce illness from typhus fever, which was deadly and highly contagious. The first step 
to prevent the spread of the disease was by making soldiers bathe frequently but, if he 
did find a louse on his body or clothes, or if he displayed symptoms, he was to report sick 
to prevent it spreading. The camp orders stated “a lousy man is therefore a danger to 
himself and to other members of his unit.”56 In August 1943 anti-typhus inoculations 
began to prevent further outbreaks of the disease. Upon arrival in Italy in March 1944 the 
division segregated personnel from one of the troopships, where there had been an 
outbreak of smallpox, to stop it spreading to the rest of the division.57 In April the 20th 
Brigade produced instructions on hygiene and anti-malaria precautions during their 
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posting to Ortona. Along with the more advanced methods of anti-malarial sprays, 
weekly skin inspections and the construction of suitable latrine and refuse trenches were 
also promoted to stop the spread of disease.58  
High standards of hygiene and sanitation were constantly aimed for. The 25th 
Brigade issued orders on sanitation in March 194559 and during June 1945 anti-malarial 
measures were maintained, even though hostilities had ceased.60 Commanders used 
informal methods to communicate to the troops the need to maintain health and 
hygiene. In January 1945, with the division in a sector of the line by the Senio River, the 
harsh winter weather made trench foot a threat. To remind the troops of the danger this 
presented to them, Major General Reid used his column in the divisional newspaper, the 
Diagonals, to remind the troops that “difficult though it may be, will you all please try 
and take off your boots at least once a day, and give your feet a good rubbing. If you 
don't you'll have quite a lot of foot trouble.”61 Sanitation and safety measures were 
practised by all elements of the division. The quartermaster's branch of the divisional HQ 
was forced to construct deep trench latrines at its location in March 1945 for reasons of 
hygiene.62 It also collected and burnt six to eight thousand empty food tins that had been 
left scattered round the camp site.63 At the same camp site the troops were tasked with 
the collection of spent ammunition cases and live ammunition that had been left there. 
The divisional Ordnance Officer was called first to make sure that the ammunition was 
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safe for the troops to collect it for disposal.64 The administrative section of the divisional 
orders contained orders related to the preparation and cooking of food, availability of 
shower and bathing facilities, camp hygiene procedures and were repeated continually.  
Another cause of non-battle casualties was the presence of motor vehicles, which 
in the Second World War were used on a far greater scale than in the First World War. It 
was this increased presence of motor vehicles in the British and Indian Armies that led to 
the huge increase in support troops.65 It is worth remembering that the commander of 
the 10th Indian Division, Major General W.H. Lloyd, was killed in a motor accident whilst 
observing an armoured training exercise in Egypt in January 1943. During its time 
stationed in Cyprus there were sixty-eight traffic accidents in January 1943 and eighty-
three in February 1943, with the threat of death or injury they posed.66 During July 1943, 
with the division stationed in Palestine, there were fifty-two traffic accidents in the Haifa 
district which resulted in the deaths of four soldiers.67 The military authorities certainly 
felt many of these incidents were avoidable and that lives could have been saved and felt 
that speeding was to blame. To this end they charged all warrant officers and NCOs to aid 
the military police in preventing speeding vehicles and to report the culprits to their 
parent unit for disciplinary action.68 Other measures to reduce the number of traffic 
accidents include the imposition of speed limits in camps and the provision of safety 
helmets for motorcyclists.  
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Unit Management 
The Indian Army, where possible, withdrew a unit when it had suffered excessive 
casualties, to give it time to reorganise and 'bed in' new reinforcements to regain its 
fighting ability. All eight of the Indian Army infantry battalions which would serve with 
10th Indian Division in Italy were pre-war regular battalions. They had all been overseas 
since the beginning of the war and had experienced fierce fighting. They had come to 
serve with the 10th Indian Division in Italy because they had suffered severe casualties, 
and their time with the division in Cyprus and the Middle East was to allow them to 
regain their strength whilst conducting garrison duties (see Appendix 9).  
The case of the 1/6th and 4/6th Rajputana Rifles, who had fought with the 4th 
Indian Division at the First Battle of Monte Cassino in February 1944, offers an example 
of this in relation to the campaign in Italy. Both of these were pre-war battalions who had 
served overseas for over four years, sustaining 1,800 and 2,700 casualties respectively, 
consequently their commander requested they be exchanged with fresh formations.69 
The two relieving battalions were the 3/12th Frontier Force Regiment and the 2/11th 
Sikhs, both pre-war battalions. The former had been in Italy since 1943 as a garrison 
battalion and relieved the 4/6th Rajputana Rifles in March 1944.70 The 2/11th Sikhs had to 
be obtained from the Middle East, despite the 4/11th Sikhs being the battalion requested 
by AFHQ.71 The 2/11th were chosen because they had greater recent experience of 
battalion and brigade training, having trained with 10th Indian Division until October 
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1943.72 During their service in the war so far the 2/11th had suffered 250 casualties, 
compared to 4/11th's 1,200 casualties.73 It was decided the 1/6th and 4/6th Rajputana 
Rifles would be returned to India after their relief, as their commanders felt “both Bns 
require long periods of rest and it is not considered that they will regain the former high 
standard by a period of guards and duties in ITALY or MIDEAST...In view of magnificent 
war record of both Bns strongly recommend that they be returned to INDIA for period of 
leave and recuperation after which they will undoubtedly regain their former high 
standard.”74  
If we recall the reforms of India Command in 1943, the problems with the 
reinforcement system extended to not only the replacement of individual soldiers, but 
also the inability to relieve battalions from the front line, who may have been stuck in 
operations for several months, with fresh units.75 On 1 January 1945 AFHQ produced a 
letter titled ‘The relief of Indian Battalions in Persia and Iraq Command (PAIFORCE76).’77 
The letter sent by AFHQ was their decision on a request from Commander in Chief of the 
Indian Army, General Sir Claude Auchinleck on 17 December 1944.78 Auchinleck 
suggested the relief of seven regular Indian Army Indian infantry battalions from 
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PAIFORCE by battalions from India, because these battalions were pre-war regulars who 
had seen little active service during the war. He proposed that the battalions in PAIFORCE 
be exchanged with their sister battalions in Italy, so the former could be used in active 
operations (see Appendix 10). The reasons for wanting to make use of these battalions 
were firstly, morale, of both the PAIFORCE and CMF battalions. Secondly, the PAIFORCE 
battalions’ limited engagement in active operations meant there were a high number of 
long-service soldiers when compared to those in their sister battalions, who had been 
more heavily engaged in operations. 
The scheme suggested by the Indian Army was one which Alexander, the 
Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean, agreed with. However, Alexander 
sought the advice of his commanders before beginning the transfer of units. The British 
increment of Fifth Army replied by offering the opinion of Major General Dudley Russell, 
the commanding officer of the 8th Indian Division, in a letter dated 9 January 1945.79 
Whilst agreeing in principle to the idea of PAIFORCE infantry battalions seeing active 
service in Italy, he was only willing to do so on the condition that a triangular relief 
system was adopted over the direct system proposed by Auchinleck. The triangular relief 
system proposed that, instead of battalions being exchanged between Italy and 
PAIFORCE and PAIFORCE and India, battalions sent to Italy from PAIFORCE would be 
replaced by those from India, and those in Italy would be sent to India. Russell justified 
this approach on the grounds of the morale of the troops in Italy. He wrote that if a 
triangular relief system was not implemented it “would be better to risk a possible, and 
not necessarily, great loss of morale in Bns retained in PAIC, rather than incur a certain 
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and complete collapse of morale in Bns sent from Italy to PAIC.” This was because Russell 
was well aware of the unpopularity of service in PAIFORCE with Indian troops, stating “it 
would be quite impossible to persuade any unit, ordered to return there [PAIFORCE], that 
the second tour would not be as bad as the first.”80 He also noted that the intention to 
offer a generous leave scheme to those battalions sent from Italy could leave them 
having to conduct operations in PAIFORCE below full strength. Eighth Army commanders 
approved the move on the condition that the battalions moving to Italy arrived a month 
prior to the departure of the battalions they would relieve, and that the battalions 
relieved in Italy should not have their “ultimate return to India...be prejudiced by their 
transfer to PAIFORCE.”81 It shows that there was a universal belief that the battalions in 
Italy should not be withdrawn from fierce fighting, only to be called upon to conduct 
unpopular policing actions in the Middle East.  
By 30 January the relief of the battalions in PAIFORCE was gaining momentum. 
Lieutenant General John Harding, Chief of Staff of AFHQ, informed Fifteenth Army Group 
that PAIFORCE had agreed to the reduction in their garrison of one infantry battalion.82 It 
intended to despatch the 3/11th Sikhs, 5/12th FF Regiment and 5/13th FF Rifles to Italy 
first, with the remaining battalions following. Indian divisional commanders believed the 
priority for relief should be based on length of service overseas.83  As such it was 
requested that the first unit to be sent to Italy be the 5/13th FF Rifles, to relieve the 6/13th 
                                                          
80
 WO 204/7394. Message of 11 January 1945 to 15 Army Group from British Increment, G(SD) Branch, HQ 
Fifth Army on Relief of Indian Battalions in PAIFORCE, Appendix A: Letter of 9 January 1945 from Major 
General Dudley Russell, 8 Indian Infantry Division on the Relief of Indian Battalions in PAIFORCE. 
81 
WO 204/7394. Cipher message from Eighth Army to 15 Army Group on 21 January 1945 on the relief of 
Indian Battalions in PAIFORCE. 
82
 WO 204/7394. Message from Lt.-General John Harding of AFHQ to 15
th
 Army Group on 30 January 1945 
on Relief of Indian Battalions in PAIC. 
83
 WO 204/7394. Message from HQ 15 Army Group to AFHQ of 5 February 1945. 
  
106 
 
in the 8th Indian Division.84 This was what Major General Russell had originally suggested 
when he gave his opinion on the matter in January. However, it had still not been 
clarified whether Russell’s proposed triangular relief system, or the linear relief system, 
was to be used. 
However, the authorities in London informed PAIC, India Command and CMF that 
the transfer of battalions was on hold whilst it assessed whether PAIC could afford to lose 
one Indian infantry battalion from its garrison.85 It was not until 6 March 1945 that 
Alexander informed the Eighth Army that London had approved the transfer of battalions 
to Italy, with the first battalion to be sent, the 5/13th FF Rifles, scheduled to arrive in Italy 
mid-April, which would permit the return of 6/13th to India.86 The fact that the battalion 
did not arrive in Italy until mid-April, and since it was not expected to be operationally 
ready until after a month of training, meant it did not play a part in operations as had 
been hoped when the scheme was launched in December 1944. On 29 April the decision 
was taken not to send any more Indian infantry battalions to Italy from PAIC, due to the 
imminent end of the war in the theatre.87  
The attempted relief of battalions in Italy by those from PAIFORCE shows that the 
Indian Army was attempting to solve the biggest complaint of the Indian soldiers in Italy: 
the lack of leave to India. This chapter will not deal with the effect that the lack of leave 
had on the morale and outlook of the Indian soldier. Instead, it will argue that the lack of 
leave granted to Indian troops in Italy made the reinforcement process much simpler. By 
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1 September 1945 there were over 19,000 Indian soldiers in Italy who had not had leave 
to India for three years or more (see Appendix 11). The 10th Indian Division by 1 October 
1945 contained 666 soldiers who had served overseas for over four years without leave, 
and 1,393 who had served three and a half to four years.88 The major problem in granting 
leave to Indian troops was transport, namely that it relied upon erratic and irregular 
shipping convoys, which was the view of the Major General Reid: 
Time and again leave parties have proceeded to TARANTO [sic] – have passed to 
Middle East and have been held up for long periods owing to shipping arrangements 
breaking down. I have suggested and spoken to higher authority on this matter and 
attempts have been made to introduce “shuttle services” etc. These arrangements as I 
warned authorities before have all broken down because any arrangement that has not 
had the blessing of Movements is bound to break down.89  
By 31 March 1945, 16th IRC contained 1,600 Indian troops who were awaiting 
passage to India but had to be kept in camp due to a lack of shipping space.90 The 
irregularity of shipping affected not only the return of soldiers to India on leave, but also 
their return to their units in Italy. Many troops that did manage to go on leave failed to 
return because they found themselves stuck in India awaiting transport to Italy, or were 
absorbed into units in India. Major General Reid found the latter of these to be a real 
problem with regard to medical personnel and RIASC91 drivers, as the time taken for 
replacements to arrive was too long and they were typically of inferior quality.92 The 
other problem that the delay or non-return of Indian troops from leave was that it denied 
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leave to other soldiers. Leave was carefully managed, with units being allotted vacancies 
for how many of their troops could go on leave. A soldier who went on leave was using 
one of these vacancies, and it could not be used by another soldier until he returned to 
his unit. Given the long delays in soldiers returning to their units this further decreased 
the availability of leave. The failures of the leave system are shown in Appendix 12, as 
troops who departed for two months leave to India took much longer to return to their 
units in Italy. 
Major General Reid had been a tireless campaigner on granting adequate home 
leave to Indian troops in Italy. He believed that the creation of a regular ‘shuttle service’, 
a naval convoy travelling direct between Italy and India, was the best way of increasing 
the number of troops given leave. However, failing that he believed that if the transport 
could be undertaken by planes, rather than ships, the decrease in numbers of men sent 
on leave would be offset by troops knowing a quick and reliable service existed.93 In 
August 1944 Reid proposed that a fleet of forty planes would permit ten planes a day to 
transport approximately sixty soldiers a day from each Indian division in Italy to India for 
leave. Reid calculated that such a scheme would have granted two months home leave to 
every soldier in an Indian division, who had served overseas for more than three years, in 
six months.94 The planes were never granted, nor was the regular shuttle service formed, 
so by August 1945 there were 25,000 Indian troops in CMF and the Middle East who had 
completed three and a half years’ service overseas. The limits of shipping meant that 
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despite 5,600 Indian troops returning to India every three months, it would still have 
taken over a year to repatriate them all.95  
Difficulties in Reinforcing the British Army 
One of the major reasons for the contribution of the Indian Army in Italy, and the 
other dominion forces, was the increasing inability of the British Army to maintain its 
own combat units as years of war took their toll. The Indian formations had an interest in 
the reinforcement system for the British Army as the Indian divisions had British units 
serving with them. The 10th Indian Division not only had several British infantry battalions 
in its brigades, but also its artillery units were provided by the British Army. From March 
1944 the British Army in CMF received no new infantry reinforcements from the U.K. 
with the exception of a few small drafts.96 These small drafts were only 600-700 men per 
month, and were set at a War Office conference in February 1944. This manpower limit 
was put into place to simplify manpower planning for the British Army at home and 
overseas.97 The overwhelming priority for the British Army was the invasion of Northwest 
Europe and so all reinforcements were earmarked for that. If no alternative source of 
manpower could be found for infantry reinforcements for British Army infantry battalions 
in Italy, there was a predicted deficiency in infantry reinforcements of 8,500 by 31 May 
1944 and 22,000 by 30 September 1944.98  
The chosen solution was to convert personnel from other service arms in CMF 
into infantry reinforcements. The vast majority of personnel came from anti-aircraft (AA) 
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regiments in CMF and the Middle East, although some personnel from the Royal Army 
Service Corps (RASC) and Royal Army Ordnance Corps (RAOC) were also retrained. All 
personnel designated to become infantrymen received training at No. 1 Infantry 
Reinforcement Training Depot (IRTD) at Cervinara. The quality of the personnel from the 
IRTD was considered very high by the units that received them, who commented that 
they were superior to the previous drafts they had received.99 However, even the 29,700 
men obtained from disbanded or diluted AA regiments were insufficient to cover the 
manpower deficit.100 The decision to re-task AA units merely meant that the 46th and 56th 
Divisions would not have to be ‘milked’ of their manpower to make up the deficiencies. 
These two divisions were promised the first batches of retrained AA personnel to make 
up their losses, with the remaining personnel begin despatched as reinforcements for all 
CMF units.101 However, the disbandment of AA units was stopped in January 1945 due to 
the heavy casualties that the AA units had suffered since their deployment in a dual 
role.102 It was not just the infantry that suffered from shortage of replacements; it 
affected all British combat arms in CMF. As such the personnel obtained were not always 
allocated to the infantry, with many being sent to other service arms (see Appendix 13, 
Table 1). 
The British infantry units in CMF received approximately half of the officers and 
other ranks that were available from the disbandment of units in CMF. However it should 
be noted that the infantry only received soldiers who had been retrained from the AA 
units in September, due to the time required to train them. From June to August 
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reinforcements had been obtained from the reorganisation of two support battalions, 
using the first reinforcements of 46th and 56th Divisions (who were then refitting in the 
Middle East) and the disbandment of two infantry battalions.103 Even with the use of this 
extra manpower, it was still estimated that every service arm of the army would be 
deficient in manpower by 30 September, even when casualties and wounded who were 
fit to return to action were included (see Appendix 13, Table 2). This pattern was 
reflected in the service arms that received reinforcements from AA units up to 24 March 
1945, and saw the infantry still receiving little more than half of the available 
reinforcements (see Appendix 13, Table 3). 
The Jaipur Infantry, along with the 4/13th FF Rifles, arrived in Italy on 23 August 
1944. Their arrival allowed the 74th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment to be released from Fifth 
Army for disbandment, with the Jaipur Infantry and 4/13th FF Rifles replacing it. Any 
deficiencies the two Indian units had in vehicles and equipment were made up by CMF, 
suggesting that the theatre was rich in equipment but poor in manpower.104 This 
shortage of infantry reinforcements eventually led to the departure of the 8th 
Manchesters from 10th Indian Division. The pre-war practice of having a British battalion 
in each brigade had been abandoned in the 20th Brigade since September 1944. Despite 
the loss of one of its British infantry battalions, the 10th Indian Division in Italy would 
operate with three brigades of four infantry battalions each, because of the deployment 
of extra Indian battalions to Italy. The attachment of 43rd Lorried Infantry Brigade saw the 
division operate with four brigades for a period in late 1944. 
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The deficiencies in manpower experienced by the British Army affected the ability 
of the British battalions in the division to effectively conduct operations. On 16 January 
1945 the 2/3rd Gurkhas were informed that the planned contact patrol from the 1st King's 
Own was cancelled, because the 1st King's Own were too short of men.105 In February 
1945, on the Monte Grande sector, the 78th Division had only five battalions forward with 
each battalion having only three companies. On the 10th Indian Division’s deployment to 
the sector it was able to deploy three brigades, 10th, 20th and 25th, of four battalions of 
four companies each.106 The account of this period commented that “the Divisional [10th 
Indian] Commander was presented with no problems in finding himself sufficient troops 
to do this whilst retaining an adequate reserve.”107  
However, the increase of Indian battalions in the 10th Indian Division placed extra 
strain on the divisional artillery, which was British, to support them. The greater number 
of infantry battalions available in the division could not win battles by themselves. They 
had to be used in conjunction with artillery, armour and air support to conduct all-arms 
operations. The success of the artillery units of the 10th Indian Division can be attributed 
to the long association between the infantry battalions and their assigned field batteries, 
which had been forged by training and serving together in the Middle East and Italy. This 
camaraderie continued to the end of the war. The gunners of 269 Battery, who were 
assigned to the 2/3rd Gurkhas throughout the campaign in Italy, presented a cup to them 
in memory of their service together in August 1945, an occasion celebrated with sports 
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matches and a party.108 When an infantry battalion was rested so were its assigned field 
battery and forward observation officers, allowing a fresh artillery battery to serve the 
relieving infantry battalion. The increase to four battalions in each brigade was not met 
with an increase in the war establishment of the divisional artillery units, in effect asking 
them to do more with the same.109  
Difficulties in Reinforcing the Indian Army 
The expansion of the Indian Army in the Second World War had been achieved by 
recruiting from the non-martial races of the population, who had been denied entry into 
the army in the inter-war years. However, this did not change the fact that combat units 
were still organised by caste, along the company and one class system. In the 10th Indian 
Division the 4/10th Baluchis was made up of troops from four different castes, Punjabi 
Muslims (50% of the battalion strength), Dogras (25%), Yusafzais (16.66%) and Khattaks 
(8.34%). The 3/1st Punjab battalion was formed from equal contingents of Sikhs and Jats, 
Punjabi Muslims, Rajputs and Hazarawals. The recruitment from the Indian lower castes 
had necessitated the formation of their own, separate units (e.g. Mahar Machine Gun 
Regiment, Mazbhi and Ramadasias Sikhs, Chamar Regiment) because they did not work 
well with high caste soldiers.110  
By 1943 pre-war units, who had been exclusively manned by the martial races, 
were unable to maintain the strengths of their battalions due to the extra demand the 
expansion of army placed upon the martial races. For these units to continue functioning 
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they had had to recruit from the non-martial races.111 For instance, the 11th Sikh 
Regiment had its 2nd, 3rd and 4th battalions in the Middle East and CMF by 1944, all of 
which were pre-war regulars and relied solely upon the Sikh population for its troops. By 
16 April 1944 it was understood in AFHQ and the Middle East that “INDIA can only 
maintain one SIKH bn in battle, which will mean that, unless other arrangements are 
made, 4/11 SIKH will be permanently in ME.”112 The expansion of the army had 
diminished the recruitable Sikh population, meaning that it was proving harder to find 
new recruits to maintain existing formations. However, by 8 May 1944 AFHQ understood 
that the “Indian Rft position will now allow of operational employment of both 2/11 and 
4/11 Sikh simultaneously....”113 The reversal in the decision to allow the deployment of 
two Sikh battalions was due to the fact that, unlike the 2/11th and the 3/11th battalions, 
which were manned 100% by Sikhs, the 4/11th was manned by both Sikhs and Punjabi 
Muslims.114  
 Given that the Indian Army organised its fighting manpower by caste it was 
necessary for reinforcements to be sent to a unit that was of their caste. The exchange of 
battalions of the same regiment between Italy and PAIFORCE would allow the unit sent 
from PAIFORCE to use the same reinforcements as the battalion in Italy. If the battalions 
exchanged were of different regiments, this would have created difficulties, as the 
example below demonstrates. On 15 February 1944 a draft of forty one IORs of 4/13th FF 
Rifles were sent to the 1/12th FF Regiment, yet the soldiers believed that they were sent 
from the Middle East “on the understanding that they would go to another Bn of their 
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Group i.e. 6/13th FFR.” However, they were told that they were in fact sent out as pool 
reinforcements for any of the frontier force units. The use of the word group is 
ambiguous; it could easily denote regiment but, if that was the case, why not use the 
word ‘regiment’ in the first place? It could be that it was an issue of caste, and that they 
associated the regiment with the caste of the soldiers it recruited. The Indian Army did 
arrange an inter-battalion exchange, so that the draft for the 4/13th FF Rifles would go to 
6/13th, if the latter agreed to send its previous draft from the 3/12th FF Regiment to 
1/12th.115 
The difficulty in granting leave (which in the Indian Army was for a period of two 
months) was it required another soldier to replace the soldier whilst he was on leave, so 
the unit could continue to function. Although it was possible to send a small number of 
men on leave without replacement, this policy would have meant that only a fraction of 
personnel would have been granted leave. Even in October 1945 the commanders of 
CMF were insisting on one for one replacement of personnel on leave, despite the war 
being over:  
Emphasise continued leave mov [sic] entirely depended on return by ARMINDIA of 1 
for 1 replacements. Recent numbers of replacements have fallen far short of leave details 
despatched. Unless full number replacements received leave will have to be stopped 
which we are anxious to avoid on grounds of morale.116 
The continued organisation by social caste in the Indian Army applied to 
replacements for leave personnel as well as reinforcements for battle casualties. In 
response to suggestions from the British Army of cross-posting troops to allow soldiers to 
go on leave the Indian Army stated “we anticipated your proposals for cross postings. 
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Emphasise main difficulty is class composition which raises problems unknown in British 
Army.”117 Attempts were made to conduct these cross postings in order to allow leave 
for long service personnel in 4th Indian Division, which could be “carried out in 4 Ind Inf 
Div service units in GREECE but this cannot be effected in Inf Bns.”118  
The official history commented on the expansion of the Indian Army, that “out of 
India’s total population of 390,000,000 it was estimated that only some ten million men 
had the requisite intelligence, aptitude and mechanical sense essential for service in 
modern armed forces.”119 Despite the success of voluntarily recruiting two million men 
who were suitable for military service, the demands for educated and intelligent men 
were not achieved as the war progressed. The Fourth Indian Manpower Review (shown 
in Appendix 14) forecast the manpower situation by 31 July 1945, and predicted 
shortages in both officers and enlisted men in all service branches and castes of the 
army. The number of formations raised by the Indian Army decreased massively in the 
latter years of the war (see Appendix 15). Recruitment was instead tasked towards 
maintaining already raised forces, in terms of reinforcements and raising service units.  
Therefore even without the problems caused by caste, finding the soldiers 
required to replace those in Italy sent on leave would have been difficult. Providing leave 
to all the Indian soldiers in Italy did not mean just finding replacements for the 
infantrymen, in whom there were predicted deficiencies (see Appendix 14). It also meant 
having trained doctors, engineers, nurses, butchers and cooks of all ranks; to replace 
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their counterparts in Italy. The manpower review predicted large deficiencies in these as 
well, with a shortage of 2,670 medical officers and 5,100 matriculation personnel.120  
The review also predicted a shortage of 15,850 clerks by July 1945.121 In 1944 it 
was noted that “the situation at Base Offices, regarding clerks and clerical staff, is acute, 
as that of units and other fmns in the fd.”122 The Adv O2E (Ind) section CMF was reliant 
upon clerks, as indeed was the entire Indian Army, which it found increasingly difficult to 
obtain as the war progressed. The shortage of clerks meant that many of them were 
denied promotion, because replacements for them could not be found. This caused 
resentment amongst clerks, who felt their intelligence and abilities meant they were 
prime candidates for promotion in the army. The opinion of one clerk is produced below: 
For clerks like me, there is no hope of salvation in the Indian army. We do not get 
leave; we cannot rise higher and we are prohibited from applying for transfer to any 
other branch of service. I shall never advise even my enemy to join the Indian army as a 
clerk.123 
When Auchinleck had first suggested the exchange of PAIFORCE Indian Army 
battalions with those in Italy he had stated “our Ind Inf maintenance position is such that 
it is not possible to maintain more bns in high wastage roles.”124 This suggests that the 
Indian Army was in no position to support additional infantry battalions for service 
overseas or in Burma by December 1944. This was most likely because the Fourteenth 
Army at this point was beginning its invasion of Burma and so all efforts were focused on 
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that. The war establishments of the Indian infantry battalions in Italy were liable to be 
amended by Allied Armies Italy (AAI125) to suit the conditions in the country. However, 
any proposal for an increase in the number of troops or officers in a unit had to be 
approved by India, so they were certain the increase could be supplied.126 The AAI 
suggested that all Indian infantry battalions be placed on the same war establishment as 
British battalions, which would have required an increase in manpower of one officer and 
fifty-six other ranks.127 The eventual increase in manpower for the 4/13 FF Rifles was 
limited to only thirty other ranks, which would suggest that this was applied to all Indian 
infantry battalions in Italy.128 The refusal by India to supply more officers to the 
battalions in Italy is hardly surprising given the shortages of officers that the Indian Army 
was experiencing (see Appendix 14).  
During the plans to use ISF battalions in active operations in 1944, special service 
officers in four to six man teams were intended to be assigned to ISF units to improve 
their standards.129 However, the shortage of officers meant only four ISF units could be 
provided with special service officers.130 Auchinleck responded to a proposal131 to give ISF 
units the same number of British officers as regular battalions with the reply, “officers 
are the difficulty will do my best to find them.”132 However, the decision to grant ISF 
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officers emergency commissions in 1943, due to officer shortages, meant that the only 
way they could be replaced with a British officer was if they were proved unfit for 
service.133 It was decided that India did not have the means to supply and maintain 
officers for the ISF battalions given other commitments, but it did allow for the possibility 
of using officers from within units in the Middle East for service with ISF units.134 The 
request to deploy 43rd Gurkha Lorried Brigade in Italy was met with a reply from India 
who pointed out the difficulties it would cause for them to maintain it. In addition to the 
difficulties in raising troops it was the greater burden on officers that was the concern to 
India. Gurkha battalions would only accept British officers, not Indian, and the need to 
see that they were Gurkhali speakers placed further demands upon India.135 
Conclusion 
To say that the Indian Army was successfully able to reinforce its units in Italy first 
requires us to define what success was. The Indian Army was never able to keep every 
unit reinforced to its full war establishment every day they were overseas. The difficulties 
were too great. Instead the Indian Army was able to keep its units supplied with troops 
so that they were still operationally capable, and it is because of this that it was 
successful. It is important to bear in mind that the German Army was also experiencing a 
manpower crisis. A divisional intelligence summary in January 1945 was able to reveal 
the German Army's strength classifications for its combat groups. A strong battalion was 
one with over 400 men, a medium strength battalion was 200-400 men, and a weak 
battalion was one with under 200 men.136 The strength returns (see Appendices 14 and 
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15) show that the Indian infantry battalions were able to keep their strengths higher than 
the British battalions, pointing to the difficulties the latter experienced in finding 
reinforcements. Throughout 1944 and 1945, Indian battalions possessed an average 
strength of between 700 and 900 men (see Appendix 18). Whilst greater difficulties were 
experienced in the reinforcement of British and ISF battalions, these would still have 
been classed as strong battalions in the German Army. The units’ strengths were 
maintained through the reinforcement system of camps, naval convoys and 
administration that meant reinforcements were able to get to Italy from India. Whilst it is 
difficult to calculate the exact number of casualties it prevented, the division’s 
application of health and sanitation measures prevented unnecessary casualties, and 
thus the demand for reinforcements. The Indian Army knew that casualties were 
inevitable and so took measures, through the training of adequate reserves and 
management of long serving units, to minimise the impact. Compromises were made in 
achieving this feat, most notably the failure to provide home leave to Indian troops who 
had been serving overseas for several years. Whilst it is important to understand how the 
Indian Army replaced the casualties it suffered, it is equally important to understand why 
Indian soldiers decided to suffer such hardships. It is to this question, amongst many 
more, that the next chapter concerns itself with. 
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CHAPTER 5: THE INDIAN SOLDIER’S EXPERIENCE OF THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN 
The experience of the Indian Army in Italy is unique amongst all the campaigns it 
fought during the Second World War. By using censor reports this chapter will observe 
what the experience of the 10th Indian Division in Italy was like. The focus will be on two 
major aspects of the division’s deployment; the first will analyse the attitude of the 
Indian soldiers of the 10th Indian Division to the Italian campaign. How the Indian soldiers 
perceived the worthiness of the war in Italy, and the wider Allied cause? What were their 
opinions on their service conditions, such as their reaction to being denied home leave 
for several years? The second section will examine what the thoughts and hopes of the 
Indian soldiers were for the future, for both themselves and their country, and whether 
their military service influenced these in any way.  
The Indian Soldier’s Wartime Experience in Italy 
In the previous chapter we saw the inability of the Indian Army to grant home 
leave to India for its soldiers. Here we will show the Indian soldiers’ reaction to their lack 
of home leave. The majority of Indian troops who served overseas spent years without 
seeing their homes and families in India. This was not a new problem, nor one unique to 
Italy. When the 10th Indian Division had been stationed in the Middle East in early 1944 
soldiers were unable to obtain leave. By 1 October 1945, the division contained 666 
soldiers who had served overseas for over four years without leave, and 1,393 who had 
served three and a half to four years.1 An Indian sweeper in November 1944 documented 
his experience of the leave system, writing “I tried to get leave but there is no hope. Men 
                                                          
1 
WO 204/1667 - 10 Indian Division: repatriation, 01 September 1945 - 30 November 1945. Movement – 
Indian troops by Major General Denys Reid, 9 September 1945, Appendices p. 7. 
  
122 
 
who came overseas in 1939-40 are still serving here without leave. I have passed 3½ 
years only and feel completely cut off from my family.”2 
There are no figures available for those soldiers who would have served similar 
lengths of time without leave, but were killed before they could be granted leave. The 
motivations for the soldiers, and their families, to return to India were often family 
reasons. Many soldiers had arranged marriages before they had been deployed overseas, 
which remained unfulfilled as troops were unable to obtain leave, as shown by this 
comment from the father of a Havildar clerk in an Indian infantry battalion in March 
1944: 
Your father-in-law is pressing hard for your marriage, because his daughter has 
attained puberty. According to our religion (Hinduism)3, it is disgraceful for both parties 
wither to break off the engagement or to delay the marriage. Try hard to come on leave 
early, even if the leave is for a few days only.4 
The long separation of soldiers from their families and loved ones could cause 
marital breakdown, particularly when relatives became ill: 
A year ago when my only child passed away, my wife wrote to me a...letter 
entreating me to come home on leave. I could not obtain leave and it exasporated [sic] 
my wife, who wrote to me her last letter denouncing our relationship. Her rash turning 
away has broken my heart and there seems to be no remedy for the wound in my soul. 
An NCO in December 1944.5 
The major complaint the Indian soldier had over leave was the belief that their 
terms of service had promised them regular leave to India whilst based overseas. This 
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was regularly commented upon by the troops, as the opinion of this Indian soldier writing 
below illustrates. He wrote “yes darling, there is an order that after 2 years overseas 
service, everybody is entitled to 2 months leave in India. That is only an order which 
exists on paper...”6  
The reason for the lack of leave was the lack of shipping space, as mentioned in 
the previous chapter. However, the experience for the Indian soldier who had been 
granted leave, only to be destined to wait on irregular shipping convoys was not an 
enviable one, as reflected by these words from an Indian NCO staying in 8th IRC: 
It is about a month since I am waiting for the passage but it is a great disappointment 
to tell you that it would be long to reach home. I feel like going back to my unit. I am so 
much worried that I don't feel like coming home. I have suffered a lot and still have to 
face so many troubles that I can't describe.7 
The censors in December 1944 noted in their analysis of all Indian mail in CMF 
that “the length of overseas service, coupled with the difficulty of obtaining leave, 
continues to be the chief complaint of Indian troops.”8 The troops in Italy felt particularly 
resentful given the belief that troops based in India and Burma were getting leave with 
greater regularity than themselves. One NCO wrote “those who serve in India get leave in 
no time, but we on overseas are not allowed to avail leave even after many years.”9 One 
British commander of an Indian infantry battalion writing in May 1944, had the utmost 
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sympathy for his troops, believing that they suffered far greater than the British soldiers 
who were similarly denied leave: 
I agree with your view on the iniquity of this forced separation with its absence of 
any definite time limit...You are very wrong when you think that it is different with the 
Indians. In fact, British people can correspond and control their affairs far more 
successfully than the I.O.R's. And the effect on a sepoy or VCO, too, for that matter, of 
knowing that his house is deserted, his land untilled, his animals possibly dead and his 
family parked on 'in-laws' is just as bad as in the case of British troops and possibly much 
worse. Some of our lads have been away for close on 4 years.10 
The primary motivation for soldiers wishing to return to India was to help their 
families, given the dire financial state that the country was in. The Bengal Famine of 
1943, in addition to the 1.5 million lives it claimed, led to skyrocketing food prices. 
Economic output was geared towards war production and this led to a shortage in 
commodities and textiles, which saw rapid price rises. The shortage and cost of everyday 
items led to a flourishing black market.11 Families regularly called upon their relatives 
overseas to return home to help in this matter. Given the conditions in India the Indian 
soldier displayed displeasure with the financial terms of his service. The Indian soldier 
often felt that his pay was too low, in particular due to the fact that the war had led to 
prices rising in Italy and in India. Due to the economic hardships that soldiers’ families 
were suffering in India, many of the troops sent a portion of their wage to help their 
families: known as the family allotment. The importance of this financial aid meant that 
one of the common themes of the censor reports was the non-receipt of the family 
allotment, and the attempts by soldiers and their families to remedy this. As this 
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comment by an IOR from March 1945 shows, it was a matter of great concern to soldiers’ 
families, “my dear father I am very sorry that you did not get the FA [family allotment] up 
to this time. I have also sent a wire to the OC of my Depot so don’t worry.”12 Soldiers’ 
families frequently requested that their family allotment be increased, which the soldiers 
found difficult to grant due to their low pay, as shown from this letter by an NCO to his 
family in November 1944, who wrote “you always write asking me to increase the family 
allotment and say that Rs 60/- are nothing in to-days hard market, but what can I do, I am 
helpless here, what I get for myself after deducting my family allotment is not enough 
even to buy cigarettes.”13  
Pay and leave were not the only complaints that Indian troops held regarding 
service in Italy, but they were the most common. Criticisms of their welfare 
arrangements varied from report to report. One of the most prominent topics was food, 
with the Indian soldier freely expressing his opinion on the matter. Although many of the 
comments were positive, complaints usually arose when rations did not contain enough 
fresh meat and vegetables, as this quotation from an engineer demonstrates: “the only 
difficulty for us out here is that we do not get fresh meat. The cigarettes we get in rations 
are those worthless Green ‘V’ cigarettes; consequently I have to spend about Rs.10/- 
monthly for buying other cigarettes from the NAAFI for smoking.”14 Whenever possible 
the Indian soldier would attend the screening of Indian films and concerts. Perhaps due 
to the rarity that such opportunities were available, the Indian soldier was quick to 
criticise any performance that he felt was not of a high enough quality. One NCO's 
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scathing review of an Indian concert party deemed that "the show was not worth even 
one Anna ticket."15 
However, despite the grievances Indian troops held towards their service 
conditions, the same censor reports continually recorded that the morale and fighting 
spirit of the Indian soldiers was high. Below are the assessments from the morale and 
censorship reports on the Indian Army at various points during the campaign. In May 
1944, as the 10th Indian Division was first committed to operations in Italy, and as the 
Allies were undertaking their spring offensive, the censors noted “a splendid fighting 
spirit is evident with 4 Ind Div and 8 Ind Div…10 Ind Div are in excellent spirits, and 
appear eager to see action.”16 As the war progressed, and hopes of a German surrender 
before Christmas 1944 were dashed, it would have been understandable to have seen a 
drop in morale as the troops campaigned in the depths of winter. However, in December 
1944, the censors observed that “despite the increasing cold met with on the Italian 
front, the excellent fighting spirit of the Indian troops remains very evident. Pride in their 
units, and in the achievements of Indian arms generally, is a marked feature of the mail 
of all ranks.”17 As the war went on into 1945 the morale of the Indian troops was still 
high: “an idea can very easily be formed from the mail under review that the morale and 
high spirit of Indian troops is soaring higher and higher every day.”18 Finally with German 
surrender in May 1945 the troops of the 10th Indian Division were able to rest and reflect 
on their efforts over the past year, with the censors commenting in June that “great pride 
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is taken in Indian fighting units’ hard-earned honours and awards after undergoing 
inmmerable [sic] hardships during the campaign.”19  
Field Marshal Slim, who commanded the largest force of the Indian Army in the 
Second World War, the Fourteenth Army, wrote on the subject of morale in his account 
of fighting the Japanese in Burma, Defeat into Victory. It is useful to apply his thoughts on 
morale to the situation that confronted the Indian formations deployed in Italy. Slim 
believed morale was formed from three aspects: spiritual, intellectual and material. 
Spiritual is the belief that what a soldier fights for is a worthy cause; intellectual means 
that the soldier recognises that the cause he fights for is achievable; and lastly material 
that he will be given the best equipment and conditions in which to conduct his duties.20 
He noted that of the three, spiritual and intellectual were more important than material, 
writing that “the very highest kinds of morale are often met when material conditions are 
lowest.”21 In Italy the Indian Army, including the 10th Indian Division, frequently had to 
contend with service conditions that tested their resolve. The problems of pay and leave 
had a negative effect on Indian soldiers’ morale, yet they still believed in the worthiness 
of the Allied cause, and that it was in India’s interests to fight, even if that meant delaying 
leave. For an IOR of 43 Indian Infantry Brigade W/S below, his reasons for wishing to 
delay leave until victory was achieved were from a sense of professional pride in his own, 
and his unit’s achievements during his time in the army:   
Don't ask me to come on leave. Victory is in sight and let me give it the finishing 
touch. We have been fighting hard for the last five years and now the result of our 
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privations is about to make its appearance. Let me remain in the battle-field till the final 
victory is achieved.22 
The extract below, from an NCO of the 4/10th Baluchis, conveys a firm ideological 
belief in the righteousness of the Allied cause, that the Axis forces were a severe threat 
to global prosperity: 
Now-a-days you must be reading good news that this horrible war is in its final stages 
and once again there will soon be peace all over the world. I have seen this tragic drama 
for the past five years. There was a time when the existence of the world was threatened 
with total annihilation by the Axis aggression. All sorts of atrocities were committed and 
Axis tyranny was at its zenith when the destruction of humanity was spread for the sake 
of establishing the New Order in Europe. Thank God, the tables have been decisively 
turned upon the enemy and the sun of aggressive powers has sunk for ever [sic]. Hitler 
and his gang are going to get what they deserve and we are achieving what we have so 
dearly earned.23 
One of the reasons for the high morale of the Indian soldiers in the 10th Indian 
Division was the fact that they had not suffered a defeat during their time in Italy. The 
division had participated in a seemingly unstoppable push up the Italian peninsula, which 
reinforced the belief that victory was inevitable. Their morale was further strengthened 
by news of the victories on the Western and Eastern Fronts: “you must be in regular 
touch with the news. We are not doing much at the moment on account of the bad 
weather which is awful. However with the Russians doing as they are I swear I’ll never 
spend another winter in Europe.”24 Given the threat posed by Japan to India, and the 
likelihood that soldiers knew people serving in the Fourteenth Army, any news of a 
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Japanese setback was gratefully received: “…even Japan is showing signs of an internal 
crack-up. Tojo has resigned and the Americans seem to be landing wherever they wish. I 
am firmly convinced that the war will be over this year, even with Japan.”25  
However, with end of active operations against the German Army in May and the 
surrender of Japan in August, the Indian troops saw few reasons for their continued 
presence in Italy. The censor report for the first half of May covered much of the soldiers’ 
initial reaction to the victory in Italy. It noted that the soldiers believed the “return of 
Indian troops to India is estimated to commence within a month or so and finish within 
six months.”26 Monitoring the subject of leave during September it was noted 
“complaints as regards leave and repatriation is again on the rise.”27 However, there was 
also a change in the Indian soldier’s opinion and view of the granting of leave. When the 
Indian formations had been engaged in active operations in Italy, the lack of leave was 
attributed to being one of the sacrifices of war. After hostilities had ceased opinion 
changed because, to the Indian soldier, the end of the war meant their services were no 
longer required, as demonstrated below:  
I do not know how long it will take for me to return to India. Germany and Japan 
both have been finished and there is nothing to be done out here now, but still from the 
circumstances it appears that it will [be] a year or two before I shall be able to see you all. 
I cannot understand the cause of my unnecessary detention in foreign countries after 
every thing [sic] is over. An IOR from GHQ 2nd Echelon (Indian) CMF, September 1945.28 
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The slow rate of Indian repatriation was an issue that led to the intervention of 
the commander of the 10th Indian Division. Major General Reid wrote “the Tps under my 
command are in good spirits and morale and discipline is excellent. Never-the-less long, 
and to them apparently quite unnecessary, delay in return to India cannot but have a 
deteriorating effect. The fact too that the Winter [sic] months will have a restricting 
effect on their out-of-door recreation will be bound to cause a certain amount of inward 
thinking and restlessness.”29 Whilst asserting that he retained control of his troops, Reid 
indicated the threat of possible unrest and ill-discipline by the Indian troops. Whether 
this threat was real or embellished, it is a reminder that the loyalty and service of the 
Indian troops was not unconditional, but earned. To support his position he earned the 
support of two members of AFHQ upper echelons. Major General M.W.M. MacDonald, 
the Deputy Adjutant General of G-1, AFHQ, wrote that “the whole question of returning 
Indians to India has been most scandalously shelved, mainly due to apathy on the part of 
India…In my opinion the Indians are being badly done down.”30 Lieutenant General 
Harding, commander of XIII Corps, believed that in recognition of their service in Italy, 
the Indian troops deserved an explanation from the authorities as to why efforts to 
repatriate them had been so slow.31 Such a suggestion would no doubt have been 
warmly welcomed by the Indian troops, who seemed to suffer the most serious blow to 
their morale from the fact that they did not know the reasons for their continued 
presence in Italy: 
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I often think this waiting to be repatriated is the wort [sic] part of the war service. So 
long as the war was on, one did not think of the furture [sic] very deeply and civilian life 
was very remote. Now it is [all] one thinks about and the time simply drags. No body [sic] 
has any interest in soldiering and this hanging about is soul-killing. An NCO from the 1/2 
Punjab Regiment, September 1945.32 
Kaushik Roy believed that had the war in South East Asia continued for another 
year, the British Army’s morale in that theatre would have collapsed, requiring the Indian 
and African armies to take on the bulk of the fighting.33 The morale reports conducted in 
CMF reported on the willingness of each nation's soldiers to fight in the Far East against 
Japan. Of all the nations in CMF the Indian Army displayed the greatest willingness to 
fight the Japanese. The morale report conducted in early May 1945 is a useful insight into 
the opinions of each nation with regards to fighting against Japan, as the end of 
hostilities in Europe made it a realistic, rather than theoretical, possibility. The British 
troops’ outlook depended on their eligibility. Veterans were increasingly unwilling to risk 
their lives further, as the opinion of this driver demonstrates: “they wanted volunteers 
for Burma and they said they would like to see every young soldier step forward…but I’ve 
done all the volunteering I’m going to do in this war.”34 Those who would be sent to the 
east to face the Japanese, accepted it with the stipulation that they be given home leave 
first, as surmised by one gunner: “I shall be one of the unlucky ones and end up in Burma, 
anyway as long as I get leave I don’t mind where I go.”35 Similarly, South African troops 
were equally reluctant to go, with one NCO describing the reaction as “a few fellows here 
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and there have signed [for continuing their military service in the east], but the response 
is very lacking.”36 
The opinions of the New Zealand soldiers were more diverse, for whilst they had 
been fighting as long as the British and South Africans, the Japanese conflict was more of 
a concern for them than the war against Germany. One private surmised it as: 
It brings a fellow more or less to a dead end wondering how long it will be before we 
either go home or on to fight the Japs. Opinion seems to be about equally divided 
between them among the boys around here. I hope that it will be home but have my 
doubts as the Japs were more our business than the Germans.37  
In contrast, Indian soldiers displayed an eagerness to take part in the fight against 
the Japanese. This is because the censor reports had observed that the Indian soldiers 
viewed the Japanese as the ‘real enemy’, due to the threat of invasion they had once 
posed to India.38 An Indian officer commented that “the war in Europe has ended. All, 
especially the Sepoys, are in excellent spirit. After a period of relaxation at home they can 
be let loose against the Japs. They are ready to fight the Japs and are very confident. 
Wonderful fellows, these Indian Sepoys are!”39 Whilst it cannot be ignored that this 
officer may have exaggerated the eagerness of the Indian sepoy to fight the Japanese, it 
is worth noting he specified that the Indian soldier, like his British counterpart, expected 
to be given home leave before being deployed in the east. This suggests that there was 
an acceptance that Japan had to be defeated, despite the wishes of many to return 
home, as demonstrated by this VCO of the 7th Madras Engineers: 
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The war in the whole of Europe has now terminated. I am quite sure it will not take 
long for me to come back to India. But there is another snag, I cannot possibly get 
discharged unless Japan is defeated. Still if I go to Singapore I will certainly be happy and 
will do my best to bring about an early ruin on Japs.40  
The Indian Soldier’s Thoughts for the Future 
The thoughts of the Indian soldiers in Italy also turned towards the time when the 
war was over. Their service in the war had left an impression on many that India’s 
contribution to the conflict should not go unrewarded. Many were aware of the irony 
that India, a nation not politically independent, was a force that had helped in the 
liberation of conquered peoples and nations, with one soldier writing “…viewing the 
whole situation of the world and seeing that even small countries demand 
independence, we can hope that India, which has played a prominent part in this war, 
will surely be given some political uplift in recognition of her splendid services rendered 
in this war.”41 Those who wrote on the subject were all strongly in favour of, at the very 
least, self-rule and dominion status, or total independence. The morale reports convey a 
strong belief in the importance of political and religious unity for a future independent 
India, a belief formed by the experiences of Indian soldiers, of many castes and religions, 
serving together in the army:  
We can not [sic] imagine why our leaders fail to achieve Hindu-Muslim Unity. Here in 
the army we have no quarrel between Muslim and Hindus. We live and dine together, 
and understand each other. By our joint efforts we have liberated many enemy-captured 
countries and can do many other things of this kind. I confidently hope that we ex-
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soldiers will do our utmost to achieve Hindu-Muslim unity which will surely pave the way 
for the independence of India.42 An unknown soldier of Skinner’s Horse. 
With these hopes for reform came, from some quarters, a heightened awareness 
of any slight towards India given her contribution to the war. The slow rate of 
repatriation was particularly galling to the Indian soldiers, especially when they saw ships 
whisking the soldiers of Brazil, South Africa and New Zealand home: 
Though the war is completely finished, no body [sic] looks after Indian Soldiers. 
Soldiers of other nations are being despatched to their countries on a large scale, but for 
Indian soldiers no ships are provided. This state of affairs is deplorable and this reminds 
us of our inferiority among the nations of the world.43 A VCO of 120 Indian Railway 
Construction Company. 
Some soldiers believed that the decision not to have included the Indian Army in 
the armies of occupation in Europe was a slight on them and India, given that Indian 
soldiers had shared the same hardships of their British, French and American colleagues. 
An IWO commented: “my views on the Indian release scheme are that some Indian Units 
should have been retained here as occupation troops. After all, they have fought and 
died like any other Allied troops, why should they now be denied the honour and glory of 
occupation of European countries?”44 An Indian officer believed the decision was a clear 
display of racism, writing “the war in Europe is over and with it the job of the Indian 
troops here. Only white nations will use their troops for occupation here, which cannot 
but remind us of racial discrimination.45  
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In addition to their demands for political independence of India, the Indian 
soldiers’ experiences in Italy influenced their opinions on what form Indian society and its 
economy should adopt in the future. Several writers attributed the higher living 
standards in Italy to the lack of caste and religious animosity, with an IOR commenting 
“the causes of our backwardness are not far to seek. The communal [dissensions] are a 
stumbling block in the way of our progress. Those who have visited the Western 
Countries will deprecate these things and strain every nerve to achieve communal 
harmony at all costs…”46 Many writers attributed the achievements of the Italian people 
to the accessibility of education to its people, something they wanted replicated in a post 
war India. A VCO of Skinner’s Horse wrote that “the European countries have taught me 
a great lesson about the prosperity of a country. The key to a nation’s good lies in getting 
her people educated…In my view, free and compulsory education will lead India to its 
proper place among the nations of the world.”47 An IWO of GHQ 2nd Echelon (Ind) saw 
education as more than teaching science and mathematics, but as a means of breaking 
down the religious tension in India: “it is fact the World War II is over, but our religious 
trouble will never end. The trouble is actually due to the lack of education. When the 
whole world is finding some way to come forward our people are finding their way down. 
It is up to the Government to introduce compulsory and free education which will be 
beneficial to the people of India.”48  
However, many of the troops were more concerned with their own more 
immediate futures, due to the predicted economic hardships of post-war India. The 
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inevitable demobilisation of the army caused great anxiety for the vast majority of 
troops, who believed prospects for future employment would be poor. The Indian 
government, unlike the British government, had not published any plans for resettlement 
or employment of demobilised soldiers. This fear of what awaited Indian soldiers, and 
officers, was still evident in August 1945, with one Indian officer commenting “now the 
Japs are out. What is your post-war plan? I don’t think anything substantial is being done 
in the way of our post-war employment…”49 As the Indian officers quoted above and 
below demonstrate, these fears were held by the Indian officers as well as the IORs, 
which is surprising considering they were likely to be more educated, and so had better 
prospects for employment. 
I have signed a form saying I would like to join the Police Force after the war. But I 
have no faith in such forms. They are only routine things to make a show of. There are 
hundreds of thousands of officers who may want such jobs…That is why I am saving 
every penny I can and want you to do the same thing.50 An Indian officer, November 
1944. 
Those soldiers who were in the service units of the army, or who had learned a 
trade, were more confident of their job prospects than others. One soldier in December 
1944 wrote, “the Army has made me an efficient mechanic and I am confident that I can 
equal any in my trade anywhere…A tradesman trained in the Army is bound to be a 
success when he starts life in civilian clothes.”51 Many soldiers resorted to calling upon 
their families to save whatever money they sent them to see them through the hardships 
ahead. An IOR wrote to his family in September 1945 to “save money as much as you can 
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so that we may start cultivation after demobilisation. Savings will be our friends in our 
days of unemployment.”52 It is a sign of the desperation, and lack of faith in the 
government, felt by many soldiers that they were resorting to savings, in spite of the 
economic crisis that India was suffering. Given this, it is difficult to see how the families 
of Indian soldiers were able to put aside savings, given that that they were already 
struggling to make ends meet with the money they received from the family allotment.  
Conclusion 
From the appreciation and censorship reports conducted for the 10th Indian 
Division, and other Indian troops in CMF, we can draw several conclusions on the Indian 
soldier’s experience of war in Italy. The first point to mention is that soldiers complained 
freely, making clear any dissatisfactions they felt with their service conditions, 
particularly leave and pay. It would be rare to find any person in the world, let alone a 
soldier on campaign, who did not have some gripe with their lot in life. Even the most 
veteran soldiers of Napoleon Bonaparte’s famed Imperial Guard, the Old Guard, earned 
the nickname ‘the Grumblers’ from the Emperor himself for their incessant complaining. 
Yet even with this sobriquet, the Old Guard were still unwaveringly loyal to their 
Emperor, and forged a fearsome reputation on the battlefields of the Napoleonic Wars. 
The author lacks the knowledge to make an assumption on the psychological rationale 
for a soldier’s complaining, other than that it was a possible method of releasing stress. 
What is clear is that the complaints of the Indian soldiers never adversely effected the 
willingness of the majority of the troops to follow their orders. This suggests that whilst 
many of the soldiers had joined the army for employment and financial gain, they either 
possessed, or through their military service formed, a belief in the war effort. This 
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 WO 204/10382. Report No. 77 for period 16-30 September 1945, D-4. 
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dissertation has shown that many saw India’s participation in the Second World War in 
her own interest, believing that India’s contribution to the war would be rewarded by 
political reforms, which could have led to independence. 
Campaigning in Italy offered a unique experience for the Indian soldiers who were 
deployed there during the Second World War. The Indian troops began to compare their 
own political, economic and social circumstances in India, with those they found in Italy. 
However, it must be noted that the relatively small numbers of men who had fought in 
Italy, meant that their opinions and experiences were in the minority amongst their 
comrades in the army, and the wider Indian population. The Indian troops stationed in 
CMF numbered 96,100 by 8 May 1945.53 This was approximately 4.7% of the total 
strength of the Indian Army in 194554, and approximately 0.025% of the Indian 
population during the Second World War.55 Whilst there may have been a sizeable 
majority amongst the Indian Army who believed in a united India, free from caste and 
religious prejudice, this was evidently not the case in the wider Indian population. The 
partition of India led to the country erupting into widespread communal violence, and 
the splitting of the army between India and Pakistan.  
                                                          
53
 WO 204/1667. Message to Chief of Staff from Major General A.D. Ward, Assistant Chief of Staff (British), 
titled ‘Return of Indian units to India’, 24 September 1945, Tab D – Movement of Indian personnel from 
CMF to India. 
54
 The Indian Army by 1945 was 2,049,086 men strong, see C. Kempton, 'Loyalty & Honour': The Indian 
Army September 1939 - August 1947: Part III (Milton Keynes, 2003), p. 104. 
55
 The Indian population was 390 million, see S. N. Prasad, Expansion of the Armed Forces and Defence 
Organisation, 1939-45 (New Delhi, 2012), p. 78. 
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CONCLUSION 
The task that had confronted the soldiers of the Indian Army in Italy was not an 
easy one. Apart from having to fight a campaign in difficult terrain, harsh climate and 
against a dangerous foe they also had to find a method of sustaining this fight in what 
became the longest Allied campaign in Europe. This had to be achieved in spite of 
historical failings and a lack of pre-war planning and preparation for such a task. Its 
success is a testament to the organisational and operational capability of the Indian Army 
in the Second World War.  
It is important to recognise that the 10th Indian Division found itself in a fortunate 
position upon its entry into the Italian campaign. The nature of the Allied campaign in 
Italy meant that it was not immediately thrown into the fray, and was instead given time 
to train before being committed to battle. It also benefited by being able to access the 
hard earned knowledge that the Indian and British Armies had learnt during five years of 
war, and then apply these lessons on the battlefield. Whilst it cannot be claimed to have 
been a visionary in the development of training and tactics, this does not mean its 
achievements are any less deserving of praise. The 10th Indian Division used the time that 
had been granted to it to become proficient at multiple forms of warfare during the 
Second World War, displaying a professionalism that served it well during its campaign in 
Italy. The division achieved this through ensuring that its training was tailored to the 
operations it was likely to conduct, most notably the training it received in mountain 
warfare in preparation for its role in the advance through the Apennines. 
Arguably the greatest achievement of the Indian Army in the Italian campaign was 
in the successful reinforcement of the units it deployed, not just the 10th Indian Division. 
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Despite the admittance of non-martial classes into the Indian Army, the continued 
organisation of the combat units by caste caused difficulties in recruitment unimaginable 
to the British Army. However, the presence of 96,100 Indian troops in CMF by VE Day is 
ample evidence that the Indian Army had found a way to overcome these difficulties.1 
Such a large number of troops and units would not have been deployed without 
sufficient means to maintain them. In February 1944 it was commented, regarding the 
future employment of Indian Army units in Italy, that “8 Ind Div [sic] has been engaged 
for some months [in Italy]. It is now, however, on a relatively quiet front. It's [sic] morale 
is magnificent, and I think that it will be able to absorb the large number of 
reinforcements that are at last in sight without losing much of its fighting efficiency.”2  
The inability to grant adequate leave to units of the Indian Army in Italy reduced 
the burden on the Indian Army to provide troops to the theatre. The most effective way 
of giving troops leave would have been to redeploy them to India and the Burma front, 
where they could be given leave before commencing operations, as had been attempted 
with the battalions in PAIFORCE and those which had suffered heavy casualties. However, 
the decision making process for such issues was too long. It would not have been 
practical, given shipping restrictions, to swap battalions between India and Italy. Also, 
given the specialist training that was needed in both theatres, it would have been 
unlikely that theatre commands would willingly give up such units, for the promise of a 
battalion from overseas which would require training before operations. Yet, to the 
                                                          
1
 WO 204/1667 - 10 Indian Division: repatriation, 01 September 1945 - 30 November 1945. Movement of 
INDIAN personnel from CMF to INDIA. 
2
 WO 201/2598 - Indian Units: Training of and miscellaneous questions on, 01 September 1942 - 31 May 
1944. Minute 10 by Brigadier L.W. Mckay Forbes BGS (IA), 21 February 1944, p. 1. 
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credit of the Indian Army it had made attempts to alleviate the burden on long serving 
units, as shown by its attempted exchange of battalions between Italy and PAIFORCE.  
However, the role of the 10th Indian Division in the Italian campaign also meant its 
reinforcement was a simpler process than for its two sister divisions. Let us first turn our 
attention to the battle casualties that the Indian Army suffered during its deployment to 
Italy in the Second World War, as shown in Table 3. 
The harsh reality is that the purpose of the division's presence in Italy was to gain the 
objectives set it, and this would require the loss of human life. The 10th Indian Division 
suffered the fewest battle casualties of the three Indian divisions in Italy, and as such 
would have had to draw upon fewer reinforcements. In relation to 8th Indian Division this 
was because of its shorter time in the Italian campaign. Whilst it eventually fought in Italy 
longer than 4th Indian Division, it did not experience a battle on the scale of Cassino, 
which explains 4th Indian Division's higher casualties. It is worth bearing in mind that in 
the period from 1 April to 25 August 1944 the 10th Indian Division lost forty officers and 
                                                          
3
 Only shows casualties suffered in Italy, not those in Greece following division's move there in October 
1944.  
Table 1: Battle Casualties in Italy, 3 September 1943 – 2 May 1945 
 Killed Wounded Missing Total 
Indian Unit Officers  OR Officers  OR Officers  OR Officers  OR 
4th Division3 39 501 117 1,649 13 251 169 2,401 
8th Division 48 746 144 2,239 15 294 207 3,279 
10th Division  24 247 69 935 4 105 97 1,287 
Total 473 6,967 
Source:  Compiled from the data in tables 1, 2, 3 and 4 in Appendix 19. See for a 
more detailed breakdown of casualties suffered. 
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639 other ranks as battle casualties.4 During 26 August 1944 to 2 May 1945 it sustained 
fifty-seven officer and 648 other ranks as battle casualties.5 In 147 days, or 37.1% of the 
time it spent in Italy, the 10th Indian Division suffered 41.2% of its total officer and 49.7% 
of its total other rank battle casualties in the whole campaign. These of course were not 
the only drain on manpower; sickness and disease also took their toll but it is harder to 
find accurate figures on their impact. Nevertheless, if historians begin to choose their 
studies based on the highest number of battle honours a division has won, the subject 
will be all the poorer for it.  
The purpose of this dissertation has not been to make a case of “exceptionalism” 
for the 10th Indian Division’s campaign in Italy. It has not argued that the division was the 
most advanced, or bravest; nor that it possessed commanders who were ahead of their 
time. Without proper comparison to the efforts of the other Allied forces in Italy, which 
lies outside the scope of this dissertation, it is not possible to draw a conclusion on that 
here. Rather, by focusing on the 10th Indian Division it is hoped to shed light on those 
elements of the Indian Army of the Second World War that have been overlooked by 
most historical studies, such as the role of Indian troops in Greece, Italy, the Middle East, 
Persia and Africa post-1943. The campaign of the 10th Indian Division in Italy is further 
proof of the transformation of the Indian Army from a colonial police force to a modern 
twentieth century army. It proved capable of training and maintaining an expeditionary 
force far from its home base. Yet, perhaps the lasting legacy of the division’s time in Italy 
was the impact it had on those troops who had fought beneath its banner. For the Raj, 
and its Indian Army, came to an end within two years of the troops returning home, to be 
                                                          
4 
See Tables 1.1 and 1.2 in Appendix 19. 
5
 See Tables 1.3 and 1.4 in Appendix 19. 
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replaced by the independent states of India and Pakistan. Whilst the Indian soldiers' 
experiences from their military service would remain with them for the rest of their lives.   
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APPENDIX 1: BRITISH ARMY CASUALTIES IN ITALY, 1943-45 
 
Table 1: British Army casualties per 1,000 ration strength per annum in Italy 1943-5 
 1943 1944 1945 
Battle Casualties 64 90 10 
Non-Battle 
Casualties 
65 44 53 
Sickness 575 513 441 
Source: J. Ellis, The Sharp End (London, 1980 [2011]), p. 181. 
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APPENDIX 2: VICEROY'S COMMISSIONED OFFICERS 
Table 1: VCOs in the IA 
Cavalry Infantry Badge of 
Rank   
Responsibilities 
Rissaldar-
major 
Subedar-
major 
A Crown One per battalion, enjoyed 
enormous prestige, respected by all 
British officers, village patriarch for 
sepoys, adviser on Indian life to 
British CO 
Rissaldars Subedars Two Stars Commanded troops/companies of 
troops 
Jemadars Jemadars One Star Assistant squadron leaders or 
platoon leaders 
Source: B. Farwell, Armies of the Raj: From the Great Indian Mutiny to Independence 
1858-1947 (London, 1990), p. 28. 
  
  
146 
 
APPENDIX 3: AREAS OF RECRUITMENT FOR THE INDIAN ARMY, 1862-1914 
 
  
Table 1: Regional Origin of Indian Infantry Battalions, 1862-1914 
 Year 
Region 1862 1885 1892 1914 
Nepal (Gurkhas) 5 13 15 20 
Hindustan east of the Yamuna (including UP and 
Bihar) 
28 20 15 15 
Punjab and NWFP 28 31 34 57 
Bombay (including Rajputana and Central India) 30 26 26 18 
Madras 40 32 25 11 
Total 131 122 115 121 
Source: D. Omissi, The Sepoy and the Raj (London, 1994), p. 11. 
  
147 
 
APPENDIX 4: INDIAN AND BRITISH TROOP NUMBERS IN INDIA 
Table 1: Ratio of British to Indian soldiers deployed in India, 1863-1939 
Year Indians British 
1863 205,000 65,000 
1887 153,000 73,000 
1903 142,000 77,000 
1923 139,000 66,000 
1939 177,000 43,000 
Source: B. Farwell, Armies of the Raj: From the Great Indian Mutiny to 
Independence 1858-1947 (London, 1990), p. 51. 
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APPENDIX 5: ISF UNITS IN 1938 
 
 
  
Table 1: ISF units by service arm in 1938 
 Regiments Squadrons Troops 
Cavalry 11 16 18 ½ 
 Horse Battery Mountain Battery Camel Battery 
Artillery 2 3 1 
 Company Sections  
Sappers & Miners 1 8  
 Battalions Companies Platoons 
Infantry 29 70 14 ½ 
 Troops   
Transport 72   
Source: A. M. Mills, 'Indian States Forces', Journal of the United Service Institution of 
India, 68 (1938), p. 304. 
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APPENDIX 6: ORGANISATION OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE ISF 
Table 1: Military Adviser's Circles for ISF units in India 
Circle States supervised Number of ISF 
units supervised 
Military 
Advisers 
assigned 
Location of 
Headquarters 
Punjab Circle Chamba, Jind, 
Kapurthala, 
Kashmir, Nabha, 
Patiala, Rampur 
33 Total: 3 
1 in charge and 
2 assistants – 1 
infantry, 1 
cavalry 
Ambala 
Central India 
Circle 
Benares, Bhopal, 
Datia, Dhar, 
Gwalior, Indore, 
Panna, Rewa, 
Tripura 
25 Total: 2 
1 in charge and 
1 assistant – 1 
of whom is to 
be a 
cavalryman 
Gwalior 
(nominally at 
Agra for income 
tax purposes) 
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Rajputana 
Circle 
Alwar, Bharatpur, 
Dholpur, Jaipur, 
Jodhpur, Kotah, 
Mewar, Palanpur 
23 Total: 2 
1 in Bharatpur 
and 1 assistant 
(cavalryman) at 
Jaipur 
Bharatpur 
Southern 
India Circle 
Hyderabad. 
Mudhol, Mysore, 
Travancore 
19 Total: 2 
1 at Hyderabad 
and assistant at 
Bangalore 
Hyderabad 
Kathiawar 
Circle 
Bhavnagar, 
Ohrangadra, 
Junagadh, Kutch, 
Nawanagar, 
Porbandar 
12 Total: 1 
Military adviser 
was a 
cavalryman 
Rajkot 
Guarajat 
Circle 
Alirajpur, Baria, 
Baroda, Idar, 
Rajpipla, Ratlam 
9 Total: 1 
An assistant 
military adviser 
Bavoda 
Camel Corps 
Circle 
Bahawalpur, 
Bikaner, Loharu 
9 Total: 1 
An assistant 
military adviser 
Bikaner 
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Sapper Circle Faridkot, 
Malerkotla, 
Mandi, Sirmoor, 
Suket, Tehri-
Garhwal 
16 Total: 1 
An assistant 
military adviser 
Roorkee 
Artillery 
Circle 
Bikaner, Gwalior, 
Hyderabad, 
Kashmir 
6 (Batteries) Total: 1 
A military 
adviser 
Ambala 
Signalling1 All All Total: 1 
An assistant 
military adviser 
 
N/A 
 
Source: A. M. Mills, 'Indian States Forces', Journal of the United Service Institution of 
India, 68 (1938), pp. 305-6. 
 
  
                                                          
1
 There was never a designated Signalling Circle as it was responsible for all ISF units in India but a military 
adviser was attached for training in signalling. It is included here as the Sapper Circle whilst never 
designated regionally as its responsibilities were across the entirety of India, is. 
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APPENDIX 7: TRAINING ESTABLISHMENTS IN INDIA COMMAND 
Table 1: Allocation of troops in training establishments in India Command 
Training 
Formations and 
Establishments 
British Army Units Indian and African Army Units 
Combat Administrative Combat Administrative 
14 Indian 
Division 
2,413 - 18,509 4,835 
39 Indian 
Division 
112 - 17,790 3,622 
52 Infantry 
Brigade 
4,372 - 89 1,142 
Eastern 
Command 
- - 810 2,890 
Southern Army - - 47,782 67,343 
North West 
Army 
- - 41,804 26,257 
Central 
Command 
- - 197,250 86,131 
TOTAL 6,897 - 324,034 192,220 
Source: CAB 44/209, Book II: situation and events in India command 1941-1943, 
by Brigadier M. Henry, p. 29, Analysis of Manpower in India Command, SEAC and 
Overseas (as affecting British and African Troops in India and Indian troops in all 
theatres) as at 1 April 1944. 
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APPENDIX 8: UNIT ALLOCATION TO INDIAN REINFORCEMENT CAMPS 
 
  
Table 1: Allocation of Reinforcements to Indian Reinforcement Camps in Italy from 23 
January 1945. 
8th IRC 11th IRC 16th IRC 
Central India Horse Skinner’s Horse 6th D.C.O. Lancers 
6th Rajput Rifles 3/1st Punjab Regiment Indian Artillery 
3/10th Baluch Regiment 1/2nd Punjab Regiment 1/5th Mahratta Light 
Infantry 
2/11th Royal Sikhs 3/5th Mahratta Light 
Infantry 
5th Royal Mahrattas 
3/12th FF Regiment 4/10th Baluch Regiment 1/12th FF Regiment 
1/2nd Gurkha Rifles 4/11th Sikh Regiment 4/13th FF Rifles 
2/7th Gurkha Rifles 3/18th Royal Garhwal Rifles 6/13th FF Rifles 
1/9th Gurkha Rifles 2/3rd Gurkha Rifles 3/15th Punjab Regiment 
Indian Engineers 2/4th Gurkha Rifles 1/5th Royal Gurkha Rifles 
I.P.O. 2/6th Gurkha Rifles Jaipur Infantry 
I.A.M.C 2/8th Gurkha Rifles R.I.A.S.C. 
IAOC/IEME 2/10th Gurkha Rifles  
I.S.C. Nabha Akal Infantry  
I.G.S.C.   
Jaipur Guards   
Jodhpur Sardar Infantry   
C.M.P. (Ind)   
Source:  WO 169/22859 Reinforcement Camps: 8 Rft Camp 01 January – 31 December 
1945. Letter from 8 Indian Reinforcement Camp Adjutant to 8 Indian Reinforcement 
Camp personnel on allocation of reinforcements dated 30 January 1945. 
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Table 2: Allocation of reinforcements to sections in 8th IRC 
Section 8th IRC Units 11th IRC Units (waiting for transfer) 
1 2/11th Sikhs 
Indian Signal Corps 
4/11th Sikhs 
2 Jaipur Guards 
Jodhpur Sardar Infantry 
IAOC/IEME 
Indian Engineers 
CMP (I) 
Nabha Akal  
3 IPC 
IGSC 
IAMC 
Miscellaneous 
 
4 2/7th Gurkha Rifles 2/6th Gurkha Rifles 
2/8th Gurkha Rifles 
2/10th Gurkha Rifles 
5 1/9th Gurkha Rifles 3/18th Royal Garhwal Rifles 
6 1/2nd Gurkha Rifles 2/3rd Gurkha Rifles 
2/4th Gurkha Rifles 
7 6th Royal Rajput  
Central India Horse 
3/5th Mahratta Light Infantry 
Skinner’s Horse 
8 2/10th Baluch Regiment 
3/12th FF Regiment 
4/10th Baluch Regiment 
1/2nd Punjab Regiment 
3/1st Punjab Regiment 
9 Personnel from 5 Indian Military 
Prison 
 
Source: WO 169/22859 Reinforcement Camps: 8 Rft Camp 01 January – 31 December 
1945. Appendix A to letter from 8 Indian Reinforcement Camp Adjutant to 8 Indian 
Reinforcement Camp personnel on allocation of reinforcements to sections dated 30 
January 1945. 
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APPENDIX 9: DEPLOYMENT OF THE 10TH INDIAN DIVISION'S INFANTRY 
BATTALIONS PRIOR TO THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN  
Table 1: The operational history of the Indian infantry battalions of the 10th Indian 
Division prior to the Italian campaign during the Second World War 
Battalion Date 
deployed 
overseas 
Service prior to joining 10th Indian Division 
4/10th Baluch 01/11/39 Served with 10th Indian Infantry Brigade in East Africa 
where the brigade suffered heavily in North Africa in 
1942. 4/10th were in reserve in June/July 1942 due to 
casualties. Moved to 10th Indian Division in September 
1942.  
Source: C. Kempton, 'Loyalty & Honour' The Indian Army, September 
1939 – August 1947. Part II (Milton Keynes, 2003), pp. 20-21. 
3/5th 
Mahratta 
Light Infantry 
01/06/40 Served with 9th Indian Infantry Brigade in Sudan, Eritrea 
and North Africa until June 1942 when it joined 25th 
Indian Infantry Brigade later transferring to 20th Indian 
Infantry Brigade in June 1943. 
Source: C. Kempton, 'Loyalty & Honour' The Indian Army, September 
1939 – August 1947. Part III (Milton Keynes, 2003), p. 25. 
1/2nd Punjab 01/05/40 Served in Aden, British Somaliland and garrison duty in 
Egypt. Served with 161st Indian Infantry Brigade at First 
Battle of El Alamein which suffered heavy casualties at 
Ruweisat Ridge. Conducted garrison duties in Middle 
East before joining division in January 1944. 
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Source: C. Kempton, 'Loyalty & Honour' The Indian Army, September 
1939 – August 1947. Part III (Milton Keynes, 2003), p. 21. 
3/1st Punjab 01/09/39 Served with 5th Brigade at Sidi Barrani, Syria and North 
Africa in 1942 with 5th and 38th Brigades. Moved to 
Cyprus in April 1942 before joining 10th Division in 
November 1944. 
Source: C. Kempton, 'Loyalty & Honour' The Indian Army, September 
1939 – August 1947. Part III (Milton Keynes, 2003), p. 19. 
4/11th Sikh 01/09/40 Served in East and North Africa until July 1942 suffering 
heavy casualties. It began reforming at Cairo and Haifa 
until May 1943 when it became demonstration battalion 
at Mountain Warfare Training School until February 
1944. Moved to Italy in July 1944. 
Source: C. Kempton, 'Loyalty & Honour' The Indian Army, September 
1939 – August 1947. Part III (Milton Keynes, 2003), p. 39. 
3/18th Royal 
Garhwal 
Rifles 
01/10/39 Served with 9th, 10th and 20th Brigades in Eritrea and 
North Africa until July 1942 when it re-joined 10th 
Brigade which was in the process of reforming. Joined 
division in May 1943 as part of 25th Brigade. 
 Sources: C. Kempton, 'Loyalty & Honour' The Indian Army, September 
1939 – August 1947. Part II (Milton Keynes, 2003), p. 20 and C. 
Kempton, 'Loyalty & Honour' The Indian Army, September 1939 – 
August 1947. Part III (Milton Keynes, 2003), p. 52. 
2/4th Gurkha 
Rifles 
01/10/40 Served on the North West Frontier until October 1940 
when it served with 21st Brigade in Syria. Fought in North 
Africa in 1942 before moving to 10th Brigade in May 
1942, with whom it remained with until departing for 
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Italy. 
Source: C. Kempton, 'Loyalty & Honour' The Indian Army, September 
1939 – August 1947. Part III (Milton Keynes, 2003), p. 61. 
2/3rd Gurkha 
Rifles 
01/10/40 Served on the North-West Frontier until October 1940 
when as part of 18th Brigade it fought at the first El 
Alamein. The brigade was destroyed in the fighting there 
and never reformed. The 2/3rd joined 10th Brigade whilst 
it was reforming in August 1942 and moved to 20th 
Brigade in January 1943. 
Sources: C. Kempton, 'Loyalty & Honour' The Indian Army, September 
1939 – August 1947. Part II (Milton Keynes, 2003), p. 27 and C. 
Kempton, 'Loyalty & Honour' The Indian Army, September 1939 – 
August 1947. Part III (Milton Keynes, 2003), p. 61. 
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APPENDIX 10: PROPOSED RELIEF OF INFANTRY BATTALIONS IN CMF BY 
THOSE IN PAIFORCE 
Table 1: Battalions in PAIFORCE and their sister battalions who served in CMF 
Battalions in PAIFORCE Sister battalions in CMF and the division they are serving in 
4th Indian Division 8th Indian Division 10th Indian Division 
4/8th Punjab  3/8th Punjab, 3/15th 
Punjab 
1/2nd Punjab, 3/1st 
Punjab 
1/10th Baluch 3/10th Baluch  4/10th Baluch 
3/11th Sikh 2/11th Sikhs  4/11th Sikhs 
5/12th FF Regiment 3/12th FF Regiment 1/12th FF Regiment  
5/13th FF Rifles  6/13th FF Rifles  
Source: WO 204/7394 Indian Battalions: Employment and Movements. Letter of 1 
January 1945 from Lieutenant General John Harding, AFHQ Chief of Staff on the 
Relief of Indian Battalions in PAIFORCE and Appendix B showing sister battalions of 
PAIFORCE battalions serving in CMF as of 1 January 1945. 
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APPENDIX 11: OVERSEAS SERVICE OF INDIAN ARMY TROOPS BY 1 
SEPTEMBER 1945 
  
Table 1: Overseas service of Indian Army personnel in units deployed to Italy by 1 
September 1945 
 Period of Overseas service (years)  
Formation 3 – 3½ 3½ – 4 4 plus Total 
4th Indian Division 1650 1273 592 3515 
10th Indian Division 1664 756 943 3363 
Non-Division 
troops 
2962 5396 4259 12617 
 6276 7425 5794 19495 
Source: WO 204/1667 10 Indian Division: repatriation. 01 September 1945 - 30 
November 1945. Movement of INDIAN personnel from CMF to INDIA. 
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APPENDIX 12: TIME TAKEN FOR INDIAN TROOPS IN ITALY TO TAKE LEAVE 
TO INDIA 
Table 1: Time taken for 10 Indian Division troops on leave to return to Italy 
Unit Number of 
Troops 
Date Departed Scheduled 
Return 
Actual Return 
1st Horse 75 01/12/44 01/04/45 01/09/45 
20th Indian 
Infantry Brigade 
1 (Orderly)  22/06/44 N/A 12/03/45 
3/5th M.L.I. 35 29/01/45 N/A Not returned 
Source:  WO 204/1667 10 Indian Division: repatriation. 01 September 1945 - 30 
November 1945. Movement – Indian troops by Major General Denys Reid, 9 
September 1945, Appendices p. 7. 
Table 2: Time taken for RIASC troops on leave to depart and return to Italy 
Unit Number of 
Troops 
Date left unit Date left 
Taranto 
Date returned 
HQ RIASC 3 21/02/45 22/04/45 Not returned 
20th IBT 3 02/02/45 22/04/45 Not Returned 
25th IBT 8 15/06/44 N/A 08/02/45 
25th IBT 4 31/08/44 N/A 25/03/45 
Source:  WO 204/1667 10 Indian Division: repatriation. 01 September 1945 - 30 
November 1945. Movement – Indian troops by Major General Denys Reid, 9 
September 1945, Appendices p. 9. 
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APPENDIX 13: CONVERSION OF BRITISH AA PERSONNEL TO INFANTRY 
Table 1: Allocation of manpower to each service arm in CMF from June – September 
1944 
Service 
Arm 
June July August September Total 
Offrs ORs Offrs ORs Offrs ORs Offrs ORs Offrs ORs 
RAC 74 1,310 4 280 - - 32 230 110 1,820 
RAC 
(Recce) 
- - - - - - - 145 - 145 
RA (Fd) 3 174 99 1,024 - 102 60 1,850 162 3,150 
RA 
(A/tk) 
29 491 - 167 - - - 450 29 1,108 
RA 
(LAA) 
2 14 - - - - - - 2 14 
RE (Fd) - 125 - 539 - 412 - 280 - 1,356 
Infantry - 1,179 126 2,826 50 1,400 140 3,555 316 8,960 
Totals 108 3,293 229 4,836 50 1,914 232 6,510 619 16,553 
Source:  CAB 106/451 Operations of British, Indian and Dominion Forces in Italy 3 
September 1943 to 2 May 1945. Part V Administrative Monographs, 4. O2E Papers, 
p. 16. 
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Table 2: Estimated manpower position of each service arm in CMF by 30 
September 1944 
Service 
Arm 
 Position as 
of 3 June 
1944 
Estimated 
Position as of 
30 June 1944 
Estimated 
Position as of 
31 July 1944 
Estimated Position 
as of 31 August 
1944 
RAC Offrs +70  +77 +8 -54 
ORs  -282 +580 +477 +155 
RAC 
(recce) 
Offrs -27 -35 -42 -48 
ORs  -184 -224 -229 -289 
RA (Fd) Offrs -20 -78 -8 -52 
ORs  -2,754 -2,965 -2,177 -2,387 
RA 
(A/tk) 
Offrs +1 +21 +13 +6 
ORs  -1,198 -728 -542 -608 
RA 
(LAA) 
Offrs +19 +16 +7 -1 
ORs  +122 +141 +226 +172 
RE (Fd) Offrs -14 -26 -40 -51 
ORs  -1,284 -1,279 -690 -380 
R Sigs Offrs -27 -26 +1 -2 
ORs  -805 -900 -804 -875 
Ft Gds Offrs +42 +19 +2 -18 
ORs  +760 +388 +251 -3 
Infantry Offrs +111 -34 -70 -148 
ORs  +1,452 -1,213 -1,595 -2,768 
Source:  CAB 106/451 Operations of British, Indian and Dominion Forces in Italy 3 
September 1943 to 2 May 1945. Part V Administrative Monographs, 4. O2E Papers, 
p. 17. 
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Table 3: Disposal of personnel from disbanded AA units as of 24 March 1945 
Service Arm Heavy AA  Light AA 
RAC 429 834 
RA (Fd & A/tk) 1,494 2,422 
RA (Grn) 1,219 2,125 
RE (Fd) 392 740 
RE (L of C) 377 549 
R Sigs 404 616 
Infantry 4,541 8,736 
RASC 1,357 1,412 
RAOC 17 18 
REME 91 450 
Total 10,321 17,902 
Source: CAB 106/451 Operations of British, Indian and Dominion Forces in Italy 3 
September 1943 to 2 May 1945. Part V Administrative Monographs, 4. O2E 
Papers, p. 26. 
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APPENDIX 14: THE FOURTH INDIAN ARMY MANPOWER REVIEW 
Table 1: Manpower Deficiencies in the Indian Army as predicted by the Fourth 
Indian Army Manpower Review  
Service Arm Manpower Deficiency 
Combatant Officers 5,238 
Medical Officers 2,670 
Clerical personnel 15,850 
Matriculation personnel 5,100 
Non-Technical Classes  
Pathans 1,060 
Punjabi Muslims 4,650 
Jat Sikhs 2,370 
Jats 4,750 
Gujars 950 
Mahrattas 1,830 
Ahirs 770 
Source: WO 204/7464A Indian Army liaison Mission, IALM Liaison letter No. 1, 
15 July 1944, p. 1. 
 
  
  
165 
 
APPENDIX 15: DIVISIONS AND BRIGADES RAISED BY THE INDIAN ARMY 
DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR  
Table 1: Units raised each year by the Indian Army 
 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 
Armoured Divisions  1 1 1 1   
Infantry Divisions 1 5 6 6  11 12 
Armoured Brigades  2 2 1    
Tank Brigades   1     
Motor Brigades  1 1     
Infantry Brigades 1 13 263 16 2 2  
Source: C. Kempton, 'Loyalty & Honour' The Indian Army, September 1939 – August 
1947. Part III (Milton Keynes, 2003), p. 105. 
 
 
                                                          
1
 The 44th Indian Airborne Division. 
2 
The BRINDIV division, the Commonwealth occupation force in Japan. 
3
 Includes one parachute brigade. 
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APPENDIX 16: STRENGTHS OF THE BRITISH AND INDIAN INFANTRY 
BATTALIONS OF THE 10TH INDIAN DIVISION DURING 1944 
The figures presented were obtained from strength returns and daily returns for the 
dates indicated from the sources cited. 
Table 1:  Strength returns of selected infantry battalions of the 10th Indian Division in 
1944 
Date 
1944 
1st DLI 1st K.O. 
3/1st 
Pun 
1/2nd 
Pun 
4/11th 
Sikh 
Nabha 
Akal 
3/18th 
Garhwal 
2/3rd 
Gurkhas 
01/01 544 
 
792 814 793 965 874 877 
15/01 619 
 
790 875 806 957 874 871 
29/01 644 
 
779 872 842 957 874 874 
05/02 637 757 836 804 841 957 862 865 
19/02 740 773 842 779 857 923 862 863 
04/03 741 755 841 765 866 908 895 865 
18/03 752 840 818 778 851 904 895 844 
01/04 737 782 838 830 895 902 926 821 
15/04 822 813 800 821 869 782 920 878 
29/04 
 
802 800 822 785 782 854 853 
13/05 780 789 780 782 789 761 832 798 
27/05 765 785 800 823 827 761 849 817 
10/06 744 794 850 831 828 872 843 874 
24/06 733 788 850 886 829 871 883 875 
  
167 
 
08/07 763 733 800 895 821 882 861 847 
22/07 692 695 850 904 821 882 780 834 
05/08 638 684 809 902 811 877 782 852 
19/08 642 677 900 896 792 877 863 809 
02/09 653 687 970 889 843 911 909 803 
16/09 744 748 920 844 714 907 903 897 
30/09 735 713 910 861 724 881 863 906 
14/10 705 678 855 
 
742 802 807 829 
28/10 694 707 855 
 
768 783 824 860 
11/11 718 730 840 
 
768 742 900 898 
25/11 692 718 840 
 
741 719 882 900 
09/12 665 694 800 870 732 692 940 904 
23/12 637 627 740 833 765 696 827 924 
Sources: 1 DLI: WO 169/16281 1 DLI, January – March 1944 and WO 170/1384 1 DLI, 1944. 
 1 K.O.: WO 169/16293 1 King’s Own, February 1944 and WO 170/1417 1 King’s 
Own, 1944. 
 3/1 Pun: WO 169/18960 3/1 Punjab, 1944. 
 1/2 Pun: WO 169/18961 1/2 Punjab, 1944. 
 4/11 Sikh: WO 169/18983 4/11 Sikh, 1944. 
 Nabha Akal: WO 169/19058 Nabha Akal, 1944. 
 3/18 Royal Garhwal Rifles: WO 169/18995 3/18 Royal Garhwal Rifles, 1944. 
 2/3 Gurkha Rifles: WO 169/19000 2/3 Gurkha Rifles, 1944. 
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Table 2: Strength returns of the 
Jodhpur Sardar in 1944 
 Table 3: Strength returns of the 
4/10th Baluch in 1944 
Date  Jodhpur Sardar  Date  4/10 Baluch 
01/01 1,092 02/01 890 
15/01 1,005 16/01 885 
06/02 1,039 06/02 887 
19/02 1,029 20/02 893 
04/03 1,040 05/03 879 
12/03 1,060 19/03 869 
01/04 1,051 02/04 871 
15/04 1,054 16/04 840 
29/04 1,011 07/05 813 
06/05 1,007 21/05 888 
20/05 1,004 04/06 849 
03/06 1,005 18/06 867 
17/06 957 01/07 834 
01/07 980 15/07 705 
15/07 968 29/07 762 
29/07 960 12/08 838 
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05/08 955 26/08 913 
19/08 989 09/09 886 
02/09 972 23/09 895 
16/09 935 07/10 885 
30/09 939 21/10 801 
14/10 949 04/11 818 
28/10 964 18/11 896 
04/11 965 02/12 915 
18/11 966 16/12 851 
02/12 939 30/12 797 
16/12 953 Source: WO 169/18979 4/10 Baluch, 
1944. 
30/12 947 
Source: WO 169/19048 Jodhpur Sardar, 
1944. 
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Table 4: Strength returns of the 3/5th 
M.L.I. in 1944 
 Table 5: Strength returns of the 8th 
Manchesters in 1944 
Date  3/5 M.L.I. Date  8 Manchesters 
30/09 834 29/01 816 
14/10 834 27/02 798 
28/10 770 29/04 858 
04/11 932 27/05 826 
02/12 801 10/06 796 
16/12 862 24/06 753 
30/12 855 01/07 709 
Source: WO 169/18964, 3/5 
Mahratta Light Infantry, 1944. 
15/07 724 
29/07 747 
05/08 776 
19/08 713 
02/09 738 
16/09 787 
30/09 751 
 Source: WO 169/16303, 8 
Manchester, January – February 1944 
and WO 170/1437, 8 Manchesters, 
1944. 
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APPENIDX 17: STRENGTHS OF THE BRITISH AND INDIAN INFANTRY 
BATTALIONS OF THE 10TH INDIAN DIVISION DURING 1945 
The figures presented were obtained from strength returns and daily returns for the 
dates indicated from the sources cited. 
Table 1:  Strength returns of selected infantry battalions of the 10th Indian Division 
in 1945 
Date 
1945 
1 
DLI 1 K.O. 
3/1 
Pun 
1/2 
Pun 
4/11 
Sikh 
Nabha 
Akal 
3/18 
Garhwal 
2/3 
Gurkhas 
06/01 618 699 743 831 814 670 846 936 
20/01 681 694 800 805 744 664 797 897 
03/02 690 695 767 817 717 729 803 883 
17/02 677 682 780 762 743 725 780 868 
03/03 668 698 721 744 740 710 795 887 
17/03 738 733 800 768 765 711 873 910 
31/03 770 773 800 797 784 710 885 907 
14/04 796 800 860 890 729 
 
983 924 
28/04 783 784 870 809 749 
 
1002 916 
12/05 785 791 937 825 779 
 
925 903 
26/05 797 795 910 835 778 
 
909 879 
09/06 809 808 900 852 756 882 916 881 
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23/06 784 793 900 878 766 894 925 919 
07/07 
 
794 900 874 753 878 917 954 
21/07 
 
892 900 831 740 813 815 893 
04/08 
 
879 910 842 784 863 842 895 
18/08 
 
577 910 821 780 863 862 879 
01/09 
 
631 910 776 804 
 
880 884 
15/09 
 
630 910 862 824 874 904 858 
29/09 
 
736 910 874 867 861 947 859 
13/10 
 
746 910 858 870 
 
943 885 
27/10 
 
837 910 850 926 
 
940 664 
10/11 
 
843 920 854 911 
  
664 
24/11 
 
822 1,010 885 944 
  
952 
Sources 1 DLI:  WO 170/4998 1 DLI, 1945. 
 1 K.O.: WO 170/5029 1 King’s Own, 1945. 
 3/1 Pun: WO 169/22363 3/1 Punjab, 1945. 
 1/2 Pun: WO 169/22364 1/2 Punjab, 1945. 
 4/11 Sikh: WO 169/22385 4/11 Sikh, 1945. 
 Nabha Akal: WO 169/22453 Nabha Akal, 1945. 
 
3/18 Royal Garhwal Rifles: WO 169/22398 3/18 Royal Garhwal Rifles, 
1945. 
 2/3 Gurkha Rifles: WO 169/22401 2/3 Gurkha Rifles, 1945. 
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Table 2: Strength returns of the Jodhpur 
Sardar in 1945 
 Table 3: Strength returns of the 4/10 
Baluch in 1945 
Date  Jodhpur Sardar  Date  4/10 Baluch 
06/01 932 13/01 784 
20/01 938 27/01 796 
03/02 926 10/02 788 
17/02 943 24/02 761 
03/03 956 10/03 842 
17/03 954 24/03 829 
31/03 955 07/04 806 
14/04 850 21/04 805 
28/04 821 05/05 836 
15/05 944 19/05 913 
19/05 994 02/06 894 
02/06 996 30/06 903 
16/06 1,014 14/07 848 
30/06 1,022 28/07 851 
07/07 1,020 13/08 849 
14/07 1,019 25/08 859 
Source: WO 169/22447 Jodhpur Sardar, 
1945. 
08/09 861 
22/09 890 
06/10 830 
 20/10 822 
10/11 827 
17/11 821 
  Source: WO 169/22380 4/10 Baluch, 
1945. 
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Table 4: Strength returns of the 3/5 M.L.I. in 
1945 
Date  3/5 M.L.I. 
06/01 861 
20/01 855 
03/02 841 
17/02 811 
07/04 870 
21/04 851 
05/05 896 
19/05 911 
02/06 923 
16/06 917 
30/06 914 
14/07 836 
28/07 849 
04/08 860 
18/08 888 
01/09 907 
15/09 946 
29/09 911 
06/10 996 
21/10 988 
Source:  WO 169/22367 3/5 Mahratta Light 
Infantry 
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APPENDIX 18: AVERAGE STRENGTHS OF THE BRITISH AND INDIAN 
INFANTRY BATTALIONS OF THE 10TH INDIAN DIVISION IN 1944 & 1945  
Table 1: Average strength of the battalions of 10th Indian Division in 1944 
Unit Average Strength  
1 DLI 702 
8 Manchester 771 
1 Kings’ Own 740 
3/1 Punjab 834 
1/2 Punjab 843 
4/11 Sikh 805 
Nabha Akal 851 
3/18 Royal Garhwal Rifles 867 
2/3 Gurkha 861 
Jodhpur Sardar 991 
4/10 Baluch 855 
3/5 M.L.I. 842 
Source: Figures are rounded up to a whole number. Averages are obtained from the 
strength returns provided for each battalion in Appendix 16. 
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Table 2: Average strength of the battalions of 10th Indian Division in 1945 
Unit Average Strength  
1 DLI 739 
1 Kings’ Own 756 
3/1 Punjab 871 
1/2 Punjab 831 
4/11 Sikh 795 
Nabha Akal 790 
3/18 Royal Garhwal Rifles 886 
2/3 Gurkha 880 
Jodhpur Sardar 956 
4/10 Baluch 838 
3/5 M.L.I. 892 
Source: Figures are rounded up to a whole number. Averages are obtained from the 
strength returns provided for each battalion in Appendix 17. 
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APPENDIX 19: BATTLE CASUALTES SUFFERED BY THE 4TH, 8TH AND 10TH 
INDIAN DIVISIONS IN THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN OF THE SECOND WORLD 
WAR 
Table 1: Battle Casualties in Italy 3 September 1943 – 11 May 1944 
 Killed Wounded Missing Total 
Indian Unit Officers  OR Officers  OR Officers  OR Officers  OR 
4th Division 22 311 79 1,127 8 146 109 1,584 
8th Division 24 411 72 1,172 9 185 105 1,768 
10th 
Division  
- 2 - 13 - - - 15 
Source: CAB 106/451 Italy: Operations of British, Indian and Dominion forces 1943 
Sept.3-1945 May 2, part IV, 02E papers (i) disbandments and conversion of 
personnel of other arms to infantry; (ii) work of "X" RTD re-allocation centre; (iii) 
statistics, p. 55. 
Table 2: Battle Casualties in Italy 12 May 1944 – 25 August 1944 
 Killed Wounded Missing Total 
Indian Unit Officers  OR Officers  OR Officers  OR Officers  OR 
4th Division 9 111 24 295 4 88 37 494 
8th Division 11 196 44 645 3 45 58 886 
10th 
Division  
10 116 29 466 1 42 40 624 
Source: CAB 106/451 Italy: Operations of British, Indian and Dominion forces 1943 
Sept.3-1945 May 2, part IV, 02E papers (i) disbandments and conversion of 
personnel of other arms to infantry; (ii) work of "X" RTD re-allocation centre; (iii) 
statistics, p. 59. 
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Table 3: Battle Casualties in Italy 26 August 1944 – 8 April 1945 
 Killed Wounded Missing Total 
Indian Unit Officers  OR Officers  OR Officers  OR Officers  OR 
4th 
Division1 
8 79 14 227 1 17 23 323 
8th Division 11 116 18 298 3 64 32 478 
10th 
Division  
13 111 33 407 3 63 49 581 
Source: CAB 106/451 Italy: Operations of British, Indian and Dominion forces 1943 
Sept.3-1945 May 2, part IV, 02E papers (i) disbandments and conversion of 
personnel of other arms to infantry; (ii) work of "X" RTD re-allocation centre; (iii) 
statistics, p. 63. 
Table 4: Battle Casualties in Italy 9 April 1945 – 2 May 1945 
 Killed Wounded Missing Total 
Indian Unit Officers  OR Officers  OR Officers  OR Officers  OR 
8th Division 2 23 10 124 - - 12 147 
10th 
Division  
1 18 7 49 - - 8 67 
Source: CAB 106/451 Italy: Operations of British, Indian and Dominion forces 1943 
Sept.3-1945 May 2, part IV, 02E papers (i) disbandments and conversion of 
personnel of other arms to infantry; (ii) work of "X" RTD re-allocation centre; (iii) 
statistics, p. 67. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 Only shows casualties suffered in Italy, not those following the division's move to Greece in October 1944. 
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APPENDIX 20: ORDER OF BATTLE OF 10TH INDIAN DIVISION IN ITALY, LATE 
MARCH 1944 
G.O.C. Major-General Denys Reid, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C. 
10th Indian Infantry Brigade  
(Brigadier T. N. Smith, O.B.E.) 
1/2 Punjabis 
4/10 Baluch Regiment 
2/4 Gurkha Rifles 
20th Indian Infantry Brigade,  
(Brigadier J. B. McDonald, O.B.E.) 
8th Manchester Regiment 
3/5 Mahratta Light Infantry 
2/3 Gurkha Rifles 
25th Indian Infantry Brigade  
(Brigadier Eustace Arderne, D.S.O.) 
1st King's Own Regiment 
3/1 Punjab Regiment 
3/18 Royal Garhwal Rifles 
Reconnaissance Regiment Skinner’s Horse 
Machine Gun Battalion 1st Royal Northumberland Fusiliers 
Artillery 68th, 97th, and 154th Field Regiments 
R.A. 
13th Anti-Tank Regiment R.A. 
30th Light AA Regiment R.A. 
Engineers 5th, 10th and 61st Field Companies 
Sappers and Miners 
41st Field Park Company 
Medical Services 14th, 21st and 30th Field Ambulances 
14th Field Hygiene Section 
Source: The Tiger Triumphs, Chapter Four (HMSO, 1946) accessed at 
http://www.ourstory.info/library/4-ww2/Tiger/triumphs02.html 
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MAP 1: ITALY 
 Source: http://custermen.com/Maps/MapItalyB.jpg 
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MAP 2: INDIAN BATTLEFIELDS IN ITALY
Source: http://www.ourstory.info/library/4-ww2/Tiger/maps/map1.jpg  
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MAP 3: THE ITALIAN FRONT MAY 1944 
  Source: http://custermen.com/Maps/MapGustav.jpg 
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MAP 4: FROM THE TRASIMENO LINE TO THE RIVER ARNO, 21 JUNE – 5 
AUGUST 1944 
 
 
  
Source: http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-MTO-Cassino/USA-MTO-
Cassino-14.html 
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MAP 5: THE TIBER VALLEY 
 
  
Source: Tehran to Trieste: The Story of the 10th Indian Division, p. 12. Accessed at: 
http://archive.org/stream/TeheranToTrieste-
TheStoryOfThe10thIndianDivision#page/n0/mode/1up 
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MAP 6: THE ITALIAN FRONT ON 25 AUGUST 1944 
 Source: http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-MTO-
Cassino/maps/USA-MTO-Cassino-X.jpg 
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MAP 7: ADRIATIC SECTOR ZONE OF OPERATIONS FOR 10TH INDIAN 
DIVISION 
 
Source: Tehran to Trieste: The Story of the 10th Indian Division, p. 28. Accessed at: 
http://archive.org/stream/TeheranToTrieste-
TheStoryOfThe10thIndianDivision#page/n0/mode/1up 
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MAP 8: THE ALLIED SPRING OFFENSIVE IN ITALY 9 APRIL – 2 MAY 1945 
Source: http://custermen.com/Maps/ArmyMap6.jpg 
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